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Abstract 
 
Whilst modern competition law is no longer in its infancy in the UK, its contours continue to 
evolve and develop as understanding of its challenges and complexities increases.  The 
addition of a criminal cartel offence within the wider anti-cartel enforcement landscape was 
intended to improve the deterrent impact of the regime.  However, the offence itself has 
arguably failed to have a significant impact upon the fight against cartel activity.  Attempting 
to determine the reasons behind the failure of the criminal cartel offence is not new.  It has 
been the subject of much academic debate, and indeed a Government consultation.  This 
work however, aims to add a new perspective through which the question can be 
conceptually analysed.  It does so by examining the place that the criminal cartel offence 
occupies within the anti-cartel enforcement landscape, in order to discover the impact that the 
regulatory dynamics have had on the enforcement and success of the cartel offence.  
Regulatory dynamics in the context of this work are the interactions that occur between the 
various aspects of anti-cartel enforcement.   
 
The introduction of the criminal cartel offence in the UK in 2002 for individuals who engage 
in hard-core cartel activity was at the time, largely atypical across the traditional competition 
law landscape in Europe.  The criminal cartel offence represented a new tool with which the 
Competition and Markets Authority could fight cartels, and brought the individuals 
ultimately responsible for their creation within the scope of the law for the first time.  The 
anti-cartel strategy in the UK is based on deterrence theory, and it was within this tradition 
that the criminal cartel offence was created.  In the 10 years that followed its enactment 
however, there had been only one successful prosecution.  In 2013, the offence was amended 
to make it easier to prosecute, but enforcement of the offence remains muted.  
 
This work analyses the position of the criminal cartel offence within the wider anti-cartel 
enforcement landscape.  A landscape that, at the time of writing, includes European Union 
competition law and policy.  The purpose of this work therefore, is to determine whether 
further changes to the cartel offence in the UK that account for the complex matrix of 
interactions that occur within the anti-cartel regulatory landscape, can improve its impact on 
the fight against cartels, and to extrapolate recommendations from the UK experience for any 
Member States who wish to add criminal sanctions to their enforcement toolkit in the future.  
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
1.1.  Background 
 
Hard-core cartels are anti-competitive agreements between competing undertakings that fix 
prices, restrict output, rig bids, or divide or share markets.6  In colluding in this way they harm 
consumers and the competitive process by, inter alia, chilling innovation, appropriating 
consumer surplus and creating a ‘deadweight loss’ in the economy, which occurs when  
consumers who would have purchased goods at the competitive price, choose not (or are 
unable) to purchase the goods at the artificially inflated price.7  In the European Union (the 
‘EU’) they also pose a threat to the internal market by creating artificial barriers to trade.  They 
are considered to be not only the most ‘egregious violations’8 of competition law but the 
‘supreme evil of antitrust.’9 
 
The threat posed by cartels should not be underestimated as they are thought to cause a ‘multi-
billion dollar drain on the global economy.’10  The International Competition Network (the 
‘ICN’) believes that there is a widely held belief that cartel activity is ‘devoid of pro-
competitive benefits.’11  The fight against hard core collusion therefore, has spread to ‘a 
significant number of jurisdictions’12 around the world.13  
																																																						
6 See OECD, ‘Recommendations of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels,’ 
C(98)35/final, 25 March 1998, 2(a).  Available at: http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2350130.pdf.  Last 
accessed 24th January 2019.   
7 See generally, Barry Rodger and Angus McCulloch, ‘Competition Law and Policy in the EU and UK’ 
(Routledge, 2015).   
8 OECD, ‘Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels’ supra n.6.   
9 Verizon Communications v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko (2004) 540 US 398, at 408.   
10 OECD, ‘Hard Core Cartels Report’ 2000.  Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/2752129.pdf.  Last accessed 20th November 2018. 
11 ICN, ‘Defining Hard Core Cartel Conduct – Effective Institutions, Effective Penalties,’ Report Prepared by 
the ICN Working Group on Cartels, ICN 4th Annual Conference, Bonn, 6-8th June 2005, 14.  Available at: 
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/CWG_BuildingBlocks.pdf.  Last 
Accessed 24th January 2019.   
12 Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Criminal Sanctions for Cartel Conduct: The Leniency Conundrum’ (2017) 13(1) 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 125.  
13 Outside of the USA however, despite there being a growing number of ‘countries having adopted criminal 
cartel sanctions (excluding bid-rigging) the number of individuals who have actually served jail time is 
practically negligible.’  Andreas Stephan, ‘Is the Head of Germany’s Bundeskartellamt Right to Suggest 
Criminal Law Sanctions are Too Severe for Cartels.’  Available at: 
https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2014/11/24/is-the-head-of-germanys-bundeskartellamt-right-to-
suggest-criminal-law-sanctions-are-too-severe-for-cartels/.  Last accessed 12th December 2018.      
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As a Member State (‘MS’) of the EU the fight against cartels and the development of 
competition law in the UK has been influenced and guided by the EU who retain exclusive 
competence over the establishment of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the 
internal market.14 
 
In 2002 the UK Government sought to enhance their enforcement toolkit and so enacted the 
Enterprise Act 2002 (the ‘EA 2002’) which, amongst other things, created a criminal offence 
for the individuals responsible for cartel agreements.15  In doing so it added criminalisation to 
a regulatory landscape that had previously been reliant upon administrative investigations and 
fines targeted at undertakings who engage in hard core collusive conduct.16  Further, it 
implicitly recognised the fact that cartel agreements occur because directors (or other natural 
persons) are acting as agents on behalf of undertakings which are essentially, artificial entities 
incapable of doing anything on their own account.17  The agency issue is supported by the 
OECD which has stated that: 
 
‘As agents of corporations commit violations of competition law, it makes sense to 
prevent them from engaging in unlawful conduct by threatening them directly with 
sanctions and to impose such sanctions if they violate the law.’18  
 
This realisation is reflected in a ‘growing tendency in a wide variety of jurisdictions to hold 
individuals accountable for the creation and implementation of cartels.’19 
 
The UK’s position was that reliance upon the traditional administrative sanctions for 
infringements of Article 101 TFEU and Chapter 1 provisions only, meant that there was a gap 
in the anti-cartel enforcement tool kit.  Not only because the level of fine required to make 
administrative sanctions a true deterrent was unachievable in practice,20 but also because it 
																																																						
14 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Article 3(1)(b).   
15 EA 2002, s 188.  
16 The fines, provided for by the Competition Act 1998 are a domestic reproduction of the EU provisions in 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the ‘TFEU’). 
17 John P. Lowry and Arad B. G. Reisberg, ‘Pettet’s Company Law: Company Law and Corporate Finance’ 4th 
edition (Pearson Education Limited: 2012) p.128.  
18 OECD, ‘Cartels: Sanctions against Individuals,’ OECD Competition Committee, 2003, 2. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/34306028.pdf  Last accessed 24th January 2019.     
19 Peter Whelan, ‘Competition Law and Criminal Justice,’ in The Intersections of Antitrust, Galloway (ed) 
(Oxford University Press, forthcoming).    
20 Wils estimates that to adequately deter cartels, fine would need to be set at 150% of annual turnover, a level at 
which only 18% of convicted companies would have sufficient funds to pay.  See, Wouter P. Wils, ‘Is 
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meant that the individuals responsible for implementing (or causing to be implemented) cartel 
agreements remained outside of the scope of the law and the reach of the relevant authorities, 
the Office of Fair Trading (the ‘OFT’) at the material time and because of the impact that it 
had on deterrence.  It was felt that,  
 
‘[t]he cartel offence helps to deter the most serious and damaging forms of anti-
competitive conduct: hard core cartels.  The possibility that business people will face 
imprisonment if found guilty of the offence should radically alter the incentives to 
engage in cartels.’21 
 
This argument is strengthened by the fact that optimally deterrent fines against undertakings 
are not achievable in practice, without threatening the financial stability and viability of the 
firm.22  In this context therefore, Whelan argues that a cartel fine becomes merely ‘a “tax” on 
(detected) cartel activity’23 rather than an effective deterrent against such activity.    
 
Historically in Europe, criminal law sanctions are not traditionally a competition law tool and 
so the UK’s move to strengthen its enforcement tool kit with the threat of imprisonment was 
largely atypical at the time.24  The UK’s decision to implement a criminal sanction appeared to 
be heavily influenced by ‘the advocacy efforts of the Antitrust Division of the US Department 
of Justice (the ‘DoJ’) who have been consistent in their belief that ‘the most effective deterrent 
for hard-core cartel activity… is stiff prison sentences.’25  Indeed, the American experience 
was referenced heavily in the White Paper that proceeded the EA 2002.26   
 
																																																						
Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’, in Cseres et al (eds) Criminalization of Competition Law 
Enforcement: Economic and Legal Implications for the EU Member States, (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2006) 
and Craycraft et al, ‘Antitrust Sanctions and a Firm’s Ability to Pay,’ (1997) 12 Review of Industrial 
Organisation 171, respectively.    
21 BIS, ‘A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform’ (BIS 2011) 61.  
22 This is discussed in more detail in 2.2.  The Genesis of the UK Criminal Cartel Offence; Wils (2006) supra 
n.21.      
23 Peter Whelan (forthcoming) supra n. 19.   
24 The USA in contrast, have had some form of criminal sanction for engaging in cartels since the Sherman Act 
1890.   
25 Belinda A. Barnett, ‘Criminalization of Cartel Conduct – The Changing Landscape,’ Joint Federal Court of 
Australia/Law Council of Australia (Business Law Section) Workshop, Adelaide, 3 April 2009, 2.  Available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminalization-cartel-conduct-changing-landscape.  Last Accessed 24th January 
2019.   
26 DTI, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition Regime’ July 2001, cm 5233.   
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Competition policy traditionally seeks to employ enforcement tools that deter prohibited 
conduct by altering the incentives to engage in it.  Reflecting economic theories of deterrence 
and punishment, and utilising certain aspects of game theory, competition policy in the EU has 
focused upon diminishing the economic benefit of collusive agreements through a series of 
fines, and destabilising the cartels by way of a programme of leniency aimed at cartel 
participants.  It did not however, properly engage with the symbiotic relationship of directors 
acting on behalf of, or for the benefit of, their firms.  Not long after the introduction of the 
Chapter 1 prohibition in the UK however, the Government decided that it would push forward 
with its policy of cartel reduction by way of deterrence, but that the deterrent threats would not 
only be aimed at the undertakings, who are unable as ‘fictional entities’27 of acting on their 
own, but at their agents as well.  In so doing, it was felt that the gap in deterrence would be 
closed and the regulatory toolkit would enable enforcement to reflect the realities of collusive 
conduct.   
 
The UK decided that the most effective deterrent would be the threat of criminal sanctions for 
individual cartelists,28 and so, as enacted by section 188 of the Enterprise Act 2002.  Personal 
fines were rejected on the basis that undertakings may ‘wish to incentivise’29 directors to 
collude and ‘simply indemnify any sanctioned individuals by paying the financial sanction’30 
for them.31  The criminal cartel offence came into force on the 20th June 2003, and the original 
estimate was that the new offence would result in approximately six to ten prosecutions a 
year.32 
 
The subsequent ten years of criminal enforcement did not unfold in the anticipated way.  The 
OFT managed only one successful prosecution, which came about as the result of an American 
plea-agreement,33 and one ill-fated contested case that collapsed before the defence was called 
to put forward their case.34  This, together with the overall perceived failure of the section 188 
																																																						
27 John P. Lowry and Arad B. G. Reisberg (2012) supra n.17, p.128.   
28 DTI, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition Regime,’ (2001) supra n.26.  
29 Peter Whelan (forthcoming) supra n. 19.    
30 Ibid.   
31 For discussion see, Patrick Massey, ‘Criminal Sanctions for Competition Law: A Review of the Irish 
Experience’ (2004) 1(1) The Competition Law Review 23. 
32 Anthony Hammond and Roy Penrose, ‘Proposed Criminalisation of Cartels in the UK: A Report Prepared for 
the Office of Fair Trading’ (2001).  Hereafter, the ‘Penrose Report.’ 
33 R v Whittle (Peter) [2008] EWCA Crim 2560.  Hereafter referred to as ‘The Marine Hose Cartel.’ 
34 See, David Teather, ‘BA price-fixing trial collapses,’ The Guardian, 11th May 2010.  Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/may/10/ba-price-fixing-trial-collapses.   
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offence led to the removal of ‘dishonesty’ from the definition as it was regarded as too high a 
bar in practice, for the authorities to overcome.35  The purpose of so amending the offence 
therefore, was to make obtaining a successful prosecution easier and in so doing, improve its 
deterrent effect.  The perhaps unintended consequence of removing the moral component of 
the offence’s definition was to bring it more clearly into line with the utilitarian, deterrence 
focused policy approach adopted in the UK.  The reality however, is that the prosecutions that 
have occurred in the 6 years since the passing of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 (the ‘ERR 2013’), have been by way of the original ‘dishonest’ cartel offence, referred 
to as ‘legacy’36 cases,37 with no prosecutions being brought under the amended ‘easier to 
prosecute’ cartel offence. 
 
Throughout the entire history of the criminal cartel offence, from its creation in the EA 2002 
to its amendment in ERR 2013 there has been very limited discussion of the interconnected 
nature of anti-cartel enforcement, and very little academic discussion of the growing body of 
‘regulatory mix’ literature and how it could be used to help negotiate what has become, a very 
complex regulatory landscape.  Many academics have nevertheless, criticised the ‘piece-
meal’38 approach to anti-cartel legislative action, and recognised the threat that it poses to a 
truly optimal response to the problem of cartels.  Antitrust literature is now starting to address 
the connection between the theory that provides the foundation for competition policy and 
enforcement action, and the enforcement toolkit and its practical application.39  This work 
seeks to augment and enhance this discussion and place the exploration of that connection 
within a wider discussion of the dynamics of the regulatory space that has been created in the 
UK for seeking to deter and punish cartels.  The amendments to the working of section 188 of 
the Enterprise Act 2002 as originally drafted, provide a rich opportunity for deeper analysis as 
																																																						
35 For discussion see, Andreas Stephan, ‘How Dishonesty Killed the Cartel Offence’ (2011) 6 Criminal Law 
Review 446. 
36 Jonathan Galloway, ‘Securing Legitimacy of Individual Sanctions in UK Competition Law’, World 
Competition 40, no 1 (2017): 121-158. 
37 Peter Nigel Snee pleaded guilty to a charge under s.188 EA 2002, and was given a sentence of 6 months in 
prison, suspended for 12 months, and 120 hours community service.  See, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/director-sentenced-to-6-months-for-criminal-cartel.  Last accessed 19th 
February 2019.  Mr Snee’s alleged co-cartelists pleased and were found not guilty.  Barry Kenneth Cooper 
pleaded guilty under s.188 EA 2002, and was given a sentence of 2 years in prison, suspended for 2 years and 
was disqualified from being a director for 7 years.  See, https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/criminal-investigation-
into-the-supply-of-products-to-the-construction-industry.  Last accessed 19th February 2019.  The CMA decided 
against prosecuting any further alleged participants in the cartel.        
38 See for example, Bruce Wardhaugh, ‘The Cartel Offence Within a “World Class” Competition Regime: An 
assessment of the BIS Consultation Exercise and its Results,’ (2012) 8(3) European Competition Journal 573.   
39 For example, see Peter Whelan (forthcoming) supra n. 19.   
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to whether corrective legislative reform accurately identified the cause of the perceived 
enforcement problems. This is particularly true given that those amendments have not led to a 
significant increase in the number of criminal prosecutions, and could in fact represent a lost 
opportunity to significantly enhance the overall regime, and alter the perception of cartel 
activity amongst those who are most likely to engage in it.  This is arguably demonstrative of 
the fact that the amendments failed to adequately identify and address the challenges of making 
a criminal offence work within a complex administrative regulatory space, built largely upon 
economic theories of deterrence. An examination of theoretical principles is not a purely 
academic one, and it was A V Dicey himself that said,  
 
‘Every law or rule of conduct must, whether its author perceives the fact or not, lay 
down or rest upon some general principle, and must therefore, if it succeeds in attaining 
its end, commend this principle to public attention or imitation, and thus affect 
legislative opinion.’40 
 
In the context of anti-cartel legislation, which is subject to ‘almost no political opposition’41 in 
most developed competition law jurisdictions, it is particularly important that the academic 
discourse that aids in shaping its form, helps to anchor the popular political preferences of the 
time, to accepted concepts and theorem in order to ensure that the possibilities and limitations 
of competition policy are properly understood, and further, to ensure that policy disasters of 
the past are not mindlessly reproduced in the future.42 
 
At the time of writing, the UK remains a Member State of the EU.  That membership adds a 
further layer of complexity to the enforcement landscape whilst simultaneously providing a 
high degree of intellectual rigour, legal precedent and cohesion to UK policy; 28 heads are 
after all, better than 1.  It is for this reason that despite the UK’s planned departure of the EU 
that this work retained discussion of the intricate and dynamic relationship, and the impact of 
that relationship upon the legislative environment in the UK.  Further, the lessons from the UK 
experience could provide useful insights for any Member States who may decide to implement 
																																																						
40 Dicey, ‘Lectures on the Relation Between Law and Public Opinion in England During the Nineteenth 
Century,’ (Macmillion: 1962) 2nd Ed, p.41.   
41 Robert H. Bork, ‘The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself’ (Basic Books Inc. Publishing, New 
York: 1978) p.7.  
42 ‘the machinery of antitrust enforcement grinds steadily on, mindlessly reproducing both the policy triumphs 
and disasters of the past.’ Robert H. Bork, ibid, p.4.  
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criminal sanctions for individuals who engage in cartel activity, in the future.  Surprisingly, at 
the conclusion of this thesis, the nature of the relationship between the UK and the EU post-
Brexit, remains unclear so it is impossible to determine with any certainty what influence that 
relationship may have on competition policy in the UK in the future.  However the Withdrawal 
Agreement envisages a very close relationship between the UK and the EU for at least the 
duration of the transition period.43  Further, an in-depth consideration of post-Brexit 
competition law and its relationship to the EU competition law regime is outside of the scope 
of this work, although it will undoubtedly provide a rich source for academic debate, including 
other doctoral research, and perhaps even litigation, for years to come.  
 
 
1.2. Thesis Objectives 
 
 
The objective of this work is to analyse the place of the criminal cartel offence within the 
regulatory space of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK both in order to better understand its 
underwhelming performance, and to identify how that performance can be improved.  To 
achieve these objectives it is important to firstly identify the various elements that operate 
within that regulatory space, and then to ascertain how those elements interact.  The process of 
examining and understanding the matrix of enforcement actions, policy goals and theoretical 
objectives for anti-cartel regulation, it is hoped, will help to bring clarity and cohesion to what 
has become a very complex regulatory environment.  In doing so, it the objective of this work 
to identify how the criminal cartel offence can inhabit that space with better effect in the future.   
 
Despite being regarded as an important element of achieving deterrence, and having been 
amended once already, the section 188 offence has not resulted in a significant, or even a 
moderate number of prosecutions.  This work therefore will also consider what impact that 
notable lack of enforcement could have on the deterrent effect of the offence, and potentially 
the anti-cartel regime as a whole.  After having identified the dynamics of the regulatory matrix, 
the objective of this work is to examine whether those interactions can be better negotiated for 
the benefit of both the cartel offence in particular, and the wider regime as a whole.   
																																																						
43 European Commission, ‘Withdrawal Agreement explained’ 8th February 2019.  Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/eu-uk-withdrawal-agreement-explained_en.  However, Theresa 
May has, at the time of writing, been unable to secure support for the Withdrawal Agreement in Parliament.   
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The anti-cartel enforcement regulatory space in the UK is inherently complex.  It is a multi-
layered approach, making use of a variety of enforcement tools in a jurisdiction, within a 
jurisdiction.44  Add to this the paradoxical nature of competition policy as a whole and the 
result is that what has been created is an intricate matrix of instruments, goals, policy objectives 
and interest that somehow must be formulated in such a way as to ensure that they work 
harmoniously together.  At the time of writing, there has been little engagement in the antitrust 
literature with the dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement, and so this work seeks to address this 
gap in the literature.   
 
The criminal cartel offence has been singled out in this work for three main reasons; 
1.  Criminal law responses are unusual in European competition law and so extra care 
must be taken to understand the implications of its inclusion.  Criminal law tends 
to be more moralistic in a way that competition law usually avoids, approaching 
problems from a largely utilitarian way.  The inclusion of concepts such as moral 
blameworthiness brings new challenges into competition policy that competition 
lawyers and academics may be unaccustomed to; 
2. Despite still being fairly atypical in Europe, the idea of introducing criminal 
sanctions for cartels is becoming more popular.  With that increased popularity 
comes an increased need to understand how to make such inclusion work within the 
traditional competition law framework.  The UK experience shows that this is not 
necessary a simple matter and the lessons learned by analysing the UK could be 
valuable to other Member States considering a similar a similar approach in the 
future.   
3. The UK has decided that it will leave the EU.  Once it is outside of the EU’s 
jurisdictional scope and influence there may come a time when the UK’s legislative 
framework needs to be re-evaluated.  A better understanding of the complex 
interactions that exist within that framework, and of the limitations of competition 
policy itself, will help to inform that re-evaluation and help to ensure that any 
amendments made are done so for the benefit of anti-cartel enforcement as a whole.   
 
																																																						
44 Pablo Del Rio and Michael P. Howlett, ‘Beyond the “Timbergen Rule” in Policy Design: Matching Tools and 
Goals in Policy Portfolios’ (2013) Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper No. 13-01.  
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1.3.  Thesis Scope 
 
 
The jurisdictional scope of this work is predominantly the UK.  The regulatory dynamics that 
are considered focus upon the enforcement mechanisms that are available to the competition 
authorities in the UK.  However, the harmonisation of competition law across the EU has 
influenced the genesis of competition law and policy in the UK, and in doing so has influenced 
the enforcement of anti-cartel law as well.  The relationship between the EU and the UK as a 
Member State is therefore relevant to, and is itself explored in various parts of this thesis as it 
has impacted upon how the UK has designed and enforced the criminal cartel offence up until 
this point in time.  Chapter 5 in particular considers the implications of one specific obligation 
that arises.  Nevertheless, the relationship between the EU and the UK is varied, complex and 
deeply entrenched.  It is not within the scope of this work to examine the full nature of that 
relationship, even within the context of competition law generally.  Such a consideration would 
be worthy of a thesis of its own.  This work therefore, has chosen to concentrate its efforts on 
one legal obligation, Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (the ‘TEU’) because of its 
potential to influence the UK’s implementation of atypical competition law responses.   
 
The USA has led the charge in respect of criminal sanctions for individuals who chose to 
engage in hard core collusive agreements and where relevant, reference is made to that 
leadership in this work.45  The focus of the thesis however, is the current state of affairs in the 
UK, and because of procedural, legal, historical and societal differences between the United 
States and the UK, an in-depth comparison between the two in not directly relevant to the 
concerns of this work.   
 
The thesis does not address the question of whether criminalisation was the ‘right’ decision.  It 
works from the perspective that the criminal cartel offence is now a feature of the enforcement 
landscape in the UK, and so endeavours to provide clarity and insight into the nature of that 
landscape in order to provide guidance as to how to best negotiate its intricacies for the benefit 
of the cartel offence in particular, but also anti-cartel enforcement as a whole.   
																																																						
45 During the pre-legislative debates in the House of Commons for the Enterprise Act 2002, the policy approach 
of the United States was referred to as the ‘gold standard’.  See Dr Vince Cable, Hansard, House of Commons, 
10th April 2002, cmn 64.  
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Further, this work considers the problem of legislating against cartels from a legal perspective 
and not an economic one.  Whilst the importance of economic theory cannot be ignored in a 
work that discusses competition law, this is essentially a doctrinal legal piece of research and 
not an economic one.  It is perhaps the case that a review of the same problems by an economist 
may yield different, though hopefully not inconsistent conclusions, such an economic 
evaluation however, is not within the scope of this work.   
 
 
1.4. Research Questions 
 
In light of the objectives and scope of the doctoral thesis outlined above, the primary research 
question is set out as: 
 
After analysing the regulatory dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK, and the 
place that the criminal cartel offence occupies within it, is more change needed to 
ensure that the section 188 offence has a better impact as a method of reducing cartel 
activity and thereby, protecting consumers and competition?  
 
In order to answer that question, a number of secondary research questions will need to be 
addressed: 
 
1. What are the theories of punishment that the criminal cartel offence is predicated 
upon, and how do those theories fit within the wider competition policy landscape 
of anti-cartel enforcement?46 
2. Should deterrence be the primary crime control objective of the cartel offence?47 
3. What are the dynamics of the theoretical foundations of anti-cartel enforcement, the 
policy objectives, and the enforcement toolkit of anti-cartel enforcement in the 
UK?48 
4. What, if any, are the implications of underwhelming enforcement of the criminal 
cartel offence in the UK on their obligations as a Member State of the EU, and their 
																																																						
46 Chapter 2:  Theories of Criminal Punishment and the Cartel Offence. 
47 Chapter 3:  Cartel Crime Reduction: Understanding Deterrence and the Alternatives. 
48 Chapter 4:  The Regulatory Dynamics of Anti-cartel Enforcement. 
 12	
	
sovereign right to create and implement criminal sanctions for individuals in an area 
of exclusive EU competence?49 
5. Market abuse has been described as analogous to cartelisation and is, like 
competition law, subject to a high degree of harmonisation within the EU.  Can any 
insights be gained from examining European market abuse regulations, for the 
benefit of the anti-cartel enforcement regime in the UK?50 
6. What recommendations can be made to improve the enforcement framework in the 
UK, and provide insight for other Member States who may seek to add criminal 
sanctions to their anti-cartel toolkit in the future?51  
 
In answering the above questions, it is the hope of the author to articulate the importance of 
ensuring that the practical legislative response to the problem of hard core cartels is firmly, and 
clearly rooted to the theoretical foundations that ensure an effective and legitimate regulatory 
response.  Further, it is the aim of this work to provide a better understanding of the dynamics 
specific to the UK’s anti-cartel regulatory space for the purpose of enabling a clearer and more 
logically consistent assessment of the framework in the future, as the regime continues to grow 
and evolve.   
 
In order achieve these aims and address the secondary research questions, the thesis looks at 
the theoretical foundations for State’s intervention into individual conduct for the purpose of 
crime control, and how they fit within the context of traditional competition law.  It then moves 
on to consider in more detail, deterrence theory, the preferred cartel reduction policy tool in 
competition law.  This work will also examine what alternative crime control strategies may 
be available to anti-cartel enforcement now that criminal law policy has been introduced to the 
legislative framework.  The thesis then moves on to an examination of the regulatory mix that 
has been created to tackle hard core collusion in the UK, and the nature of the interactions that 
occur between the policy objectives, and the enforcement tools that have been chosen to satisfy 
them.  So far there have been limited attempts to thoroughly consider the matrix of enforcement 
in the UK and this work brings together aspects of the regulatory mix literature with anti-cartel 
enforcement literature in order to address what the author perceives to be a gap in the 
competition law literature.  The dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK are influenced 
																																																						
49 Chapter 5: The Loyalty Principle and the Criminal Cartel Offence 
50 Chapter 6.  Improving the Anti-cartel Regulatory Framework: lessons from the law on market abuse. 
51 7.6.  Recommendations 
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by the relationship that the UK has with the EU as one of its Member States.  This work will 
therefore, consider the potential implications upon Member States’ ability to legislate for 
criminal sanctions within their own jurisdiction as a result of the complex dynamics that exist 
in the anti-cartel regulatory space.  This work will also seek to draw upon the experience of 
market abuse regulation in the EU with the aim of illuminating potential conceptual solutions 
of navigating complex regulatory spaces aimed at tackling delinquent economic behaviour.   
 
 
1.5. Originality and Contribution 
 
 
The originality of this work can be identified in a number of areas.  The first is the use of 
regulatory mix literature to understand and analyse the dynamics of the anti-cartel regulatory 
space in the UK,52 and thereby examine the criminal cartel offence’s place within that space.   
Regulatory mix theory has an establish body of literature and represents one perspective from 
which complex regulatory regimes can be understood.  It is regularly employed to tackle 
environmental law regulatory frameworks, and has provided a means by which a clear 
framework for intricate and complex problems can be legislated for.  There is little engagement 
with regulatory mix theory in the competition law literature, however.  Nevertheless, it singled 
itself out as a useful theorem for the purpose of this work because of its ability to provide a 
paradigm for negotiating complex regulatory responses for difficult to legislate for problems. 
 
Chapter 4 in particular is able to build upon the theoretical grounding in chapters 2 and 3, and 
elevate the competition law debate by infusing literature from regulatory theory and from other 
regulatory fields, so as to provide an original contribution to the debate in competition law and 
policy.  Chapter 4 applies the tools of regulatory mix theory to the problem of anti-cartel 
enforcement. Much of this work’s originality therefore, is born from the convergence of 
competition law and criminal policy within the framework of regulatory mix theory.  The idea 
that the ad-hoc manner in which the legislative response to cartels has been approached is 
																																																						
52 See for example, Michael Howlett and Jeremy Rayner, ‘Design Principles for Policy Mixes: Cohesion and 
Coherence in ‘New Governance Arrangements’ (2007) 26(4) Policy and Society 1; Gunningham and Sinclair, 
‘Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Policy’ (1999) 21 Law & Policy 49; Pablo 
Del Rio and Michael P. Howlett, ‘Beyond the “Timbergen Rule” in Policy Design: Matching Tools and Goals in 
Policy Portfolios’ (2013) Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper No. 13-01. 
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problematic, is not new to the competition law community, nor is the paradoxical nature of 
competition policy itself.  The analysis of the regulatory dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement 
reveals that such an approach is unsuitable for the fight against cartel activity.   
 
The UK’s relationship with the EU provides a further level of intricacy and sophistication to 
the competition law landscape considered in this work. It is not without its tensions however, 
and Chapter 5 examines one of those tensions which arises because of the duty of sincere 
cooperation contained in Article 4(3) of the Treaty of the European Union (the ‘TEU’) in light 
of the inclusion of a criminal cartel offence in the UK.  The hypothesis that Article 4(3) TEU 
and the criminal cartel offence in the UK (or indeed any Member State) may be a challenging 
combination was originally raised (though unexplored) by Joshua and Klawiter in 2001.53  This 
work aims to explore that idea, and in doing so therefore, adds a new perspective to the 
academic literature on the implications of criminalising cartel conduct.  Chapter 5 of this work 
therefore, also accounts for some of this works original contribution to the anti-cartel literature.  
 
Chapter 6 also contributes to the original contribution to the academic literature made by this 
thesis.  It considers the issue of duality of enforcement.  A comparative legal analysis approach 
is used which examines the example set by the EU’s approach to tackling market abuse.  The 
EU Market Abuse Regulation54 and the Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive55 have 
been used to fight a difficult to detect, complex economic crime and have created a framework 
within which criminal and administrative sanctions for that delinquent conduct can co-exist.  
This work turned to market abuse for its comparative legal analysis as insider dealing, one 
particular form of market abuse, was quoted as having ‘similar characteristics’ to hard core 
collusion when the criminal cartel offence was originally debated.56  Further, anti-market abuse 
regulation faces similar challenges to those faced in the fight against cartel activity, and is also 
subject to a high degree of harmonisation in the EU.  A comparative legal analysis approach is 
used to extrapolate insights from the experience of regulating market abuse to the challenges 
faced when fighting cartels, for the purpose of examining whether there are any insights that 
																																																						
53 Julian M. Joshua and Donald C. Klawiter, ‘Step Forward or Another Complication – The UK Criminalization 
Initiative,’ (2001) 16 Antitrust 67.   
54 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market 
abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, OJ L173/1.  
55 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions 
for market abuse (market abuse directive), OJ L173/179.   
56 DTI, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition Regime,’ supra n.26, para. 7.34.  
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can be used to improve the impact of the criminal cartel offence on cartel crime, without 
jeopardising the impact that administrative sanctions have on cartels.  There is some literature 
that aims to use the existing normative solutions developed in the sphere of market abuse to 
inform the regulation of cartels but, at the time of writing, it is limited.  Chapter 6 of this thesis 
therefore, seeks to contribute to this body of academic work.   
 
This thesis aims to bring a new perspective to the study and understanding of regulating cartels, 
particularly when the choice is made to implement criminal sanctions.  This thesis also furthers 
the understanding of the limitations and possibilities of such regulation in light of the 
obligations that arise by way of Membership of the European Union. 
 
 
1.6. Methodology 
 
‘Designing research principally, though not exclusively, involves the process of moving from 
the conceptual to the concrete to clarify the project.’57  This statement was taken from a text 
discussing empirical legal research.  Whilst this project does not engage in such research, there 
are some similarities that can be drawn between empirical research and the doctrinal research 
that this work undertakes.  In terms of the ‘design’ of the research, both of which are dependent 
upon a doctrinal assessment of the legal question under review, starts with a ‘hunch’58 which 
the researcher must turn into an identifiable, and researchable question.  In the context of this 
work, the seed that would become the central ‘hunch’ of this work was the question of why the 
criminal cartel offence had failed, and was continuing to fail to have a significant impact upon 
cartel activity in the UK.  This is not a new question.  It has been the subject of much academic 
debate, and indeed a Government consultation.  This work however, aims to add a new 
perspective through which the question can be conceptually analysed.  The hunch that became 
the rationale for this work was that the placing of a criminal sanction, uncritically within a 
competition law regulatory space had contributed to the underwhelming and inadequate impact 
that the criminal cartel offence could have upon the fight against hard-core collusion in the 
UK.  The next step in the process was to define the concepts inherent in the ‘hunch’ and create 
a primary research question which could adequately articulate the central concepts in need of 
																																																						
57 Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin, ‘An Introduction to Empirical Legal Research’ (Oxford University Press: 
2014) p.9. 
58 Ibid, p.9.  
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analysis, that would enable conclusions to be drawn.  Those foundational concepts relate to the 
ideological differences between criminal policy and competition policy, and the impact of 
combining the two within one enforcement space.  
 
This project this rooted in doctrinal legal research which ‘lies at the heart of any lawyer’s task 
because it is the research process used to identify, analyse and synthesise the content of the 
law.’59  Doctrine is sometimes defined as the ‘synthesis of rules, principles, norms, interpretive 
guidelines and values’ that ‘explains, makes coherent or justifies a segment of the law as part 
of a larger system of law.’60 This definition is intuitively appropriate to a central element of 
this thesis which seeks to analyse the position of the criminal cartel offence within the wider 
sphere of anti-cartel regulation.  However, to consider this work as purely doctrinal research is 
not an entirely adequate reflection of the project.  The doctrinal element of the work aims to 
‘provide a systematic exposition of the rules governing a particular legal category, analyse the 
relationship between [the] rules, explain areas of difficulty and, perhaps predict future 
developments.61  However, there is also a ‘reform oriented’62 element to the thesis which seeks 
to ‘evaluate the adequacy of existing rules’63 and to recommend ‘changes to any rules found 
wanting.’64  Additionally, one of the central purposes of this work is to anchor the practical 
manifestation of anti-cartel enforcement to the accepted theoretical justifications for state 
intervention in this area, where currently a disconnect exists.  Therefore, there is a theoretically 
focused aspect to the thesis that aims to ‘foster a more complete understanding of the 
conceptual bases of legal principles and of the combined effects of a range of legal rules and 
procedures that touch’65 upon the central concepts under analysis.   
 
This thesis therefore, engages with theoretical research and incorporates it with a normative 
legal doctrinal methodology. This enables the work to create a framed analysis that roots 
enforcement practices and tools to the relevant theories and policies, ultimately to help make 
																																																						
59 Terry Hitchinson, ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the jury’ in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds) 
Research Methods in Law (Routledge: 2018, 2nd edition) p.12.  
60 Dennis Pearce, Enid Campell and Don Harding, ‘A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary 
Education Commission,’ (Canberra, Australian Government Publishing: 1987). 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui 
(eds) Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press: 2007) p.30.  
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‘better law.’66  Elements of comparative-style legal analysis are also used in later chapters as a 
way of ‘promoting insight and knowledge’67 to gather insights that could ‘illuminate different 
perspectives that may yield a deeper understanding’68 of the complex challenges that are yet to 
be thoroughly explored in the context of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.   
 
It was important for this work to adopt a mixed approach because a purely doctrinal analysis 
may have resulted in an ‘inward-looking’69 thesis, and it was important to the author of this 
work to not only identify the relevant elements of the regulatory environment that the UK has 
created to tackle cartels, but also to create a ‘high quality, policy-relevant’70 analysis capable 
of real world application for the improvement of cartel enforcement. Further, it was important 
to the author to not only point out failings, but to be in a position to recommend solutions.  
Competition academics are concerned, on the whole, with the protection of competition for the 
benefit and welfare of society, and it is with this overriding concern in mind, that this work 
seeks to offer a new perspective for dealing with the complexities that have stifled the 
enforcement of the criminal cartel offence in the UK.  This would only be possible by making 
use of a mix of research methodologies.   
 
 
1.7. Thesis Structure 
 
This work is divided into 7 chapters.  Chapter 2 provides contextual background for the 
implementation of the criminal cartel offence and examines the theoretical foundations for the 
use of criminal law sanctions in general.  The chapter looks at the genesis of the offence and 
the failures of the pre-existing regime that it was hoped the section 188 offence would address.  
It then addresses the failures of the cartel offence itself and in doing so, builds a base upon 
which the cartel offence can be understood within the wider context of anti-cartel regulation in 
the UK.  It looks at the motivations for introducing the section 188 offence and examines them 
against the theoretical justifications for the creation and use of criminal sanctions.  In doing so 
																																																						
66 Ibid.   
67 Edward J. Eberle, ‘The Method and Role of Comparative Law, (2009) 8(3) Washington University Global 
Studies Law Review 451.   
68 Ibid.   
69 Ibid.  
70 Lee Epstein and Andrew D. Martin (2014) supra n. 57, p.14.  
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it provides the groundwork for examining the dynamics the exist in the regulatory landscape, 
between the theory, policy objectives and the enforcement toolkit.    
 
Deterrence is accepted as the primary cartel reduction policy of anti-cartel enforcement in the 
UK.  Chapter 3 therefore, focuses on deterrence theory as a crime control method.  It examines 
what conditions are necessary to create a real deterrent effect and reflects upon whether those 
conditions have been present in the UK.  As highlighted in Chapter 2, deterrence is not the only 
means by which crime can be tackled and reduced.  This chapter therefore looks at alternative 
mechanisms that could also be used in the fight against cartels.  That discussion begins to 
highlight the interconnected nature of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK, which is a concept 
that is explored in more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 4 analysis the dynamics of the interconnections that exist in the complex regulatory 
landscape that has been created for fighting cartels in the UK.  The chapter uses regulatory mix 
theory as a framework within which those dynamics can be considered.  Regulatory mix theory 
has been chosen as a lens through which anti-cartel regulation can be viewed because of its 
success in navigating other complex regulatory environments.   
 
The influence of the EU plays an important role in the examination in Chapter 5 because of the 
role that EU law has played in the creation and evolution of competition law in the UK.  The 
previous chapters examined the place that the criminal cartel offence occupies within anti-
cartel regulation in the UK and what may have caused its underwhelming impact upon the fight 
against cartels.  Chapter 5 considers the impact that the muted enforcement record of the 
criminal cartel offence could have on that underlying relationship between the UK and the EU.  
The chapter focuses upon one important, but largely unexplored element of the relationship 
between the EU and its Member States in the context of criminal sanctions for competition 
law, and that is Article 4(3) TEU. The chapter examines what impact the ineffective 
enforcement of a criminal cartel enforcement could have upon the obligation of loyal 
cooperation contained within Article 4(3) TEU.   
 
Chapter 6 turns again to the EU and uses a comparative legal analysis of how the EU has 
managed to legislate for duality of enforcement in the field of market abuse in order to seek 
potential insights as to how the UK could better negotiate the complexities of anti-cartel 
enforcement in the UK.   
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Chapter 7 is the concluding chapter of this work.  It brings together the analysis of the thesis 
and draws a series of conclusions about the place of the criminal cartel offence in the regulatory 
landscape of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.  It then makes a series of recommendations for 
creating a more cohesive and clearly structured framework within which anti-cartel 
enforcement regulation can exist in general, and within which the criminal cartel offence in 
particular, can thrive.  It outlines an argument in favour of further change for the section 188 
offence to ensure that it has a more positive impact upon the fight against cartels in the future.   
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Chapter 2:  Theories of Criminal Punishment and the Cartel Offence  
 
 
 2.1.  Introduction 
 
 
The use of the criminal law as a sanction for a breach of competition law, whilst growing in 
popularity, remains far from standard practice across the Member States of the EU. Indeed in 
2002 when the criminal cartel offence was originally enacted in the UK, it was largely atypical 
across Europe for such a response to the problem of cartels to be adopted.71  It is for this reason 
that this chapter examines the reasons that a criminal punishment may be chosen to tackle a 
perceived social harm, and in particular which of those justifications could be used to articulate 
the rationale for the unusual inclusion of a criminal sanction for anti-competitive behaviour in 
particular.   
 
Administrative fines, which are the traditional means by which cartel arrangements are dealt 
with in Europe, are used because of the belief that a correctly calculated fine can act as a 
deterrent to those undertakings that are considering subverting the competitive process by 
colluding with their competition.  These fines are supported by a programme of leniency that 
seeks to exploit the presumed unstable nature of a cartel, and based upon the game theory 
model called the ‘prisoner’s dilemma.’72  This type of cartel reduction theory assumes that 
cartelists make rational decisions based upon a cost versus benefit analysis of colluding.  A 
fine of an adequate size, it is believed, would alter the outcome of that calculation and thereby 
dissuade the undertaking from engaging in the cartel.73  This approach to the fight against 
cartels is based upon utilitarian theories of crime control in general, and economic deterrence 
theory in particular.  These will be considered in more detail later in this chapter, and the next.  
The leniency programme operates within this framework of enforcement by seeking to alter 
the likelihood that the cartel is detected, by incentivising members of the cartel to blow the 
																																																						
71 At the time when the criminal sanctions were first contemplated in the UK, in Europe only Austria, France, 
Norway and Ireland had a criminal offence covering cartel activity, and Germany had a criminal bid-rigging 
offence.  See DTI, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition Regime ,’ supra n.26, para. 7.12.   
72 See generally, Christopher R. Leslie, ‘Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability,’ (2006) 31 
Journal of Corporate Law 453.  
73 Gary Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,’ (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 169.   
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whistle on their co-cartelists in exchange for a reward (namely a reduction of, or immunity 
from the ultimate fine.)  The implications of the use of a leniency programme upon the internal 
dynamics of the regulatory space will also be considered later in this work.   
 
This chapter looks at the impetus for the creation of a criminal law response to cartels and 
considered the theoretical arguments that were used to support its inclusion in the anti-cartel 
enforcement landscape in the UK.  The chapter will then explore the amendment of the section 
188 offence and the potential impact that the removal of dishonesty as the substantive test had 
on the nature of the offence, and its place within the regulatory space.  Arguably a criminal 
offence that is reliant upon retributivist theories of criminal punishment to justify its existence 
and directs its use, is fundamentally changed when the very component that represents those 
retributivist elements is removed.  Such a fundamental shift in the theoretical basis for serious 
State interference in the lives of its citizens should not avoid scrutiny.   
 
In order to participate in that scrutiny this chapter first explores in more detail the genesis of 
the criminal cartel offence and the main events that led to its creation and later amendment.  In 
doing so it highlights the articulated (and implied) justifications for its creation.  The chapter 
then turns to the main theoretical justifications for imposing criminal punishments in general 
in order to provide a basis upon which the theoretical justifications for the creation of a criminal 
cartel offence can be analysed, both as a dishonest offence as was originally the case, and in 
its current form as amended by ERR 2013.    
 
 
2.2.  The Genesis of the UK Criminal Cartel Offence  
 
 
Prior to the creation of the criminal cartel offence, in the UK there existed no sanctions for the 
individuals responsible for implementing (or causing to be implemented) hard-core anti-
competitive agreements between undertakings.  Chapter 1 of the Competition Act 1998 (the 
‘CA 1998’) represented the totality of the UK’s legislative response to cartel activity and 
prohibits undertakings from engaging in hard-core agreements.74  Hard-core agreements are 
defined in the CA 1998 as price-fixing agreements, market sharing agreements, agreements to 
																																																						
74 Competition Act 1998, Chapter 1, s 2(1).   
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limit the supply or production of goods or services, and bid-rigging arrangements.75  This 
approach to cartel regulation adopted in the CA 1998 ‘expressly aligned domestic law relating 
to agreements’ with the approach of the EU contained in Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (the ‘TFEU’).  Article 101 TFEU represents the primary 
enforcement tool of the EU in the fight against cartels.  Since the decentralisation of 
competition law enforcement, the Member States have been under a legal obligation to ensure 
that they effectively enforce Article 101 TFEU within their jurisdictions.   
 
The Chapter 1 prohibition in the UK is an administrative sanction that voids any hard-core 
agreements that ‘have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the United Kingdom.’76  Those undertakings judged to have engaged in the 
proscribed agreements will be liable for a fine of up to 10% of annual turnover.77  The purpose 
of the fine is to deter undertakings from engaging in cartels in the first place by altering the 
cost versus benefit calculation that it is thought takes place on the question of whether to 
collude with their competitors, and to disgorge them of their illicit cartel rents should they 
choose to cartelise anyway.  The leniency programme was created to enhance the deterrent 
element of the administrative regime but in so doing, allows for undertakings to minimise or 
completely avoid any fine, and thereby, retain their cartel rents.   
 
Despite the prominence of administrative fines for cartel activity across the EU and the UK, 
there exist very good reasons why the level of fine required for the creation of optimal 
deterrence is unachievable in practice.  Given that deterrence is the driving force behind 
administrative sanctions for undertakings who engage in hard core collusion, its inability to 
achieve optimal deterrence in practice is a concern.  Calculating the level of fine required to 
achieve optimal deterrence is done by dividing the expected gain from a cartel by the 
probability of being caught and prosecuted.  Wils has fleshed out the details of the equation 
and estimates that the average mark-up of a cartel is 20% which is then reduced to a gain of 
10% of turnover per year.  The average duration of a cartel he estimates to be 5 years, and the 
probability of punishment as one in three.78  The equation therefore becomes: 
 
																																																						
75 Competition Act 1998, Chapter 1, s 2(2).   
76 Competition Act 1998, Chapter 1, s 1(b). 
77 Competition Act 1998, Chapter 1, s 36(8).   
78 Wouter P. Wils, (2006) supra n.20.  
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Cartel Gain (10% of annual turnover x 5 years) / probability of getting caught 
= 150% of annual turnover79 
 
Imposing fines of 150% of annual turnover would put the financial viability of the majority of 
firms facing the fine at risk.  Driving firms into bankruptcy would not only result in the 
suffering of innocent employees, shareholders and suppliers, but would be a staggeringly 
disproportionate sanction given that the firm itself is likely to have gained by only 10% over 
the 5 years, and it would be far from a pro-competitive outcome as it would result in a reduction 
of the number of competitors operating in that market.  Whelan argues that in this context, fines 
can be regarded as ‘a mere “tax” on (detected) cartel activity’80 which may be written off by 
some undertakings as just another cost of doing business.  
 
The second critical failure of a system which relies solely upon administrative fines to tackle 
cartel activity is that it fails to acknowledge the reality of how firms operate.  Undertakings are 
artificial entities incapable of making decisions.  It is the individuals responsible for the 
operations of the undertaking who collude on the firm’s behalf.  By relying upon administrative 
sanctions for the undertakings only, those who are ultimately responsible for the cartel remain 
outside of the reach of the law.   
 
Together these two criticisms of an enforcement regime that relies only upon administrative 
sanctions make a compelling case for the creation of sanctions for individuals who engage in 
cartel activity and does indeed represent not only a ‘gap in deterrence’81 but a gap in 
enforcement.  The UK government argued, and many agreed, that the only way in which that 
gap could be plugged was through the use of criminal sanctions,82 and it was for this reason 
that the section 188 offence was created by way of the Enterprise Act 2002 (the ‘EA 2002’).   
 
The criminal law is usually and rightfully reserved for the most serious and harmful conduct.  
During the contemporaneous debate on the creation of the cartel offence the government sought 
to articulate why cartel agreements fell into that category, without however, attempting to fully 
explain what the serious criminal harm of a cartel actually was.  In that vein however, many an 
																																																						
79 Peter Whelan, (forthcoming) supra n.19.  
80 Peter Whelan, Ibid.   
81 Ibid.   
82 DTI, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition Regime’ supra n. 26, Box 7.3, p.40. 
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academic and indeed, the then Secretary of State for Trade and Industry likened cartels to 
theft.83  It is a comparison with which this work does not agree, nevertheless, it does indicate 
an attempt to engage with the difficult but necessary task of making plain what aspect of a 
cartel represents the harm worthy of criminalisation.  Theft is a crime of dishonesty, the legal 
meaning of which brings with it a judgement to be made as to moral blameworthiness of the 
conduct.  This element of moral condemnation was included in the original cartel offence as a 
means of narrowing the scope of the offence so as to avoid ‘inadvertently criminalising 
practices that would be lawful under civil competition law prohibitions,’84 but also, in order to 
‘signal the seriousness of cartel conduct to the business community, the general public and the 
courts.’85  This is not a utilitarian concern and meant that deterrence therefore, was not the sole 
justifying objective of the creation of the cartel offence.  The inclusion of dishonesty as the 
substantive mens rea test for the offence and the associated moral judgement that a dishonest 
offence requires indicated that retributive considerations had now been introduced into the anti-
cartel regulatory space for the first time.86   
 
Notwithstanding, the section 188 offence was primarily intended to have a positive impact 
upon the deterrent effect of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.  It was thought that the existence 
of a criminal sanction would drastically alter the cost versus benefit analysis of the decision to 
collude and so would induce fear based compliance with the law.  The seriousness of the threat, 
it was thought, would be communicated by an anticipated 6 to 10 prosecutions a year.87 In 
the ten years that followed the creation of the offence however, the OFT managed to secure 
only one conviction. That conviction however was uncontested and came about by way of a 
plea deal with the American Department of Justice (the ‘DoJ’) of the Marine Hose Cartel.88 In 
that case the British defendants, Peter Whittle, David Brammar and Bryan Allison all agreed 
																																																						
83 See, for example, Margaret Bloom, ‘[Cartel] activity is equivalent to theft. It has no redeeming features’ in 
‘Key Challenges in Public Enforcement: A Speech to the British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law.' 17th May 2002; Klein, J.I., Address, International Anti-Cartel Enforcement Conference, Washington, DC, 
September 30, 1999; Richard Whish, ‘Competition Law’ (Oxford University Press: 2009), p.498. 
84 Andreas Stephan, ‘The UK cartel offence: a purposive interpretation,’ (2014) Criminal Law Review 879 
85 Ibid.  
86 The criminal cartel offence was implemented when the Modernisation Regulation 1/2003 was still in 
contemplation, and the inclusion of dishonesty was a means of ensuring that there would be no conflict with the 
EU’s desire to decentralise anti-cartel enforcement.  Regulation 1/2003 however, stated that criminal sanctions 
for cartel activity would not be per se prohibited.   
87 Anthony Hammond and Roy Penrose, ‘Proposed Criminalisation of Cartels in the UK; A Report Prepared for 
the Office of Fair Trading,’ (OFT 2001).   
88 R v Whittle, Grammar & Allison [2008] EWCR Crim 2560.  
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to plead guilty in America in exchange for being sentenced and imprisoned in the UK.89  The 
only contested case to be brought by the OFT resulted in its spectacular collapse before the 
defence was even required to put forward their case.90  The collapse of the case against the four 
British Airways executives and its subsequent review, were pivotal in the decision to amend 
section 188 EA 2002 and remove dishonesty as the substantive test for the offence despite it 
never having been tested in court.  The arguments made in favour of its removal largely centred 
around increasing the ease with which prosecutions could be secured.91  Less consideration 
was however given to how the removal of the moral component, used for signalling the 
seriousness of the offence, would alter the underlying justifications for the implementation of 
a criminal offence for cartel activity, or how its place within the anti-cartel regulatory space 
would be affected.  
 
 
The section 188 offence was enacted as part of the Enterprise Act 2002 and was the only piece 
of criminal law within the entire statute, which arguably is another indication of the perspective 
with which the criminal cartel offence was being viewed at the time.  It made a person guilty 
of a criminal offence if he dishonesty agreed with one or more persons to ‘make or implement, 
or cause to be made or implemented, arrangements … relating to at least two undertakings.’92  
The arrangements in question are the same as those prohibited in the CA 1998, namely direct 
or indirect price-fixing of a product or service,93 the limitation or prevention of supply94 or 
production,95 the division or sharing of a market,96 or the rigging of a bid.97 
The inclusion of dishonesty as the substantive test for the offence was a step away from the 
approach adopted in the administrative sanctions that avoids any articulation of moral 
wrongfulness.  At the relevant time the test for dishonesty was defined in R v Ghosh98 and 
stated that a person is dishonest if ‘according to the standards of reasonable and honest people’ 
																																																						
89 United States of America v Bryan Allison, Criminal No. H-07-487-01; United States of America v David 
Brammar, Criminal No. H-07-487-02; United States of America v Peter Whittle, Criminal No. H-07-487-03.   
90 David Teather, ‘BA price-fixing trial collapses,’ 11th May 2010, The Guardian.  Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/may/10/ba-price-fixing-trial-collapses.  Last accessed 18th 
November 2018.    
91 For discussion see, Paul Gilbert, ‘Changes to the UK Cartel Offence – Be Careful What You Wish For,’ 
(2014) 6(3) Journal of European Competition Law and Practice 192.  
92 Enterprise Act 2002, s 188.   
93 Enterprise Act 2002, s 188(2)(a). 
94 Enterprise Act 2002, s 188(2)(b). 
95 Enterprise Act 2002, s 188(2)(c). 
96 Enterprise Act 2002, s 188(2)(d) and (e). 
97 Enterprise Act 2002, s 188(2)(f).   
98 [1982] Q.B. 1053; [1982] 2 W.L.R. 110 CA (Criminal Division).  
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the defendant ‘realised what [they] were doing was by those standards dishonest.’99  This 
element of moral culpability was new to competition lawyers, the OFT and to the regulatory 
space in which the offence was to operate.  Even after the offence had been in force for a few 
years, evidence, although limited, indicated that there still lacked a strong consensus amongst 
the general public that cartel activity was worthy of imprisonment, despite the fact that in 
general it was acknowledged that it was seriously harmful.100 Such feeling could perhaps have 
been established over time by way of consistent enforcement of the section 188 offence; 
however, in the five years that followed, the only successful prosecution by way of section 188 
was of the Marine Hose cartel.   
 
In that case the three defendants had created a cartel that operated in the market for marine 
hoses which was estimated, by the European Commission, to be worth roughly €32 million 
between 2004 and 2006.101  The cartel was created in 1986 and had remained active until the 
defendants (along with other individual members of the cartel) were ultimately arrested in 
Texas in 2007.  Together the defendants had worked to fix prices, allocate bids, share markets 
and exchange commercially sensitive material.  The arrests were carried out by the DoJ after a 
coordinated investigation instigated by a leniency application made to the European 
Commission by Yokohama, one of the cartel participants.102  In respect of the UK defendants, 
each entered into a plea agreement with the DoJ, the terms of which required them to plead 
guilty to a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 ‘from at least as early as 1999’ 
to the 2nd May 2007, and in the UK to a violation of the Enterprise Act, s 188 between the 20th 
June 2003 and the 2nd May 2007, in exchange for being able to serve out their terms of 
imprisonment in the UK rather than in the United States.103  The agreement also stipulated that 
should they receive a sentence in the UK courts shorter than that which they had agreed to in 
																																																						
99 The test has since been amended by a Supreme Court ruling in Ivey v Genting Casinos [2017] UKSC 67.  In 
that case the Court determined that ‘the principle objection to the second [subjective] leg of the Ghosh test is 
that the less the defendant’s standards conform to what society generally accepts, the less likely he is to be help 
criminally responsible for his behaviour’ (para. 58).  Therefore, following that case only the first, objective leg 
of the old Ghosh test need be proven for a finding of dishonesty to be made.     
100 Andreas Stephan, ‘Survey of Public Attitudes to Price-Fixing and Cartel Enforcement in Britain’ (2008) 5(1) 
Competition Law Review 123.  
101 European Commission Press Release, ‘Antitrust: Commission fines marine hose producers €131 million for 
market sharing and price fixing cartel,’ 28th January 2009, IP/09/137.  Available at: 
https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=the+european+commission+estimated+that+the+mari
ne+hose+cartel+was+worth+32+million&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8.  Last accessed 11th February 2019.   
102 The application was made to the European Commission who as a result, levied no fine against Yokohama for 
their involvement in the cartel.  The investigation was a coordinated effort between the European Commission, 
the DoJ, the OFT, as well as other international competition authorities in Japan and Korea.   
103 The difference in the dates is reflective of the period of time in which cartel activity was criminalised in the 
UK.   
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their US plea deal, they would serve the remaining period of their American sentences in an 
American prison.  Upon conviction in the UK however, the judge at first instance sentenced 
both Whittle and Allison to 3 years imprisonment, and Brammar to 30 months.   
 
At the time the OFT claimed that this ‘first criminal prosecution sends a clear message to 
individuals and companies about the seriousness with which UK law views cartel 
behaviour.’104  That message however, was arguably undermined when the defendants 
successfully appealed the duration of their sentences.  The Court of Appeal, who lowered their 
terms of imprisonment to the minimum sentence agreed upon in their plea deal with the DoJ, 
stated that they could have been persuaded to ‘reduce the sentences further than [they had] 
been invited to’105 had counsel for the defendants’ so argued.106  Sanction severity plays a 
critical role in the creation of a real world deterrent107 and Marine Hose case does nothing to 
demonstrate that the judiciary in the UK have an appetite for imposing sentences towards the 
upper limit provided for in section 188.108  Further, the investigation came about as a result of 
a leniency application made to the European Commission, and so not as a result of the threat 
of criminal sanctions in the UK.  Arguably therefore, the only significant role that the criminal 
cartel offence played in this particular case was to create the reciprocity needed for the 
extradition of the defendants.  Whilst the deterrent function of the offence in this case, may 
well have been limited, the retributive element of the section 188 offence was arguably engaged 
as it signalled, for the first time since its creation 6 years earlier, that engaging in hard-core 
cartel activity was in fact a serious enough to warrant criminal prosecution.  In order to 
overcome the reality of the previous total lack of enforcement of the offence, and the 
collaborative role of the OFT in the prosecution, the OFT needed to use the Marine Hose Cartel 
																																																						
104 OFT Press Release, ‘Three imprisoned in first OFT criminal prosecution for bid rigging,’ 11 June 2008. 
Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20131101181416/http://oft.gov.uk/new-and-
updates/press/2008/72-08.  Last accessed 7th August 2017.   
105 R v Peter Whittle, Bryan Allison, David Brammer [2008] EWCA Crim 2560; (2008) WL 4820465, para. 31.  
106 They went on to say that they had ‘doubts as to the propriety of a US prosecutor seeking to inhibit the way in 
which counsel represents their clients in a UK court.  Ibid, para. 28.  
107 The role of sanction severity in the creation of a deterrent effect is considered in more detail in section 3.2.4. 
of this work.  
108 Indeed, in the subsequent cases where defendants have pleaded guilty, terms of imprisonment have been 
imposed, but suspended.  Barry Kenneth Cooper received a 2 year prison sentence, suspended for 2 years and 
was disqualified from being a director for 7 years after pleading guilty under section 188, for his participation in 
a cartel for the supply of precast concrete drainage products.  Peter Nigel Snee received a sentence for 6 months 
in prison, suspended for 12 months after he pleaded guilty under section 188 for his participation in a cartel for 
the supply of galvanised steel tanks for water storage.  His alleged co-cartelists pleaded, and in fact were found, 
not guilty under section 188.  See, CMA Cases.  Available at: https://www.gov.uk/cma-
cases?parent=&keywords=&case_type%5B%5D=criminal-
cartels&closed_date%5Bfrom%5D=&closed_date%5Bto%5D=.  Last accessed 17th September 2018.    
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case as a springboard to greater enforcement of the criminal cartel offence if it were to have 
the deterrent impact upon cartel activity that it was intended to have.109  The next criminal 
prosecution was not initiated however, for another 4 years.   
 
The second criminal prosecution under section 188 EA 2002 occurred in 2010 and was to be 
the very first contested criminal cartel case in the UK.  It turned out to be a critical turning 
point in the story of the criminalisation of competition law, but not for the reasons the OFT had 
surely hoped for.  The case involved four British Airways executives (the ‘BA’ executives) 
who were being criminally prosecuted for their alleged involvement in a cartel accused of 
fixing the prices of fuel surcharges with their competitor, Virgin Atlantic Airways (‘VAA’).  
Their co-cartelists, the executives at VAA, had received immunity from criminal prosecution 
as a result of a corporate leniency application which also led to VAA receiving total immunity 
from any administrative fine.  The case against the BA executives collapsed however, upon the 
court discovering that roughly 70,000 electronic documents in the possession of VAA had not 
been disclosed to the defence.  This led to Mr Justice Owens ordering the acquittal of the 
defendants.  The ‘spectacular collapse’110 of the case led some to ‘raise serious questions about 
the OFT’s competence as a criminal prosecutor and its reliance on a leniency programme.’111  
A review was conducted of the OFT’s handling of the case which highlighted various 
contributing factors,112 but which did not explicitly identify the dishonesty test as one of them, 
although it was alluded to.113  In a response to a Government consultation on options for 
reforming, inter alia, the criminal cartel offence the OFT articulated very clearly their view of 
the place that dishonesty had within the definition of the section 188 offence:  
																																																						
109 The OFT stated that after the Marine Hose Cartel case, they would continue to ‘investigate and prosecute 
cartels vigorously.’  OFT Press Release, ‘Three imprisoned in first OFT criminal prosecution for bid rigging,’ 
11 June 2008.  Available at: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402202948/http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-
updates/press/2008/72-08.  Last accessed 17th September 2018.     
110 Andreas Stephan, ‘Collapse of BA Trial Risks Undermining Cartel Enforcement,’ 
https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2010/05/12/collapse-of-ba-trial-risks-undermining-cartel-
enforcement/.  Last accessed 6th April 2019.   
111 Ibid.  
112 ‘The collapse of the case resulted from a highly unusual combination of factors…The issues identified 
essentially relate to the processes used in the case…With the benefit of hindsight it was not ideal as the OFT’s 
first contested criminal case… OFT, ‘Project Condor Board Review,’ 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/556876fce5274a1895000008/Project_Condor_Board_Review.pdf
.  Last accessed 6th April 2019.    
113 ‘In particular, the alleged cartel was a bilateral one in which the immunity applicant and its witnesses (who 
were also immune from prosecution) were equally implicated in the alleged offence.  The reliability of the 
witnesses might be questioned.’  OFT, ‘Project Condor Board Review,’ 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/556876fce5274a1895000008/Project_Condor_Board_Review.pdf
.  Last accessed 6th April 2019.    
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‘Relying on a normative concept, such as dishonesty, to define the criminal cartel 
offence inevitably introduces some uncertainty… Such uncertainty is reflected to some 
extent in the range of factors that have been raised by those under investigation by the 
OFT as potential counter-arguments to the suggestion that their conduct was dishonest 
…  
 
There is no certainty as to how a jury would approach any of these matters when 
assessing dishonesty, particularly in relation to conduct which many jury members may 
not consider inherently dishonest (emphasis added) …  
 
The OFT believes that such uncertainty is inherently undesirable … It also makes it 
more difficult and resource-intensive to investigate and prosecute the offence, as even 
those who may be ready to admit their involvement in cartel conduct will have an 
incentive to contest the case in the hope that a jury will be persuaded that they were not 
acting dishonestly.  This in turn impacts on the number of cases that can realistically be 
investigated and prosecuted and the level of deterrence that can be achieved.   
 
In a speech to the Law Society not long after, the then Senior Director of the Cartel and 
Criminal Enforcement Group of the OFT, Ali Nikpay summarised their position even more 
succinctly:  
 
‘[T]o date there has only been one successful criminal cartel prosecution and two 
prosecutions in total.  Given its importance to the regime, this naturally raises the 
question as to why.  I can answer that question in one word: “dishonesty.”’114 
 
The OFT statements are indicative of a number of things.  The rejection of a normative standard 
as the test for the criminal cartel offence because of the nuanced motivations that may motivate 
collusions, and the acknowledgement that cartels were not considered inherently wrong by the 
standards of reasonable people is problematic.  Indeed, fundamentally:  
 
																																																						
114 Ali Nikpay, Speech to the Law Society Anti-Trust Section, 11 December 2012.  Transcript available at: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402205844/http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2012/1112.p
df.  Last accessed 10th August 2018.    
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‘Just because questions of morality are difficult and unfamiliar does not mean that 
competition lawyers can ignore them while still seeking to utilise the perceived 
advantages of criminal deterrence.  If we are to use criminal law, we must abide by its 
conventions and justify our offence on its own terms.’115   
 
Indeed, the reality is that ‘the criminal trial is inherently a “moral space” where guilt and 
innocence are established.’116 Traditionally, the criminal law is reserved for behaviour ‘if it 
deserves moral opprobrium and/or clearly causes societal harm,’117 and to it is arguably the 
challenges that it poses to prosecution is insufficient reason to seek to avoid it.  A more 
advantageous approach would be to better define the criminal wrongfulness of a cartel and 
define the offence so as to target that harm.  If prosecution of the offence is still challenging, 
investigative processes should be improved in order to ensure that the evidential burden of 
proving the offence is satisfied.118  Defining the offence in this way would help to improve the 
‘comprehensibility’119 of the cartel offence and would go some way to addressing the problem 
of the lack of strong feeling that cartel activity is inherently criminal.   
 
Nevertheless, despite the issue of dishonesty never actually being tested in court, the impact of 
its inclusion as the substantive test for the criminal cartel offence was reassessed.  During the 
consultation process that preceded the ultimate reform, the Government stated that whilst the 
section 188 offence had helped to ‘deter the most serious and damaging forms of anti-
competitive conduct’120 the fact that there had been ‘only two cases prosecuted since 2003 … 
weaken[ed] the offence’s deterrent effect.’121  The focus therefore, remained firmly on the 
deterrent impact of the cartel offence and it was with the deterrent effect in mind, that the 
offence was ultimately amended so as to remove dishonesty as the substantive test.   
 
																																																						
115 Angus MacCulloch, ‘The Cartel Offence: Defining an Appropriate “Moral Space”’ (2012) 8(1) European 
Competition Journal 73. 
116 Ibid.  
117 Ibid.  
118 Despite claims by the OFT that dishonesty was the cause of it poor enforcement record for the original 
criminal cartel offence, there have been more cases brought under the unaltered offence or ‘legacy’ cases that 
have been brought under the new ‘easier to prosecute’ offence.  
119 Peter Whelan, ‘A Principled Argument for Personal Criminal Sanctions as Punishment under EC Cartel 
Law,’ (2007) 4(1) Competition Law Review 7.  
120 DTI, ‘A Competitive Regime for Growth: a consultation on options for reform: Government Response to 
Consultation,’ March 2012, p.10.  Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/192722/12-
512-growth-and-competition-regime-government-response.pdf.  Last accessed 18th August 2018.     
121 Ibid.  
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The amendment of the offence occurred by virtue of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 
2013 (the ‘ERR 2013’) which also brought about the amalgamation of the OFT and the 
Competition Commission (the ‘CC’),122 to create the Competition and Markets Authority (the 
‘CMA’). 
 
The newly amended criminal cartel offence makes a person guilty of a criminal offence if they 
agree with one or more other people to make or implement, or cause to be made or 
implemented, the hard-core agreements articulated in the original offence (price fixing, market 
sharing, production or supply limitation, and bid rigging) relating to at least two undertakings.   
By removing the requirement that criminal agreements had to be entered into dishonestly, the 
scope of the offence was significantly widened.  Instead of attempting to provide a more self-
contained definition of what was illegal, the ERR 2013 instead sought to carve out agreements 
that were not.  Therefore section 188A EA 2002 now states that: 
 
(1)  An individual does not commit an offence under section 188(1) if, under the 
arrangements— 
(a)  in a case where the arrangements would (operating as the parties intend) 
affect the supply in the United Kingdom of a product or service, customers 
would be given relevant information about the arrangements before they enter 
into agreements for the supply to them of the product or service so affected, 
(b)  in the case of bid-rigging arrangements, the person requesting bids would 
be given relevant information about them at or before the time when a bid is 
made, or 
(c)  in any case, relevant information about the arrangements would be 
published, before the arrangements are implemented, in the manner specified at 
the time of the making of the agreement in an order made by the Secretary of 
State. 
(2)  In subsection (1), “relevant information” means— 
(a)  the names of the undertakings to which the arrangements relate, 
(b)  a description of the nature of the arrangements which is sufficient to show 
why they are or might be arrangements of the kind to which section 188(1) 
applies, 
																																																						
122 The CC has previously been responsible for market investigations and merger inquiries.   
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(c)  the products or services to which they relate, and 
(d)  such other information as may be specified in an order made by the 
Secretary of State. 
(3)  An individual does not commit an offence under section 188(1) if the agreement is 
made in order to comply with a legal requirement. 
(4)  In subsection (3), “legal requirement” has the same meaning as in paragraph 5 of 
Schedule 3 to the Competition Act 1998.123 
 
In addition to the carve out above, the ERR 2013 also added a number of defences.  Now, 
according to section 188B of the EA 2002, it is a defence for an individual charged with the 
cartel offence to show that: 
 
(1)  In a case where the arrangements would (operating as the parties intend) affect the 
supply in the United Kingdom of a product or service, at the time of the making of the 
agreement, he or she did not intend that the nature of the arrangements would be 
concealed from customers at all times before they enter into agreements for the supply 
to them of the product or service. 
(2)  At the time of the making of the agreement, he or she did not intend that the nature 
of the arrangements would be concealed from the CMA. 
(3) Before the making of the agreement, he or she took reasonable steps to ensure that 
the nature of the arrangements would be disclosed to professional legal advisers for the 
purposes of obtaining advice about them before their making or (as the case may be) 
their implementation. 
 
As stated above, the aim of the reform was to improve the prosecutability of the offence and 
thereby, its deterrent effect.  The removal of dishonesty also brought the offence more closely 
into line with the predominantly utilitarian approach to dealing with cartels adopted by the 
administrative side of the anti-cartel regulatory space.  However, there was little to no 
discussion of the impact that its removal, and the significant alteration to the nature of the 
offence that it signified, would have upon its relationship with the other tools in the 
enforcement toolkit.  Further, the moral wrong-worthiness of the offence, as exemplified by 
the inclusion of dishonesty, was one of the justifying elements that supported the creation of a 
																																																						
123 Enterprise Act 2002, s 188A, as amended by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, s 47.  
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criminal offence in the first place.  The removal of that element on that justification was 
similarly not considered.   
 
This work therefore, now turns to a consideration of what justifies the creation of a criminal 
offence, before also exploring the utilitarian and retributivist arguments for imposing criminal 
punishment.  The purpose of so doing is to begin to articulate a standard against which the 
enforcement of the criminal cartel offence, within the wider scope of anti-cartel enforcement 
in general, can start to be assessed.   
 
 
 2.3.  Criminal Law Theory: justifying criminal sanctions 
 
 
The imposition of criminal punishment involves the infliction of harm by the State upon its 
citizens.  That harm includes physical, financial, reputational and emotional harm, and is one 
of the most significant examples of State power.  In order to be regarded as a legitimate exercise 
of that power, it should not be considered as an excessive interference with individual freedom.  
Some would argue that there is a tendency for the over-criminalisation of conduct enabled by 
a lack of a coherent theory of criminalisation.124  This has in turn led to ‘few meaningful 
constraints on the scope of the criminal law.’125  Brown argues that this state of over 
criminalisation has partly come about because: 
 
‘Legislators create crimes, and legislatures do not abide by a consistent set of principles 
regarding what matters are appropriate for criminalization.  They employ criminal law 
purely instrumentally, as a tool for achieving whatever end majorities choose to 
pursue.’126   
 
This has caused legislators to create ‘“ancillary offences” – statutes designed to support a 
complex regulatory scheme that persons find ingenious ways to circumvent.’127  Husack goes 
on to explain the threat of these kind of offences which include an ‘absence of culpability 
																																																						
124 Douglas Husak, ‘Criminal Law Theory’ in Martin .P. Golding and William.A. Edmundson et al (eds) The 
Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2008) p.108. 
125 Ibid.  
126 Darryl K Brown, ‘Can Criminal Law be Controlled?’ (2009-10) 108 Michigan Law Review 925. 
127 Douglas Husak, supra n. 124.   
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requirements … the implicit trust in prosecutorial discretion to prevent abuse’128 both of which 
he argues are ‘incompatible with fundamental principles long held sacrosanct by criminal law 
theorists.’129  This would imply that at the very least culpability should be a consideration when 
articulating a criminal offence, although it would appear not an absolute requirement.  Indeed, 
the use of strict liability offences is not uncommon, however it is far beyond the scope of this 
work to enter the debate on criminalisation and how its scope should be defined.  Nevertheless, 
preventing the overuse of criminal sanctions is important in a fair and just society, and in order 
for that to be the case there need to be some reason or justification for the limitation of 
individual behaviour by way of the criminal law.  Further, the integrity of the criminal justice 
system as a whole is put at risk when a criminal sanction is unjustifiable, unfair and illegitimate 
as it threatens society’s normative commitment to obey the law voluntarily.   
 
 2.3.1.  The Scope of the Criminal Law, and the Criminal Cartel Offence 
 
Some would argue that one of the most important and defining features of the State is that it 
‘has an obligation to take steps to prevent harm’130 to its people by ‘encouraging peaceable 
living among citizens and safeguarding the basic means by which citizens can live good 
lives.’131  The mechanisms by which a State facilitates this and the justifications for those 
mechanisms vary.  Nevertheless, in most penal systems criminal sanctions imposed by the 
State, whether in the pursuit of the prevention of further harm or some other objective,132 
involve the infliction of harm on those found guilty of transgressing accepted societal norms.  
This therefore, is not only to be regarded as a legitimate, but also a fundamental function of the 
State.  The exercising of such censuring powers through the criminal law system however, 
‘means treating people in way which we would not to be justifiable in contexts other than 
punishment.’133  To ensure therefore, that the imposition of such punishment is a justifiable 
manifestation of State power, and given that there exists no coherent finite definition of what 
																																																						
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid.  See also, Ashworth, ‘Is the criminal law a lost cause?’ (2000) 116 Law Quarterly Review 225–56; 
Adams, ‘The new ancillary offences’ (1989) 1 Criminal Law Forum 1-39.  
130 Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner, ‘Punishment Paradigms and the Role of the Preventive State’, in 
Simester, A. P., Antje Du Bois-Pedain, and Ulfrid Neumann (eds) Liberal Criminal Theory: Essays for Andreas 
von Hirsch (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014) p.3.  
131 Ibid, p.4.  
132 It is von Hirsch who argues that the prevention of harm rather than the upholding of ‘moral order’ is the 
preferred prerogative of State power.  See Andreas von Hirsh and A Ashworth, ‘Proportionate Sentencing: 
Exploring the Principles,’ (OUP 2005) p.14.  
133 William Wringe, ‘An Expressive Theory of Punishment, (Palgrave Macmillan 2016), p.7. 
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should constitute a criminal offence worthy of such punishment, there must be a way in which 
the outer scope of the criminal law can be delineated.  Some academics have therefore, argued 
in favour of ‘limiting principles’134 that aid in determining when the criminalisation of an action 
may not be appropriate.135   
 
In much the same way that the new criminal cartel offence does not attempt a definition capable 
of capturing all of the possible ways in which the crime may be committed, but to carve out 
the ways in which it is not, these limiting principles attempt a similar task.  Drawing on the 
work of various theorists, those principles are as follows: 
 
A)  Prohibitions should not be included in the criminal law for the sole purpose of 
ensuring that breaches are visited with retributive punishment136 
B) The criminal law should not be used to penalise behaviour that does no harm137 
C) The criminal law should not be used to achieve a purpose that can be achieved as 
effectively whilst imposing less suffering138 
D) The criminal law should not be used if the harm of the penalty is greater than the 
harm of the offence139 
E) The criminal law should not be used to compel people to act in their own best 
interests140 
F) The criminal law should not include prohibitions that do not have strong public 
support141 
G) A prohibition should not be included if it is not enforceable142 
 
When each of these limiting principles is applied to the criminal cartel offence it is possible to 
establish whether there are any significant ideological obstacles that would preclude the 
creation of a criminal cartel offence. 
 
																																																						
134 Nigel Walker, ‘Punishment, danger and stigma: the morality of criminal justice,’ (Rowman and Littlefield 
1980) p.4. 
135 Ibid, p.4-8.   
136 Beccaria, ‘Of Crimes and Punishment,’ (1764).  
137 Jeremy Bentham, ‘An Introduction to the Principles of Moral Legislation,’ (1789). 
138 Ibid.  
139 Ibid.  
140 John Stuart Mills, ‘On Liberty,’ (1859). 
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The first principle states that creating a sanction for the sole purpose of enabling the infliction 
of punishment is not an appropriate use of the criminal law.  An additional, justifying element 
is required.   Retributive theories justify punishment as the infliction of harm in response to 
wrongdoing or infliction of harm,143 and it this additional element of wrongdoing or harm, that 
is crucial.  That a criminal punishment should only be applied when a wrongful or harmful act 
has been committed is arguably intuitive, as to do otherwise would place the State in the 
position of inflicting harm in unnecessary and disproportionate ways.  However, in the context 
of the cartel offence, whilst it is widely accepted that hard-core cartels are indeed harmful, the 
task of articulating that harm within the context of the criminal law has not been simple.  
Nevertheless, defining the harm to be punished is an important process when creating a 
criminal offence, especially when attempting to ‘translate a desire for increased competition 
law deterrence into criminal law’144 in part because competition law does not typically concern 
itself with backward looking policy concerns such as the wrong-worthiness of proscribed 
conduct.  The criminal law by contrast focuses on the guilt and innocence, and the punishment 
of guilty for their wrongdoing; for that wrongdoing to be judged it is crucial to know what it 
is.145 
 
When the original cartel offence was introduced to the competition law landscape, there was 
no mention of the harm that cartels caused contained within the definition of the offence.  
Instead, the focus was upon the ‘dishonesty’ of entering into agreements that circumvent the 
competitive process whilst also taking advantage of others who do not.  Some have argued that 
the avoidance of relying upon the harm of cartels when defining the criminal cartel offence is 
beneficial as it will prevent the need to introduce complex economic arguments to lay juries146 
when attempting to prove the case against a defendant.  However, no matter how persuasive 
the arguments are for the exclusion of harm from the definition of a criminal cartel offence, a 
suitable alternative definition of the criminal harm of a cartel should be made clear.  This need 
has arguably become even more pressing since the removal of dishonesty as the substantive 
test for the offence. 
 
																																																						
143 For discussion see for example, Whitney R. P. Kaufman, ‘The Problem of Punishment,’ in Honor and 
Revenge: A Theory of Punishment (Springer, Dordrecht: 2013).  
144 Angus MacCulloch (2012) supra n.115.  
145 Ibid.  
146 See for example, C Harding, ‘The Anti-Cartel Enforcement Industry: Criminological Perspective on Cartel 
Criminalisation’ in Beaton-Wells and Ezrachi (eds) Criminalising Cartels (Hart Publishing: 2011); Angus 
MacCulloch, (2012) supra n.155. 
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This ties in with the second limiting principle requiring that an action does harm before it can 
be considered for criminalisation.  That hard-core cartel cause harm is widely accepted.  In 
competition law terms, that harm is colluding to avoid the influence of the competitive process, 
enabling the cartel to become a ‘price setter.’147  This leads to, inter alia, consumers paying 
more for goods than they are worth,148 a loss of innovation and efficiency gains, a lost consumer 
surplus that would have otherwise belonged to the consumer but that was instead, 
appropriated149 by the cartel,150 and the ‘deadweight loss’ which occurs when consumers are 
deterred from purchasing a product because of its artificially inflated price.151  However, not 
all harms are deserving of protection by the criminal law and indeed Mill argued that,  
 
‘society admits no right, either legal or moral, in the disappointed competitors …it feels 
called on to interfere, only when means of success have been employed which is 
contrary to the general interest to permit – namely fraud or treachery, and force.’152 
 
Some have argued that the appropriate measure of harm for a criminal cartel offence is the 
harm done to the ‘market as an institution used by society to distribute foods and services, i.e. 
as a means of distributive justice’153 whilst others have argued that harm should be rejected as 
the basis of criminalisation of cartels and instead, the key rationale for individual criminal 
sanctions should focus on the subversion of the competitive process.154   
When the cartel offence was originally created,155 dishonesty filled the role as identifier of the 
harm or wrongdoing.  However, when, as articulated by the OFT, there is not an inherent belief 
																																																						
147 Bruce Wardhaugh, ‘Cartels, Markets and Crime: A Normative Justification for the Criminalisation of 
Economic Collusion’ (Cambridge University Press, 2014) p.7.  
148 Worth is normally determined by competitive market conditions which is a reflection of supply, demand, 
availability and innovativeness.   
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Whish, ‘Recent Developments in Community Competition Law 1998/99’ [2000] European Competition Review 
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153 John Rawls, ‘A Theory of Justice’ (Harvard University of Press: 1971).  
154 Angus MacCulloch (2012) supra n.115. 
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economic impacts.  If discovered they jeopardise the interests of shareholders, creditors and employees.  Their 
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supra n. 26,  para. 7.35 (emphasis added).   
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that cartel agreements are dishonest, an inevitable problem occurs because ‘dishonesty cannot 
inculcate collective moral censure … because it presupposes and relies upon such collective 
moral censure already existing.’156  When it was removed, the Government chose not to seek 
a replacement that would act as an indicator of the specific harm or wrongdoing that that 
criminal offence was seeking to address.  Arguably therefore, the removal of dishonesty has 
not only changed the nature of the offence itself, but has altered the justifications for imposing 
criminality without now articulating what aspect of the offence is deserving of that criminality.   
 
There has been much discussion in the academic literature as to what could adequately and 
appropriately articulate the harm at the core of cartel which is deserving of criminal sanction.157  
Arguably the most convincing are those which acknowledge that the inherent harm of a cartel 
is not the secrecy in which they are made,158 which is merely a ‘symptom of increasing moral 
repugnance of cartel activity, not the cause’159 but the intention to avoid the effects of 
competition.160   
 
The third limiting principle requires that the criminal law only be used when an alternative that 
causes less suffering cannot be found that achieves the same purpose.  This will be referred to 
as the ‘suffering cost’ of criminal sanctions.  This is a reflection of the desire that State 
interference be proportionate and no more than is necessary to achieved the desired goal.  In 
the context of the criminal cartel offence, this equation is made muddier by the lack of a clear 
indication of exactly what aspect of cartel agreements is deserving of criminal punishment.  
However, once the decision was taken to focus attention of criminal sanctions upon the 
individuals responsible for implementing cartel agreements, practical options were limited to 
two; criminal liability and director disqualifications.  As has been previously stated, fines were 
rejected quite early in the debate because of the possibility that individuals could be 
indemnified against financial sanctions by their employers.  Competition Disqualification 
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Orders (‘CDOs’) are considered to be a powerful deterrent, and operate on a much lower 
evidential standard that the criminal offence making them easier to prove.  They do not carry 
the same degree of censure as a criminal sanction however, and so do not fulfil the educative 
and moralising functions that a criminal prosecution would.  The level of punishment is vastly 
different with criminal sanctions depriving the convicted of their liberty and director 
disqualification orders simply depriving those determined to be ‘unfit’ from working as a 
director for a specified period of time.   
 
CDOs have been found to be second only to criminal sanctions in terms of their deterrent 
effect161 and if employed regularly, would avoid the disastrous effects of under-enforcement 
on that deterrent effect.  If deterrence is the overriding objective of individual sanctions, 
arguably the suffering cost of the criminal offence cannot be justified.  If however, the criminal 
sanctions are seeking to achieve some other, retributive function for example, the suffering cost 
equation may have a different outcome.  Dishonesty played a role in articulating what that 
alternative function may be, its removal without replacement make identifying that function 
more difficult.   
 
The fourth limiting principle requires that the harm of the punishment should not be greater 
than the harm of the crime.  Quantifying the harm of a crime or its punishment is an incredibly 
difficult task.  The scope of the harm to be considered is not clear.  Should only those who are 
directly harmed be included, or should the harm inflicted indirectly be caught within that 
scope?  As the element of cartel agreements that justifies criminality has not been clearly 
identified by the Government, its relationship to the potential punishment, 5 years in prison, is 
difficult to establish.  When deciding upon a term of 5 years, the White Paper that proceeded 
the original EA 2002 offence looked to the jurisdictions of Canada, Japan and the USA for 
guidance,162 as well as to UK offences that they felt were analogous such as insider trading and 
obtaining property by deception.163  Whilst it is beneficial to look for outside guidance when 
determining the sentence for a new criminal offence, more has to be done to link the chosen 
																																																						
161 CMA, ‘The deterrent effect of competition authorities’ work: Literature review’ 7th September 2017.  
Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642801/deterr
ent-effect-of-competition-authorities-work-lit-review.pdf.  Last accessed 16th November 2018.    
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sentence to the actual harm of that offence.  This would be beneficial for not only ensuring the 
legitimacy of the criminalisation of the act, but would also make the sentencing of those found 
guilty simpler for the judiciary.  In the absence of official sentencing guidelines and with no 
connection between the (ambiguously defined) harm and the sentence, there is a real risk that 
the objectives sought by criminalisation could be ultimately undermined by sentences that are 
too lenient or indeed, too severe. This is particularly true if the primary objective of the criminal 
offence is deterrence.   
 
The fifth limiting principle is that the criminal law should not be used as a means to compel 
people to act in their own best interest.  There are examples of where the criminal law has 
successfully been used in this way however.  One such example is section 14(3) of the Road 
Traffic Act 1998 which requires that a person is guilty of an offence if they fail to wear a seat 
belt whilst driving or riding in a car.  The wearing of a seat belt is in the interests of the person 
wearing it as it significantly reduces the risk, and severity of injury to the wearer in the event 
of a collision.164  Despite the fact that wearing a seat belt reduces the risk of injury and death, 
there was significant push back when the issue of compulsory seat belts was first raised, and it 
took 15 years and 12 attempts to finally make it law.165  Laws which seek to compel individuals 
to act in their own best interest are often categorised as examples of ‘legal paternalism’ which 
many argue against as it represents an unjustified interference with an individual’s ‘protected 
realm of sovereign self-rule’166 even if the ‘self-harm the state wants to prevent is big or the 
coercion needed to prevent it is small.’167  This is because ‘sovereignty is an all or nothing 
concept; one is entitled to absolute control of whatever is within one’s domain however trivial 
it may be.’168  There is much debate as to the appropriateness of the criminal law when 
deployed in a paternalistic way169 and it is not within the scope of this work to add to that 
debate.  Nor is it within the scope of this work to explore that debate because within the context 
of the criminal cartel offence it adds nothing to the analysis.  Individuals enter into hard-core 
																																																						
164 It was estimated that the year after it became legally compulsory to wear seat belts the number of fatalities 
was reduced by 25.7%, and the number of serious injuries fell by 22%.  See, Road Safety Observatory, ‘Seat 
Belts: How Effective: Key Statistics,’ 30 Jan 2017.  
165 Road Safety GB, ‘How has the seatbelt law evolved since 1968?’ 9 April 2018.  Available at: 
http://roadsafetygb.org.uk/news/how-has-the-seatbelt-law-evolved-since-1968/.   
166 Heidi Malm, 'Feinberg's anti-paternalism and the balancing strategy' (2005) 11(3) Legal Theory 193. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Joel Feinburg, ‘Harm to Self’ (Oxford University Press 1986) p.55. 
169 See for example, Russ Shafer-Landau, ‘Liberalism and Paternalism’ (2005) 11 Legal Theory 169; Richard J 
Arneson, ‘Joel Feinberg and the Justification of Hard Paternalism’ (2005) 11(3) Legal Theory 259; Williamson 
A Edmundson, ‘Comments on Richard Arneson’s Joel Feinberg and the Jusitification of Hard Paternalism’ 
(2005) 11(3) Legal Theory 285.  
 41	
	
anticompetitive agreements in order to pursue either their own best interests, or those of their 
firm as they perceive them to be.  This limiting principle therefore, would not act as a bar on 
the criminalisation of such conduct.  
 
The sixth limiting principle is that the criminal law should only be used when there is strong 
public support.  This is linked to the idea that ‘people comply with the law because they believe 
it is the right thing to do’170 and in order to create and sustain that belief ‘a normative model of 
crime control … secure[s] compliance and cooperation by developing policies that generate 
legitimacy.’171  It is not, in this instance therefore, deterrence that persuades citizens to obey 
the law, but a belief that the laws (and the legal system) are, in general, just and legitimate, and 
should therefore be obeyed.  When criminality is created without public support, it risks being 
considered an illegitimate manifestation of the State’s power over its citizens which can in turn 
undermine the public’s commitment to comply with that law.  When the legitimacy of enough 
of the State’s actions is questioned is could arguably lead to a significant erosion of the general 
commitment to comply with the legal system in general.  However, where legitimacy of State 
action is maintained, it ‘leads individuals to follow rules not because they agree with each 
specific rule … but because they accept that it is morally right to abide by the law.’172   
 
In the case of the criminal cartel offence, which some empirical evidence suggested only had 
limited support when it was introduced,173 relies upon the legitimacy of the Government and 
criminal justice system as a whole to bring the offence within the scope of the public’s ordinary 
commitment to obey the law.  Legitimacy in this context then is the ‘psychological property of 
an authority … that leads those connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper and 
just.’174  In practice therefore, criminal sanctions can be included within the legal landscape of 
a jurisdiction even when they lack strong public support if there is support for the criminal 
justice system in general, a support that is partly encouraged by the legitimacy (and perceived 
legitimacy) of that system.  There is however, arguably an obligation to provide especially 
robust, clearly articulated justification for the imposition of a criminal offence when there is 
limited societal support for it.   
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The final limiting principle is that criminal laws should always be enforceable.  This again is 
linked to the legitimacy of criminal sanctions and the criminal justice system as a whole and 
the desire to preserve the reputation of the criminal law.  It is clear that the criminal cartel 
offence can indeed be enforced, although with what degree of success is arguably up for debate.  
Its enforceability problems however, are not solely to be laid at the feet of the offence itself.  
Nevertheless, the ‘communicative effort which punishment involves [should be made] even if 
we are certain that it will fail … we owe it to the victim who has been wronged, and to the 
offender, as a moral agent and fellow citizen to make the effort.’175  This implies that the 
criminal law is seeking to achieve something more than simple deterrence and that it has other 
roles in the fight to reduce crime. 
 
When the criminalisation of cartel conduct is considered against each of these limiting 
principles, the first thing that is clear is that at the time of its creation, there was insufficient 
consideration of the appropriateness of a cartel sanction within the context of the criminal law.  
Most, if not all of the contemporaneous discussion focused upon the use of a criminal cartel 
sanction within the context of competition law.  This has meant that little has been done to 
clearly articulate the criminal wrong of a cartel, or to elaborate upon what other crime reduction 
functions the criminal cartel offence could achieve.  Deterrence cannot be the sole function of 
the offence as otherwise the position that it is a preferable enforcement tool over the 
competition disqualification order becomes more difficult to maintain.  The competition 
disqualification orders are a highly effective deterrent and result in significantly less harm for 
those guilty individuals against whom they are used.  They are however, only enforceable 
against a small class of culpable individuals and so there is an argument to be made that to 
focus enforcement action on such a small class of people would enable others of equal 
culpability to evade sanction.  This argument however, is not without its faults.  The current 
system of leniency allows for equally culpable defendants to evade sanction if it is to the benefit 
of the deterrent effect of the enforcement regime as a whole.  Given that the enforcement of 
the criminal cartel offence is so inherently challenging, the position that the deterrent effect of 
the regime would be better served by focusing upon the use of competition disqualification 
orders, and thereby a limited class of culpable cartelists, is not without merit, as the lower 
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evidential burden of the disqualification orders means that when enforced enthusiastically, 
more individual cartelists are likely to be subject to the orders.  More frequent use of the orders 
would, according to deterrence theory, mitigate the effect of the less severe sanction on the 
creation of an impactful deterrence effect.  
 
The preceding discussion considered what arguments may exist that would preclude the use of 
a criminal cartel offence but are not positive arguments in its favour.  The positive justifications 
for the inclusion of a criminal sanction in the competition enforcement landscape can be 
divided into two broad categories, those that are forward looking or utilitarian, consequentialist 
justifications, and those that are backward looking, or retributive, non-consequentialist 
justifications.  An exploration of these aspects of criminalisation and the theories of criminal 
punishment, may help to better understand the space that the section 188 offence occupies in 
the criminal policy sphere, as well as the competition enforcement sphere.  It will also help to 
identify the various crime reduction functions that the criminal cartel offence could fulfil, 
functions that the contemporaneous debate on the criminalisation of individuals for 
participating in cartels failed to thoroughly engage with.  This discussion also serves a more 
practical function; if the underlying theory for the section 188 offence can be clearly articulated 
it helps to provide a ‘critical standard’176 against which the actual enforcement practices and 
legislative responses can be measured.  
 
2.4. Justifications for Punishment and the Cartel Offence 
 
The relationship between the criminal cartel offence and theories of punishment has become 
an increasingly prominent part of the academic literature on the cartel offence.177  That was not 
always the case and indeed, at the time that the section 188 offence was first created it received 
very little attention at all.  It is not the intention of this work to attempt to reshape that debate, 
but it is useful to articulate the main aspects of it in order to clarify the position that the criminal 
offence occupies in both the sphere of both criminal and competition policy.  This is 
particularly true given the potentially radical change to the nature, and justifications for the 
offence that arguably occurred when dishonesty was removed, and not replaced, from the 
definition of criminal cartel conduct.  An exploration of the theories that justify the imposition 
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of punishment will enable an assessment of that change to be made.  In addition to that, it will 
be the first step to clearly delineating the link between the theories of criminal punishment, the 
goals of anti-cartel policy, and the enforcement tools ultimately used to achieve those goals.  
At the time of writing, there is no clear path from the theoretical foundations of criminal 
punishment to the theoretical foundations of the section 188 offence, or to the enforcement 
tools and choices of the CMA.   
 
  2.4.1.  Theoretical Justifications for Criminal Punishment 
 
Utilitarian theories of punishment are forward looking and consider the benefit that the 
imposition of a punishment, which is by its very nature an imposition of harm, can have in the 
future, for example, a reduction in crime.  That could be achieved because the imposition of 
the punishment deterred others (and the punished) from committing crime in the future because 
the threat of that punishment scared them sufficiently to induce another, law abiding course of 
action.  The punishment could also reduce crime in the future because it rehabilitated the 
offender, or if it involved a term of imprisonment for example, incapacitated them from 
committing further crime.  The focus of this work will be upon the deterrent justification for 
the imposition of criminal punishments as that has been the dominant perspective in the 
literature to date.  That is not to say that rehabilitation and incapacitation do not play a role in 
the reduction of cartel crime.  Some academics have argued that rehabilitation is inappropriate 
in the antitrust context because they argue that it focused upon,  
 
‘those recidivist individuals who, after being punished, are, by their very nature, still 
incapable of adhering to the law – [so] is of limited relevance when one is considering 
the punishment of rational and educated corporate decision-makers who are capable, 
one assumes, of learning from their mistakes.’178   
 
The implication being therefore, that rehabilitation is reserved only for those who are 
‘powerless to choose not to violate the law’179 because for example, of an addiction to drugs 
or alcohol.180  Others have argued that,  
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‘certainly no one would claim any rehabilitative effect from the imposition of criminal 
punishment on those pillars of the community who agree with their competitors to fix 
prices.’181   
 
This view of rehabilitation however, is based upon its more modern incarnation; the ‘medical 
model.’182  Its roots nevertheless, predate this interpretation of the rehabilitative effects of 
punishment and are based upon a belief that ‘crime [is] a product of society, rather than a result 
of inherent sinfulness.’183  It thereby placed an emphasis upon offering an offender ‘a chance 
at moral transformation.’184  This view of rehabilitation, unlimited by the modern medical 
therapeutic definition, could arguably be in line with modern antitrust enforcement.  The 
typical cartelist is one without a passion for criminal conduct in general and is usually someone 
who has demonstrated that in most aspects of their life that they have a normative commitment 
to obey the law.  That normative commitment however, is not extended to the prohibitions of 
anti-cartel enforcement, within the corporate ‘society’ in which cartel agreements are reached.  
Punishment then becomes a way in which their moral judgment can be rehabilitated or 
transformed.  In this context therefore, rehabilitation is almost synonymous with the moralising 
and educative function of the criminal law that is a critical element of the compliance literature.   
 
Some academics have argued that incapacitation is an inappropriate justification for criminal 
punishment for cartel conduct because,  
 
‘we do not wish to put cartelists (who, their cartel activity notwithstanding, are usually 
productive, law-abiding members of society) behind bars merely to prevent them from 
being physically able to cartelize again in the future.’185 
 
Whelan goes on to say that there are far less severe alternatives to imprisonment that would 
incapacitate reoffending, namely competition disqualification orders, but that they are to be 
considered inferior to criminal sanction because of their ability to create a general deterrent 
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effect.186  This argument is in line with the earlier discussion of the principles that limit the 
scope of the criminal law to prohibit conduce and so, incapacitation in the narrow context of 
justifying criminal sanction is therefore, not appropriate, but that does not negate its role in the 
wider, crime reduction enforcement landscape.   
 
The fourth justification for the imposition of criminal punishment is backward looking, and 
seeks to validate the use of the sanction because a wrong has been committed and that wrong 
deserves to be punished.  This approach to criminal punishment is referred to as a retributive 
theory of criminal punishment, and together with deterrence, which is a utilitarian justification, 
are considered to be the most appropriate means by which criminal sanctions for cartel conduct 
can be advocated and it for this reason that the focus of this work will rest upon them.   
 
  2.4.2.  Utilitarianism and the Cartel Offence 
 
Utilitarian theories of criminal punishment can be traced back to Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 
1832), although since its inception many variations of the original thesis have developed.  
Utilitarianism maintains that an action can be justified by the consequent utility that the action 
has.  In terms of legal punishment therefore, it can be justified when the future consequence of 
the punishment has a greater utility that the harm of the punishment itself.187  Utilitarian 
theories of punishment seek to ‘evaluate actions in terms of their propensity to maximise 
goodness’188 and believe that the ultimate measure of morality is that of utility.189  Bentham’s 
classical theory argues that an action that produces more good than the alternatives is the right 
action.190  Bentham believed that mankind had been placed under the ‘two sovereign 
masters’191 of pleasure and pain, and that people had an innate tendency to seek out one and 
avoid the other.192  In the context of legal sanction, utilitarian theory argues that the primary 
function of the sanction, the infliction of harm, is outweighed by beneficial the consequence of 
that sanction.193  That consequence is the deterrent effect that the public imposition of that harm 
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is said to create, which is capable of persuading others to obey the law in the future.  This is 
turn will result in fewer crimes194 in the future which is beneficial to the happiness of society.195  
This indirect consequence of the punishment is sufficiently utile that when balanced against 
the ‘primary mischief’196 of the sanction, a net utility to society has been achieved.  The 
ultimate aim of utilitarian theory therefore, is the overall reduction of pain or harm within 
society.  That by definition, must include the pain suffered by the defendant as a result of the 
imposition of a punishment for wrongdoing.  The sanction must therefore, ‘be employed only 
when the disutility of its imposition is less than the utility to society secured by its deterrent 
effect.’197  The infliction of a punishment also serves to address any increased temptation to 
reoffend that may be induced by the successful commission of a crime.198 
 
The deterrent effect of punishment can be divided into two broad categories; special deterrence, 
which operates to prevent the subject of the punishment, from reoffending, and general 
deterrence which operates as a deterrent on the public in general.199  In the anti-cartel 
enforcement landscape general deterrence is the primary motivating factor as it is felt that 
‘(individual) recidivism following incarceration is considered to be “virtually non-existent” 
even if recidivism by the corporate body is acknowledges by EU antitrust enforcement policy 
and practice.’200   
 
Gary Becker’s seminal work has introduced an economic perspective to the debate on 
utilitarian theory that has become influential in the discussions about the creation of deterrence 
in the anti-cartel enforcement space.  In his work, the maximisation of wealth is the 
determinative standard by which the utility of an act is to be judged.201  This economic approach 
to deterrence theory argues that individuals are rational and can be expected to act in their own, 
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welfare maximising interests.202  If therefore, the ‘price’ of the punishment is greater than the 
gain of the prohibited action, a person will be deterred from breaking the law.203   
 
Utilitarian theory is not without its critics, one of the most powerful of which is that it fails to 
address the fact that a wrongful conviction that produces the sought after general deterrence 
would still be justified by pure utilitarian theory.204  Although the harm of a criminal sanction 
suffered by an innocent person will be greater than the harm suffered by a guilty one, if the 
deterrent effect of the sanction is created, the net utility to society could still achieved and 
therefore the imposition of the sanction would, in theory at least, be justified.205  The 
assumption of rational thinking crucial to the economic theory of deterrence articulated by 
Becker has been also been criticised for failing to ‘adequately reflect reality.’206 The strength 
of this criticism is arguably dependent upon the specific crime in question.  In the example of 
the drug addict, rationality is likely to play a very limited role in the decision of whether or not 
to commit.  In the context of the cartel offence however, a higher degree of rationality could 
reasonably be expected to be present in the decision of whether or not to collude illegally.  The 
process of maintaining a cartel agreement also implies a high degree of rational consideration.  
Therefore, in the context of anti-cartel enforcement this particular criticism of economic 
deterrence theory is less powerful.  A further criticism is based on the premise that the cost and 
the benefit of the commission of a crime can in practice, be adequately quantified so, 
 
‘while economic theory can indeed be used to set the quantum of punishment, its 
application in a real world scenario, where the variables may not be determined 
accurately, can prove difficult if not impossible.’207  
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In respect of the cartel offence, calculating the benefit of committing the offence is in theory, 
more simple to ascertain that would be the case for a non-economic crime.  However, the true 
calculation of the harm of a cartel is a complex process that requires a counterfactual against 
which the effect of the cartel can be judged.  Further, the typical cartelist is likely to be a well 
remunerated individual of otherwise good standing.  The impact of a prison sentence for a 
cartelist then is likely to be high, both economically and reputationally which, according to 
utilitarian theory, would mean that a less severe sentence would achieve the deterrence effect 
sought.  This argument is further supported by the fact that the direct benefit of the cartel is not 
typically felt by the individual cartelists, but by the undertaking. Nevertheless, the criminal 
cartel offence provides for a term of imprisonment of up to 5 years.  This is perhaps to mitigate 
for the exceptionally low enforcement of the criminal cartel offence, a variable that is 
considered in economic deterrence theory.208  This approach however, risks over enforcement 
in individual cases and disproportionate sentences for the purpose of manipulating the 
behaviour of other potential cartelists, which could undermine the legitimacy of the offence in 
the view of the wider public.  To punish an individual in a manner that is disproportionate to 
the offence he committed just so that future potential harm could be perhaps avoided ignores 
the autonomy of the individual in question.  Kant criticised this aspect of utilitarian theory 
when he said that punishment,  
 
‘[c]an never be used merely as a means to promote some other good for the criminal 
himself or for civil society, but instead it must in all cases be imposed on him only on 
the grounds that he has committed a crime; for a human being may never be 
manipulated as a means to the purposes of some else…He must first be found to be 
deserving of punishment before any consideration is given to the utility of his 
punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens.209   
 
The economic theory of deterrence has long been deployed to determine how to create a 
sufficient deterrent effect in anti-cartel enforcement.  In respect of administrative fines levied 
against undertakings the question of calculating the benefit of the cartel agreement in order to 
determine the level of requisite fine is much simpler than the same calculation in respect of 
prison sentences for individual cartelists.  The pursuit of deterrence in an administrative context 
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is also arguably less controversial as the liberty of individual people is not being leveraged to 
manipulate the possible future behaviour of others.  Deterrence has dominated the criminal 
enforcement landscape however, despite the fact that the original inclusion of dishonesty 
alluded to a more moralistic approach to fighting cartel crime.  
 
  2.4.3.  Retributivism and the Cartel Offence 
 
Retributivism, which some regard as ‘the oldest theory of punishment’210 finds its classical 
roots in Immanuel Kant’s, ‘The Metaphysical Elements of Justice.’211  Its central tenant is that 
justice can only be achieved when those who are guilty of doing wrong are punished.  It is a 
backward, or non-consequentialist justification because the imposition of criminal punishment 
focuses on the wrongful act that has been committed and not any future benefit that may arise 
from that punishment, like, for example, the prevention of the further wrongful acts yet to be 
done.   Punishment is deserved not because of the future benefit of that punishment, but because 
transgressing accepted standards deserves punishment, i.e. punishment is a wrongdoer’s just 
desserts.  Punishment therefore, becomes a way to condemn unacceptable behaviour and to 
apportion blame for harm upon the guilty.212  Followers of retributivist thinking maintain that 
in focusing only upon each individual defendant and the punishment that they deserve, they 
are affording them a respect that utilitarians do not as utilitarian theory it is argued, uses them 
simply as a means to an end.213 
 
Modern retributive supporters have moved away from this classical justification of criminal 
punishment and recognise that there are other benefits of punishment than simply the 
punishment is deserved because it is deserved.  The most prominent of those benefits are the 
removal of any ‘unjust advantage’ that a wrongdoer has obtained by his wrongdoing,214 and 
the role of criminal sanctions are a communicator to society of the wrongfulness of an action.215   
 
The criminal cartel offence as originally drafted, appeared to embrace this approach to 
punishment.  Cartelists were to be punished not simply in order to deter future illegal collusion, 
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but because to enter into a cartel was a dishonest and wrongful act, thereby deserving of 
punishment.  The severity of the potential sanction, up to 5 years in prison, would ‘restore 
social balance’216 and ‘neutralize an unfair advantage secured by non-compliant citizens in 
breach of the law.’217  It would also serve to communicate to society the seriousness of the 
offence and arguably therefore, contribute to society’s normative commitment to obey the law 
in general, and that law in particular, reducing the need for the State to compel its citizens into 
obedience.  This principle can be traced back to Plato who said that the purpose of punishment 
‘is not to cancel the crime – what is once done can never be made undone – but to bring the 
criminal and all who witness it to complete renunciation of such criminality.’218 
 
The removal of dishonesty, without a moralising equivalent, could therefore be said to 
fundamentally change the philosophical justification for the imposition of criminal punishment 
for individuals who enter into illegal agreements.  A retributive approach to the punishment of 
individual cartelists perceives justice as a value in and of itself, worthy of pursuing.219  In 
contrast with deterrence theory, which requires that a constant flow of successful prosecutions 
be maintained in order for optimal deterrence to be achieved, a retributive approach to 
sanctioning requires only upon discovery, the guilty are punished.  The amended cartel offence 
brings individual sanctions more closely in line with the majority of anti-cartel enforcement.  
In doing so however, it perhaps risks further undermining its perception as an effective 
deterrent, if the anticipated increased ease of prosecution (that was a driving force of 
dishonesty’s removal) does not materialise.   
 
The retributive approach to criminal punishment is not without its criticisms.  By failing to 
concern itself with the prevention of future crime for example, it is open to the criticism that a 
government that relies solely upon retributive approaches to criminal punishment, is failing in 
one of its fundamental functions of government, namely the protection of its people from harm.  
An approach to punishment based only on just desserts appears to ignore this ‘relatively 
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straightforward proposition that helping to prevent persons from mistreating others is an 
important and legitimate function of the state.’220  It also appears to be blind to the fact that,  
 
‘[t]he very form of criminal punishment strongly suggests a preventative design.  When 
the state criminalises conduct, it issues a legal threat: such conduct is proscribed and 
violation will result in the imposition of specified penalties.  This threat surely has 
something to do with inducing citizens to refrain from the proscribed conduct.’221 
 
2.5.  Conclusions 
 
It is important to try to understand the justification for creating a criminal cartel offence and 
thereby, permitting the use of criminal punishment upon individuals who engage in illegal 
collusion because ‘if we do not know why we punish, we cannot even begin to ask the question 
of whether punishment is morally justified.’222  It is more, therefore, than an academic exercise; 
it helps to create a standard against which the practical function of enforcement and punishment 
can be judged.  When the justification and therefore, aim, of the punishment is unclear the 
choice of appropriate enforcement tool also becomes unclear.  In a complex regulatory space 
that has many interconnected features, this lack of clarity could arguably result in unexpected 
and unintended reactions between enforcement tools, and ultimately the wrong tools being used 
at the wrong time, to the overall detriment in the fight against cartel activity.   
 
The original cartel offence appears to have attempted to utilise retributive theories of 
punishment whilst also pursuing utilitarian objectives.  Instead of relying upon an argument 
rooted solely in the need for greater deterrence, perhaps because that need had not been 
adequately demonstrated, moralistic language became central to the discussion of why a 
criminal law response to cartels was required.  This approach, given the novel nature of the 
cartel offence, had its benefits as it meant that a greater focus upon communicating the 
wrongfulness of hard-core agreements to people who, ordinarily it would appear, are persuaded 
to comply with the law and avoid engaging in illegal and wrongful activities.  It did however, 
introduce entirely new policy considerations to competition law, arguably without the proper 
																																																						
220 Andreas von Hirsch and Andrew Ashford, ‘Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring Principles,’ (Oxford 
University Press 2005) p.14.  
221 Andreas von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment? From “Why Punish” to “How 
Much”’ (1990) Criminal Law Forum 259.  
222 Whitney Kaufman (2013) supra n 143, p.1.  
 53	
	
consideration of how those considerations would sit amongst the rest of the anti-cartel 
enforcement toolkit, particularly the operation and perception of the leniency programme.  
Dishonesty’s removal therefore, brought the criminal cartel offence in line with the remainder 
of the enforcement toolkit and in doing so, could have reduced the risk of difficult and 
unintended reactions between enforcement tools.  Nevertheless, what has been created is an 
anti-cartel regulatory space that is too heavily weighted in favour of deterrence, and if the 
desired increased ease of prosecutions does not occur, the legitimacy of the offence may be 
further jeopardised.  A purely deterrence focused approach to reducing cartel crime is less 
effective as a moral educator and so risks overlooking the various and nuanced ways in which 
people can be persuaded into obeying the law.  This is particularly relevant in the sphere of 
crime committed in a corporate environment by individuals who appear to, in most aspects of 
their life, have some degree of normative commitment to legal obedience evidenced by their 
lack of criminal history.   
 
A more nuanced approach to tackling cartels that seeks to incorporate some element of moral 
blameworthiness is arguably better suited therefore, to this conundrum; that cartelists appear 
to have a high degree of normative commitment to law obedience in most aspects of their life, 
that could perhaps, in the right circumstances, be extended to cartel crime.  Further, despite the 
critical role that deterrence plays in justifying the inclusion of a criminal sanction in a 
previously administrative only regime, it seems clear that the concept of deterrence, and more 
importantly, how it is created in practice, has been underestimated by the Government as 
evidenced by the then, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Patricia Hewitt MP quoting 
the words of David Lenon when he said,  
 
‘I do not believe that many business people will end up in jail as a result of the 
government’s proposal.  But introducing a criminal sanction should provide a strong 
disincentive.’223 
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Chapter 3:  Cartel Crime Reduction: Understanding Deterrence and the Alternatives 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter sought to understand the various theoretical justifications for imposing 
criminal sanctions upon individuals found to have engaged in hard core cartel agreements.  In 
doing so it highlighted that there is a degree of disconnect between the theory underlying the 
criminal cartel offence and its practical enforcement, typified by the belief that the existence 
of the sanction alone is sufficient to achieve the desired goal.   The primary justification 
articulated by the government when the sanctions were introduced, and again when it was 
amended, was the utilitarian goal of deterrence.  Deterrence itself is not the end objective, it is 
a means by which the end could be achieved.  The end of course, is a reduction in the number 
of cartels and thereby, a reduction in the harm that cartels inflict upon consumers, and the 
competitive process.   
 
The analysis in Chapter 2 showed that deterrence is only one way in which criminal cartel 
sanctions could be justified, and the desired objective of obedience with the cartel laws could 
be achieved.  It showed that when the original cartel offence was created, there was some intent 
to engage with retributivist theories of punishment which focus on punishing offenders rather 
that preventing future offences. A retributivist approach to enforcement, whilst not 
consequentialist in nature, can play a role in controlling, and reducing crime by helping to 
create the perception that cartels are serious and morally condemnable offences, something that 
will be considered in more detail later in the chapter.   
 
This chapter aims to consider the deterrence theory in more detail and thereby, explore and 
address the disconnect that currently exists between theoretical deterrence and real world cartel 
deterrence.  It will also explore alternative methods of crime control that the UK have been 
slow to fully engage with.  The purpose of so doing is to establish whether a more holistic and 
inclusive response to cartels could benefit the regime, and its outcomes, as a whole.   
 
Deterrence is the primary mechanism by which the reduction of cartels is to be achieved in the 
UK, indeed some have argued that is it ‘the only significant function of sanctions for cartel 
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activity,’224 and yet when the criminal cartel offence was created, little time was taken to 
understand how the theoretical concept of a deterrent effect would be achieved in practice.  
Further, as articulated in the previous chapter, when the cartel offence was originally created, 
the inclusion of dishonesty as the substantive mens rea test indicated that deterrence was not 
the exclusive means by which cartel activity was to be tackled.  Nevertheless, the almost 
exclusive focus on deterrence in practice has arguably meant that alternative methods of 
addressing the problem of cartels have not been adequately considered, a problem which has 
potentially been exacerbated by the removal of dishonesty as the substantive test for the 
offence.   
 
This chapter seeks to explore how practical deterrence can be created in the context of the 
criminal cartel offence.  This will provide a way of identifying any shortfalls in the current 
enforcement landscape.  The chapter will then go on to consider alternative methods of crime 
control that could be utilized in order to enhance the anti-cartel enforcement space in the UK.  
Alternative methods of crime control are arguably an important element of a successful 
approach to cartel reduction because most people comply with the law voluntarily, without the 
need for coercive threats, and to ‘conceive the preventative effects of punishment as simply a 
matter of deterrence or intimidation is to miss more subtle points which are fundamental.’225  
Some have argued that these more subtle points can be included in a generous definition of 
deterrence,226 whilst others maintain that they are ‘something quite different and independent 
of deterrence.’227  It is this latter position that this work takes because obeying the law because 
of some level of ‘unconscious control’228 without, perhaps, even being aware of the specific 
laws that are being obeyed, cannot be regarded as the same as refraining from breaking the law 
out of fear of a known sanction.  Further, when government institutions intend for their 
enforcement choices to reduce crime in a utilitarian manner, they do so in the hope that they 
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will prevent future crime in the narrow sense229 articulated above, and it is against this standard 
that specific crime control tools are judged.   
 
3.2. Understanding Deterrence 
  
Deterrence as a mechanism for controlling crime is popular across the globe.  Indeed, Morris 
states that ‘every criminal law system in the world, except one, has deterrence as its primary 
and essential postulate.’230  In respect of competition law, some have argued that ‘effectiveness 
in the field of the fight against cartels is ultimately about deterrence’231 so its relationship with 
the State’s duty to protect its citizens from harm cannot be ignored.  Nevertheless, the 
theoretical capacity for deterrence to reduce undesired and prohibited conduct needs to be 
properly understood and utilised correctly if the desired goal is to be achieved in practice.   
 
Deterrence in the context of this work adopts a narrow usage, derived from Cesare Beccaria’s, 
‘On Crimes and Punishment’232 which arguably provided the basis for Jeremy Bentham’s 
model of deterrence,233 which again, provided the basis for the more modern incarnation of 
deterrence theory as articulated by Nobel Prize Winner, Gary Becker in his seminal work, 
‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.’234  That ‘narrow usage specifies that a 
person is deterred from doing something if he failed to act because he feared the extrinsic 
consequences of that action.’235  This definition therefore, excludes any intrinsic factors that 
may have produced a similar result, such as feelings of guilty or moral outrage.236 
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The literature on deterrence in this narrow sense is vast and diverse, but much of it agrees that 
deterrence can be further divided into the two sub-categories of ‘general deterrence’ and 
‘special deterrence.’  General deterrence aims to deter the ‘unsanctioned population’237 from 
committing the regulated crime, and specific deterrence aims to deter the already punished 
individual from reoffending.238  In a recent review of the literature, the CMA also highlighted 
the importance of incremental deterrence upon the enforcement landscape in the UK.239  
Incremental deterrence refers to the additional deterrent effect of one enforcement tool as 
compared to another, or the marginal increase in the overall deterrent effect of the regime as a 
whole when a measure is added, amended or removed.  
 
For the purposes of precision it is important to remember that ‘there are no deterrents, only 
measures which may be deterrents’240  This clarity is helpful because it recognises that the 
inclusion of an enforcement tool within a regulatory landscape is insufficient alone to achieve 
deterrence, the tool is merely a means by which, if implemented correctly and in the correct 
conditions, can create a deterrent effect capable of manipulating behaviour.  The ‘correct 
implementation’ includes an offence which is clearly defined and capable of enforcement, with 
a sanction that outweighs the intended gain of the crime.  The ‘right conditions’ include a 
general acceptance that the conduct is wrong, and the ability to communicate the enforcement 
actions and successes of the responsible authority.  Each of these elements work together to 
turn the legislative threat of a sanction and turn it into a real world fear which dissuades people 
from breaking the law, even though they still wish to.   
 
The threat of the sanction is the most obvious element required to create a deterrent effect but 
alone it is insufficient to create a credible deterrent effect for the purpose of reducing crime.  
The advantage of this approach to crime control is that it places much of the control in the 
hands of the State; choose a sufficiently severe sanction and citizens can be compelled into 
obeying the law, even when they do not want to.  The belief is that people act in their own best 
interests and so can be manipulated through the use of rewards and punishments.241   People 
who do follow this instrumentalist approach to decision making will base their decisions upon 
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their own estimates of whether they will get caught and punished, and how this compares to 
the potential benefit to be derived from committed the proscribed act.242  This view of crime 
control however, implies that if all people made the choice to obey the law in this way, the 
State would be in a constant state of compelling its citizens to comply with the law when their 
best interests would otherwise be best served by not obeying the law, and would only 
voluntarily comply when doing so was in their best interests anyway.243  Intuitively, this cannot 
be the case in practice as generally, people are not in a constant state of supressing urges to 
break the law solely because they reasonably expect to get caught and fear the punishment if 
they do.   
 
Nevertheless, in the context of crimes which are committed after a relatively rational 
consideration of the costs and the benefits, deterrence theory can arguably play an important 
role in altering the calculation of whether to commit a crime in favour of legal obedience 
instead.  However, whilst ignorantia legis neminem excusat, ignorance of the law (or its 
sanctions) is the perfect excuse for not being deterred by it. Therefore, a ‘law-enforcement 
measure will only act as a deterrent in certain circumstances.’244  Those circumstances, as 
outlined in the literature, are: 
 
1.  Knowledge that the act is prohibited,  
2. Fear that there is a genuine risk of being caught (certainty of detection), 
3. Fear that there is a genuine risk of being successfully prosecuted (certainty of 
prosecution), and  
4. Fear of the sanction, and a genuine belief that it will be imposed by the courts 
(sanction severity)245 
 
This work will refer to these conditions as the ‘chain of deterrence’ with each condition being 
a link within that chain.  For a deterrent effect to be created in practice, each link within the 
chain must operate sufficiently to allow the communication of the threatened sanction to 
operate a dissuasive force upon the deterrable potential criminal.  It is important to define this 
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class of people as the target of deterrent focus because although an individual knows of a 
criminal prohibition and would fear it’s associated sanction, his decision to obey the law may 
be totally independent of that knowledge and fear.  ‘He may have simply not wanted to commit 
the crime, he may not have had the opportunity, or the ability.’246  It cannot be said therefore, 
that he was deterred.247  Zimring and Hawkins articulated the targets of deterrent threats to be 
the ‘marginal group’, one of three categories of the population.  The three categories consist 
of: the law-abiding – those who obey the law for moral or habitual reasons; the criminal group 
– those who will commit crime no matter what steps are taken to deter them; and the marginal 
group – those who could be persuaded to commit crime or not depending upon the 
circumstances.248   
 
These categorisations are not unproblematic as they imply a staticness that is arguably not 
reflective of reality, for example, a member of the criminal group may be ‘undeterrable’ 
because he suffers from a drug or alcohol addiction, but if treated for that addiction and in 
remission, may in the future be deterred by the threat of more legal sanctions, or indeed may 
become a member of the law-abiding group.   
 
Beyleveld focuses his criticism of this categorisation however, on the fact that it seeks to base 
the differences between each category upon ‘differences between persons rather than upon 
differences between actions.’249  He argues that:  
 
‘deterribility is a direct function of types of actions … and only indirectly a function of 
types of persons.  In order to construct a typology what is required is to divide up 
explanations of compliance or non-compliance, group them, and then only secondarily 
apply them to persons.  We should really speak of “marginal actions” … Persons are 
only ‘marginal’ in so far as they contemplate crimes which can only be prevented by 
																																																						
246 Deryck Beyleveld (1980) supra n. 212, p.xxxii. 
247 Jack P. Gibbs and Maynard L. Erickson, ‘Capital Punishment and the Deterrence Doctrine’ in Hugo Adam 
Bedau and Chester M. Pierce (eds) Capital Punishment in the United States, (AMS Press Inc, New York 1976) 
299-313.   
248 Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon J. Hawkins, ‘Deterrence: The Legal Threat in Crime Control’ (University of 
Chicago Press 1973); Franklin E. Zimring, ‘Threat of Punishment as an Instrument of Crime Control’ (1974) 
118(3) Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 231; Franklin E. Zimring, ‘The Legal Threat as an 
Instrument of Social Change’ (1983) 39(4) Journal of Social Issues 143; Franklin E. Zimring and Gordon 
Hawkins, ‘Deterrence and Marginal Groups’ (1968) 5(2) Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 100.  
249 Deryck Beyleveld (1980) supra n.212, p.xxxii.  
 60	
	
successful deterrence.  Furthermore, a person can be marginal in relation to one crime 
but law abiding in relation to another…’250 
 
Therefore, even before considering whether a chain of deterrence has been created it is first 
necessary to determine whether the specific offence in question is a deterrible offence.  
Extrapolating from the discussion in the previous chapter, as deterrence is a utilitarian crime 
control method, a deterrible offence is one in which it is reasonable to assume that an 
instrumental decision making process is utilised when contemplating whether or not to obey 
the law.  In practice therefore, the most deterrible offences are those which are calculated acts 
or are at least ‘capable of calculation in terms of … utility.’251  Marginal acts are therefore more 
likely to be morally neutral as people are less likely to make an instrumental decision about 
whether or not to commit morally condemnable crimes.252  Once it has been established that 
an act is capable of being deterred, the next step is to consider whether a chain of deterrence 
has been created.   
 
3.2.1. Knowledge of Criminality 
 
In order to be deterred against committing a specific crime a potential defendant must at the 
very least, be aware that the action is prohibited by the criminal law, and whenever possible, 
the severity of the sanction that can be imposed when prosecuted for that crime.  In respect of 
certain crimes specific knowledge of the legislative sanction may not be necessary for law-
abiding, or even marginal persons to be persuaded to obey the law.  For example, in general a 
person does not have to have specific knowledge of the crime of rape to know that it is illegal, 
and it is very unlikely that such knowledge will be the determining factor in a rapist’s decision 
of whether or not to commit the crime.  Crimes in this category therefore, are not rightly 
regarded as instrumental or deterrible crimes.   
 
In contrast, for a legislative sanction to operate as a deterrent for a marginal or deterrible act, 
the State must take steps to attempt to communicate the criminality of that act to those who 
may consider engaging in it.  In the context of the criminal cartel offence, it is for this reason 
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that the CMA has an obligation to advocate for fair and effective competition and to publicise 
its enforcement actions.  In a recent review of literature, the CMA highlighted that any 
enforcement action that it takes has a greater deterrent impact upon other firms in the same 
sector, in part because it increases the knowledge amongst other firms in that sector of the 
illegality of collusive conduct.253  Over time, as the number of enforcement actions increase, it 
should be expected that the degree of ignorance of the legal threats in place for cartel behaviour, 
will decrease.   
 
Increased knowledge of the criminality of hard-core collusive agreements could also have a 
beneficial impact upon voluntary compliance rates.  If, for example, there was a gradual 
increase in the number of cartelists being sent to jail, the moral neutrality with which some 
people appear to regard cartel conduct, may be altered in favour of a more moral blameworthy 
view, arguably thereby increasing the likelihood that those who have a degree of normative 
commitment to not commit morally condemnable crimes, include hard-core collusion within 
the scope of the crimes they will not commit.  
 
3.2.2. Certainty of Detection 
 
The probability of an act being detected is sometimes considered in the literature under the 
more expansive term, certainty of punishment.254  Certainty of punishment includes both the 
certainty of detection and the certainty of prosecution.  In the context of this work however, it 
is appropriate to consider each element separately, and that is because of the specific challenges 
inherent to anti-cartel enforcement.  The detection of cartels raises particular challenges, 
referred to as the ‘cartel problem,’255 that are not always relevant in the context of traditional 
crimes.  The cartel problem is borne of the inherent secrecy of cartels combined with the fact 
that some of the typical detectable symptoms of collusive agreement, similar pricing amongst 
competitors for example, may just be examples of normal market conduct.  The challenge that 
poses for investigators then is rather than having to determine whether an action was illegally 
rather than legally carried out, as for example in the case of rape, they must establish whether 
in fact the act was carried out at all.256  This is not a problem exclusive to cartel as ‘[e]nforcers 
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regularly face extreme difficulties in detecting errant behaviour when the regulated community 
is vast … and where breaching rules is cheap and easily carried out in a clandestine manner.’257 
 
In order for a deterrent effect to be created there must be a belief that there is a realistic prospect 
of being detected for committing the crime.  When considering morally neutral offences, the 
degree of certainty of detection is likely to play a crucial role in the level of deterrence 
created.258  In the case of parking violations for example, an offence that the majority of people 
would consider morally neutral, it is likely a proportion of those same people would take an 
instrumental approach to deciding whether or not to park in a prohibited manner.  They would 
not, therefore, park illegally when the potential pleasure of parking more conveniently (but 
illegally) is outweighed by the risk of being caught and fined.  If however, there is a genuinely 
held belief that they are very unlikely to be caught, because for example they will not be parked 
there for very long, they may be much more inclined to take the risk.259  External factors, such 
as the presence of a parking official, or if they have recently received a parking fine, are likely 
to alter the perception of the likelihood of their detection.260 
 
As previously mentioned the detection of cartels, as with many financial crimes, could be 
regarded a weak link in the chain of deterrence.  Any enforcement policy seeking to deter 
cartels must therefore take steps to address and mitigate that weakness.  Attempts have been 
made to determine the detection rate of cartels, with some estimating the probability of 
detection in the EU to be around 13%261 and others placing that probability between 15% and 
20%.262  In traditional competition law behavioural economics, the low detection rate of cartels 
has an important impact on the severity of the sanction deemed to be appropriate for creating 
deterrence.  This is because utilitarian deterrence theory maintains that a low rate of detection 
can be offset by increasing the ultimate sanction as dissuasion will occur only when the benefit 
of the cartel rents is less or equal to the expected sanction.263  The expected sanction is the 
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average sanction times the inverse probability of getting caught.264  The calculation is not so 
clear cut when criminal prohibitions and non-pecuniary sanctions are to be considered.  If a 
purely instrumental approach was adopted for calculating the appropriate sentence, given the 
likely social standing and salary of a typical cartelists, very short periods of incarceration 
should be sufficient to induce a significant deterrent threat (the lost remuneration would be 
high and therefore the financial consequences would be high, together with the social shaming 
and stigma of a criminal conviction would be higher than compared, for example, to an 
unemployed repeat offender who commits a theft).  
 
The inclusion of a leniency programme, whereby whistle-blowers can achieve immunity from 
or a reduction in fine from the competition authorities in exchange for otherwise unattainable 
information regarding a cartel, is the primary mechanism by which competition authorities 
have sought to tackle the cartel problem.  It is considered by some to be critical to effective 
cartel detection and thereby deterrence.265  The resulting overall lower penalties266 is accepted 
as the inverse of the above proposition; higher detection rates require lower penalties for 
effective deterrence.   
 
Credible detection rates are also reliant upon the knowledge and abilities of the competition 
authorities because ‘brilliant theory without skilful implementation’267 will never lead to 
optimal enforcement.  An effective competition agency is dependent upon a number of factors, 
including sufficient budgetary allocation,268 adequate internal planning and strategy 
implementation, and most importantly of all ‘the capabilities of the managers and staff who 
implement the agency’s programmes.’269  The mix of knowledge and experience of the staff 
must reflect the needs of the agency and the policy mechanisms that they seek to implement.  
The inclusion of a criminal sanction therefore, requires the addition of staff with experience of 
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criminal investigations and prosecutions to a highly skilled staff of economists, lawyers and 
managers. An ongoing assessment of the needs of the agency is vital to its success, particularly 
when fundamental alterations are made to the mix of policy tools or to the scale of enforcement 
required.  A successful agency therefore will typically be created ‘through a series of 
incremental improvements over time.’270 
 
When the criminal cartel offence was originally added to the enforcement toolkit, there was 
arguably a failure to recruit enough suitably qualified personnel to oversee and implement the 
new function.  This was likely a contributing factor to the failure of the prosecution of the 
British Airways Executives.  Following the creation of the CMA however, this failure was 
addressed with, inter alia, the recruitment of their first in-house General Counsel and the 
creation of the Director of Criminal Enforcement position.271  However, prior to the 
amalgamation of the CC and the OFT, the CC routinely scores an Elite 5 Star rating in the 
annual Global Competition Review enforcement rankings.  The CMA however, received only 
a 4 star rating in the most recent review.272  A senior member of the CC Legal Department had 
mused, prior to the amalgamation, that the joining of the two agencies may drag the 
effectiveness of the CC down rather than pull the OFT up,273 and there appears, at least by the 
GCR’s standards, to be some anecdotal evidence that that may have initially been the case.   
 
 3.2.3.  Certainty of Prosecution 
 
Certainty of prosecution, the second element of certainty of punishment, poses its own 
particular challenges.  It refers to the likelihood that once an illegal act has been detected, a 
prosecution will be successfully carried out, resulting in the punishment of the criminal.  In 
respect of the criminal cartel offence, the inherent secrecy of the agreements and the difficulty 
with which evidence of them is obtained, combined with the higher evidential burden and 
procedural protections for criminal cases, mean that the decision to prosecute is not a foregone 
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conclusion.274  Additionally, in pre-2013 cartel cases where dishonesty is still at issue, it is 
unclear how a prosecution will fair when part of their case will be dependant upon the 
testimony of an equally culpable cartelists who, in order to obtain immunity from prosecution, 
has had to admit that they have acted dishonestly.  
 
Immunity from prosecution is atypical in traditional criminal law offences in the UK and as a 
result there is little empirical information available as to how a British jury may receive the 
testimony of a culpable whistle-blower, particularly an admittedly dishonest one.  Research 
conducted in Australia found that the support for immunity from prosecution for whistle 
blowers was low even when the information that they provided would likely have been 
otherwise uncovered by the authorities.275 
 
The reality of the increased difficulties with which criminal prosecutions face in the context of 
anti-cartel enforcement, meant that in 2017/18, despite 10 civil enforcement cases being 
opened by the CMA against undertakings for engaging in hard-core collusion, there were no 
criminal enforcement cases opened against any of the individuals responsible for creating and 
implementing those hard-core agreements.276   Further, when the CMA has chosen to bring a 
case and it has been contested by the defendants, the CMA have not faired well.277  In 2015 
they brought their first criminal case since the collapse of the trial against the British Airways 
executives.  The case involved a cartel agreement between three competitors in the market for 
supplying galvanised steel tanks for water storage in the UK.  A civil investigation of the cartel 
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resulted in an infringement decision and a £2.5 million fine.278  The CMA brought criminal 
charges against three executives, one of whom, Peter Nigel Snee, pleaded guilty and was 
sentences to 6 months imprisonment, suspended for 12 months, and 120 hours community 
service.279  The remaining two, Clive Dean and Nicholas Stringer however, contested the 
charges.  Because the cartel agreement to fix prices, divide up customers and rig bids operated 
between 2005 and 2012, the CMA had to bring the criminal prosecution under the original 
cartel offence.  Mr Dean and Mr Stringer therefore, maintained as their defence that they had 
not acted dishonestly.  Counsel for their defence argued, inter alia, that they had not acted 
dishonestly because their agreements were implemented to save their businesses and thereby 
the jobs of their employees, not to increase their profits.  At the material time, Ghosh dishonesty 
required that the conduct was dishonest by the standards of reasonable and honest people, and 
that the defendant realised that by that standard, his conduct would be considered dishonest.  
The jury took just two and a half hours to unanimously acquit both defendants.280   
 
Cartelists who have been bold enough to contest prosecutions brought under the original cartel 
offence, so far have a 100% success rate.   
 
 3.2.4. Sanction Severity 
 
The above discussion also serves to highlight that sanction severity can operate as an obstacle 
to optimal deterrence.  Since the original cartel offence was created in 16 years ago, there have 
been only 5 criminal prosecutions brought by the OFT or the CMA.281  Of those 5 cases only 
3 resulted in convictions (2 by way of early guilty plea and 1 as a result of a plea deal with the 
Department of Justice).  The UK courts, when unconstrained by the terms of an American plea 
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deal, have shown that they are reluctant to condemn cartelists to spend time in jail.  The two 
cartelists who pleaded guilty received suspended prison sentences and so in the absence of 
committing another crime (which seems unlikely given the otherwise law abiding nature of a 
typical cartelist) they will not spend a single day in jail.   
 
Sanction severity plays an important role in the effective creation of a deterrent effect and it is 
ultimately the source of the fear that seeks to serve as a behaviour manipulator.  The preceding 
links in the chain of deterrence are the means by which the threat is actualised, but the threat 
itself is the sanction. ‘[C]ultural values … impose limits on’282 the severity of a sanction in 
response to a crime.  In some American states for example, capital punishment is still culturally 
acceptable for very serious crimes such as murder.  In the UK however, the imposition of the 
death penalty for murder (or any other crime) is not culturally acceptable and so a cultural limit 
is placed upon the tolerated sanctioning power of the State.  When discussions consider the 
severity of a sanction therefore, they must occur in light of the cultural and political context in 
which they exist.283   
 
In Western nations that often means looking to the penal choices of other nations or for 
comparable offences to gauge the acceptable upper limit of a sanction.  In the case of the 
criminal cartel offence the penal choices of the USA, Japan and Canada284 were considered, 
and insider dealing and obtaining property by deception were also considered as comparable 
offences.  This, in part, led to the UK adopting a maximum sentence of a term of imprisonment 
of up to 5 years.285   
 
Comparable offences and the penal choices of other nations should not however, be the totality 
of the discussion, as if crime reduction by way of deterrence is the primary objective being 
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pursued, the sanction should be no more than is needed to create that deterrent effect.286   The 
cost of the sanction seeking to outweigh the benefit of the cartel, includes a variety of things.  
A term of imprisonment for example, will include the emotional cost of the loss of liberty, the 
psychological costs of shame and guilt, and the economic cost of lost employment.287  The cost 
to each offender will therefore vary depending upon their circumstances but in all cases ‘[t]he 
cost to each offender would be greater the longer the prison sentence since both forgone 
earnings and foregone consumption are positively related to the length of the sentences.’288  
Given the circumstances of a typical cartelist therefore, even a short term of imprisonment is 
likely to carry a significant cost as they are likely to have earned a significant salary, the shame, 
guilty and emotional cost of a prison sentence for an educated, middle class, first time criminal.  
Further, it seems probable that there would also be an economic cost to society of prohibiting 
an otherwise intelligent and successful business person from working.  In purely deterrence 
terms therefore, a term of 5 years in prison would arguably surpass what was required to 
outweigh the benefits of the cartel, particularly given that the benefits of a cartel are usually 
felt primarily by the undertaking and not the individual.   
 
According to deterrence theory, when the certainty of detection is low this can be offset by an 
increase in the severity of the sanction.289  As was discussed above, the probability of detecting 
a cartel, even with the existence of the leniency programme, is relatively low.  A term of 
imprisonment of up to 5 years should, according to the theory, mitigate somewhat for that low 
detection rate.  However, with the courts showing a reluctance to actually send cartelists to jail, 
and with the Court of Appeal stating that it ‘would have little, if any, knowledge of where to 
place [cartel] case[s] in the scale of seriousness’290 because at the time of the Whittle appeal, 
there was ‘no sufficient body of case law … to be able to make that assessment.’291  Since then 
a further 2 defendants have been given suspended prison sentences by the courts, leading to a 
limited body of case law that indicated that prison terms are not the norm.  So despite the 
detection rate being low, and the prosecution rate being even lower, the ultimate severity of the 
sanction is also relatively low, arguably calling into question the deterrent efficacy of criminal 
sanctions for cartelists in the UK.   
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Given that it is improbable that there will be a significant increase in the number of criminal 
prosecutions for engaging in cartels in the short to medium term, the challenge of ensuring that 
a credible sanction is imposed is unlikely to improve significantly in the absence of a set of 
sentencing guidelines292 that advocate for terms of imprisonment that result in cartelists 
actually going to jail.293 
 
 3.2.5.  Conclusions 
 
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link.  In the context of cartel criminalisation, the 
inherent nature of cartels makes detection a particular challenge, as well as prosecution 
particularly in the case of pre-2013 cartels where dishonesty must still be proven.  The use of 
a leniency policy that encourages whistle-blowing is one mechanism that has been adopted to 
mitigate the challenges faced in detecting cartels.  However, detection rates remain relatively 
low and this has the potential to degrade the chain of deterrence.  This is arguably exacerbated 
by the low prosecutorial rates where when cartelists have been bold enough to fight a 
prosecution, so far they have done so with a success rate of 100%.  According to deterrence 
theory however, these problems should be mitigated by the high sanction that is available for 
individuals who engage in cartels.  However, in practice it would seem unlikely that 
successfully prosecuted cartelists will receive sentences anywhere close to the permitted 
maximum.  The chain of deterrence therefore, risks further degradation by the sanctions that 
have in fact been imposed for those who have admitted their guilt.   
 
Despite the fact that the severity of the sanction is the ultimate source of the deterrent fear, ‘the 
factors that make the most difference … are the perceived likelihood of detection and 
enforcement, more than the objective severity of and subjective fearsomeness of the sanctions 
imposed.’294  Crime reduction objectives are more likely to be met if the certainty of 
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punishment is higher (which allows for a lower sanction, all other things being equal).  An 
increase in detection rates is, to a large degree, the result of budgetary increases that enable 
greater recruitment of qualified investigators and prosecutors, as well an increased 
enforcement.  An increase in prosecution rates also brings with it an increase in costs.  To a 
utilitarian, the increase in cost which would lead to an increase in detection, would also lead to 
an increase in the cost of the social harm caused by the cartelist’s actions.295   
 
The choice of investigative method and enforcement tool are critical therefore, and ensuring 
that the combined societal cost of the prohibited action is not too high, and the law enforcement 
response are proportionate.   
 
It would seem therefore, applying the principals of deterrence theory the criminal cartel 
offence, with its low detection rate combined with its low punishment rate, has a long way to 
go to be considered truly effective as a mechanism of crime control in its own right.  It does 
not exist in a vacuum however, and was introduced as an ancillary296 enforcement tool to the 
administrative sanctions that predated it.  Its efficacy as a deterrent therefore, cannot be 
considered in isolation, and the CMA conclude that it has increased the deterrent effect of the 
overall anti-cartel enforcement regime in terms of cartel duration and overall harm.297  But that 
raises the question of whether the use of a sanction that has resulted in three individuals 
spending a significant time in jail, predominantly as a means to improve administrative 
enforcement of competition laws against undertakings is a breach of fundamental concepts of 
fairness and justice.298  
 
 
3.3.  Deterrence and the CMA 
 
As the body responsible for the practical enforcement of the tools with the anti-cartel (and 
indeed competition law) legislative framework in the UK, the impact that their enforcement 
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choices and actions has cannot be underestimated.  It is important therefore, to explore the 
CMA’s approach to deterrence and their understanding of how it can be achieved in practice.  
 
In 2017 the CMA published their review of the literature on the deterrent effect of the wok 
carried out by competition authorities.299  It is the most extensive CMA publication to date on 
deterrence, and gives an in-depth review of much of the available literature about cartel and 
merger deterrence.  Of particular interest to this work is the discussion about the challenges 
that exist in assessing deterrent effects of enforcement tools and practices, particularly the fact 
that ‘few studies attempt to distinguish between the total deterrent effect of particular tools and 
policies … and the incremental effect of increased enforcement activities.’300  Additionally, the 
paper highlights that the literature fails to thoroughly address the question of ‘which type of 
interventions lead to greater levels of deterrence.’301  The document clearly states what 
deterrence means in the context of cartels which they articulate as the impact that the regime 
and the actions taken by competition authorities have in ‘preventing or reducing the severity 
of anticompetitive actions in contemplation or operation.’302  The CMA highlighted that there 
is a particular challenge in assessing deterrence ‘related to the interactions between different 
competition policy tools’303 as some studies have demonstrated that there is a degree of 
interdependency between different areas of competition law enforcement, for example, anti-
cartel enforcement and merger control.304  The nature of the interactions between anti-cartel 
enforcement and merger control are beyond the scope of this work, but are mentioned to again 
highlight the highly complex and inter-related nature of competition law enforcement as a 
whole, as reflected in the challenges of anti-cartel enforcement in particular.   
 
The CMA also acknowledges that a better understanding of the interdependencies that exist 
between the various elements of deterrence could help to give a more thorough understanding 
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of deterrence as a crime control mechanism for anti-cartel enforcement.305  In summarising 
their review of the literature they state that,  
 
‘most papers suggest that cartel enforcement deters anticompetitive activity and that 
this deterrence is reflected in the formation, stability and duration of cartels as well as 
the overcharge associated with cartels that form.’306 
 
As each of these aspects of cartels are explored (formation, stability, duration, and harm) the 
impact of regime existence, regime characteristics, and a leniency programme, and their impact 
upon cartel-specific deterrence are considered.  In the section, ‘Optimising Deterrence,’307 the 
deterrent impact of financial penalties are compared against the impact of the threat of 
imprisonment has in terms of achieving a deterrent effect. In this same way, private and public 
enforcement methods are compared.  The ultimate conclusions that the CMA makes are that, 
inter alia, director disqualification orders are an underused resource capable of creating a 
powerful deterrent effect, and that private enforcement plays a more important role in deterring 
cartelists than had previously been thought308 highlighting the fact that a more diverse 
enforcement approach could improve the capacity of the anti-cartel regime to deter.  In respect 
of CDOs for example, the purpose of which are to protect the public from unfit directors, and 
not deterrence.  However, the CMA found that in one study, competition lawyers and 
companies identified CDOs as ‘ranked second only to criminal penalties.’309  This again 
highlights that whilst an enforcement tool may be used in pursuit of a primary objective, an 
attempt should be made to understand any potential secondary, and in some cases tertiary 
objectives that could be met through its use.   
 
The importance placed upon the leniency programme to the deterrent goals of the regime by 
the CMA is clear from the report, which states that it plays a pivotal role in reducing cartel 
overcharge as well as impacting upon cartel formation.310  The literature on the effect of  a 
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leniency programme on the stability of cartels however, shows the empirical evidence to be 
more mixed,311 with some papers even concluding that cartel stability is in fact improved in 
jurisdictions where there is a leniency programme.312  This is arguably corroborated by the 
finding that ‘it is common for leniency applicants to apply only months or years after the cartel 
has collapsed.’313  The practical reality of this therefore, is that in cases where leniency 
applications are made when the cartel has already collapsed, or is close to it, the applicant has 
already benefitted from the cartel and will not be subject to a fine that could disgorge them of 
their illicit cartel rents.  The individuals responsible will likely not be criminally punished or 
subject to CDOs (depending upon the type of leniency obtained).  The cartel therefore, was not 
deterred, will not be fined, and the directors will not be incapacitated from further wrongdoing.  
The only available consequence would be the compensation of the cartel’s victims, but 
typically, information gained by way of a leniency application will not be made available for 
the purpose of a third party claim for damages.  To a utilitarian, this outcome is acceptable 
when the overall benefit is outweighed by the social cost of allowing a culpable cartel 
participant to escape censure and retain cartel rents.  That benefit naturally includes the future 
deterrence of other undertakings.  The CMA claims that despite not being deterred overall, the 
cartel will likely have caused less harm because of the existence of the leniency programme 
and anti-cartel enforcement, meaning in part, that the cartel rents the immunised cartelist is 
able to retain are lower than they otherwise would be, and the harm to the consumer is reduced.  
The harmful impact upon the competitive process however, is harder to mitigate as the 
mechanisms for subverting the competitive process will have still been successful, despite the 
overall harm being reduced.   
 
The CMA review of literature is the first comprehensive document that they have compiled 
attempting to understand and articulate the deterrent effect of their work.  They acknowledge 
some of the shortfalls of the review such as the difficulty of proving deterrence empirically: 
 
‘it requires making inferences about infringements … that never take place and the 
impact of [CMA] activities on the number of these ‘latent’ infringements … In addition, 
the relationship between the observed (direct) impact and deterrent effect of 
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competition authorities’ work is not obvious: an authority may have a relatively low 
case load because it is not very good at detecting breaches of the law, or because it has 
deterred breaches of the law so effectively that not many remain to be investigated.’314 
 
And the fact that ‘individual aspects of enforcement are often considered independently’ 
resulting in a lack of understanding as to ‘the trade-off between different measures.  For 
example, does increasing the enforcement rate improve deterrence at the same rate when 
penalties are high and when they are low?315  However, there is no critique at all of deterrence 
as an enforcement objective which, given its total dominance in the regulatory space of anti-
cartel enforcement, is arguably short-sighted.  It means that assumptions made in deterrence 
theory that individuals and, indeed, undertakings always act in a rational way and therefore can 
be deterred in the same rational way are accepted without question.   
 
Deterrence is a means by which cartel crime is hopefully reduced.  Deterrence itself is not the 
goal.  Whelan argues that one of the reasons that the European approach to dealing with cartels 
is deficient is because there is a ‘failure to subject cartels behaviour to adequate 
condemnation.’316  Whilst he makes this argument in the context of the ‘instrumental purpose 
of deterrence’, it is an equally valuable criticism in respect of the wider crime reduction goals 
of the regime.  This is again reflected in the lack of engagement with the multiple objectives 
that enforcement tools can pursue, and little understanding of how they may work together to 
enhance the overall impact of the regime.   
 
 
 3.4.  Alternative Methods of Crime Control: The Educative and Moralising Effect 
 
Deterrence theory is predicated upon the assumption that external influences applied by the 
State can be used to manipulate the behaviour of citizens, in a fairly formulaic way.  It places 
the State in a constant state of having to compel people to obey the law using the legislative 
and enforcement mechanisms available to it, and so it a relatively costly way of ensuring legal 
obedience.317  It is far too simplistic, and not at all accurate to argue that people obey the law 
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simply because of they fear the legal consequences if they do not.  Deterrence theory therefore, 
is arguably relevant only to those individuals who have adopt an instrumental approach to the 
question of legal obedience.  Even Jeremy Bentham recognised that ‘other tutelary motives 
such as benevolence, religion and honour’318 play a vital role in the decision, whether conscious 
or not, to obey the law.  Those other motives are internalised factors that influence an 
individual’s decision to act in accordance with accepted societal legal rules and standards.  
Those internalised factors amount to a normative commitment to legal obedience based upon 
what is regarded as morally appropriate.319  Compliance in this context is not therefore, reliant 
upon the fear of a particular punishment, but is motivated by those intrinsic factors.320   In order 
for those factors to operate in an influencing way, the norms must first become internalised.  
The following section considers various ways in which the process of internalisation of societal 
standards to a sufficient degree to result in compliance, rather than compulsion.   
 
The imposition of punishment can ‘play an important part in the socialization process as a 
teacher of right and wrong’321 because the fact that some behaviour results in punishment, and 
some does not, helps to educate society as to what behaviour is good or bad.  Witnessing 
transgressors receive unpleasant consequences for engaging in proscribed conduct reinforces 
the message to society and helps the process of internalisation of that lesson.  This then works 
to influence legal obedience when there is a degree of normative commitment to do what is 
considered ‘right’.  Punishment in this context also becomes a barometer of how wrong the 
activity is;322 the more severe the punishment, the more abhorrent the behaviour is by socially 
accepted standards.  This is the ‘educative-moralising function of the law.’323  Punishment is a 
tool that can be used to express disapproval and this ‘helps to form and strengthen the public’s 
moral code and thereby creates conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing 
crimes.’324  The intrinsic desire to obey the law occurs as a result of a moral education which 
is in part, learned by witnessing how people are treated when they break the law.325 
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In this context the process of a trial and the infliction of punishment become a mechanism by 
which societal disapproval is communicated, followed by stigmatization and loss of social 
status.326  The moral education that occurs as a result is useful for both forming and 
strengthening the public’s moral code.327  It can also work in the reverse, and when a shift in 
societal attitudes means that behaviours are no longer considered morally wrong, the 
decriminalisation of those behaviours can serve to act as an educator to any parts of the 
community that are yet to catch up.  An example would be the decriminalisation of 
homosexuality in the UK, which first occurred by virtue of the Sexual Offences Act 1967.  This 
began to pave the way for the gradual improvements in the legal rights and equal treatment of 
the homosexual community that eventually led to the right for homosexual couple to legally 
marry in the UK.328  A further example is the recent referendum in the Republic of Ireland on 
the legalisation of abortion.  Prior to the referendum, abortion in Ireland was only legal when 
a woman’s life was at risk, but not when the pregnancy was as a result of rape or incest, or 
when there was a foetal abnormality.329  In practice, the laws in Ireland effectively banned legal 
abortion.  This had led to on average, nine women a day travelling to the UK to obtain a legal 
and safe, but privately funded abortion,330 meaning that the option was only available to those 
who could afford it, and often leaving women to face the procedure alone and in a foreign 
country.331 Perhaps most crucially of all, the Eighth Amendment denied the women of Ireland 
dominion over their own bodies.  The Irish people voted overwhelmingly in favour of repealing 
the Eighth,332 which was reflective of a larger change in Irish society away from traditionally 
conservative Catholic views, to more liberal and modern approach to human rights.   The Prime 
Minister of Ireland, Leo Varadkar stated that the result was ‘a culmination of a quiet revolution 
that’s been taking in place in Ireland for the past 10 or 20 years.333 
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One of the primary criticisms of punishment as a moral educator is that there is ‘little evidence 
to support the idea that morality is best taught by fear of legal punishment.’334  The fear of legal 
punishment is not the sole educator in this context however.  It is the fact of criminalisation 
that seeks to educate as to the wrong worthiness of the conduct, reinforced by the process of 
prosecuting and convicting perpetrators.  The punishment, as previously mentioned, serves as 
a gauge for the degree of condemnation and stigmitazation that should be associated with the 
commission of the prohibited act.   
 
In the 1953 Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment it was stated that it was, 
 
‘reasonable to suppose that the deterrent force of … punishment operates not only by 
affecting the conscious thoughts of individuals tempted to commit murder but also by 
building up in the community over a long period of time, a deep feeling of perculiar 
abhorrence for the crime of murder… This widely diffused effect on the moral 
consciousness of society is impossible to assess but it must be at least as important as 
the direct part which [a] penalty may play as a deterrent in the calculation of potential 
murderers.’335 (emphasis added) 
 
This highlights the fact that often the moralising impact of punishment is built up over time but 
that its role in securing obedience to the law is arguably as important as the role played by 
deterrence.  This educative aspect is particularly important when there are ‘substantial 
movements up and down the scale of agency responses being contemplated.’336  Alterations in 
punishment such as this not only impact the level of deterrent effect of the prohibition but 
educate people that the behaviour is morally condemnable.  For those who have a weaker 
commitment to obey the law in general, and who may be inclined to commit crimes that they 
regard as ‘not that bad’ if it is in their interests to do so, a review of punishment that leads to a 
significant increase in severity may lead them to conclude that the conduct is in fact ‘too 
serious’ of a crime and may cause him to turn away from it.337   In this context the punishment 
becomes an ‘eye-opener’338 and serves as an attention focusing mechanism.339  Further, the: 
																																																						
334 H.L.A. Hart, ‘Law, Liberty and Morality’ (Stanford University Press, 1963) p.58.  
335 1949-1953 (1953) Cmd 8921, 59.    
336 Zimring and Hawkins (1973) supra n.320, p.90.  
337 Ibid.  
338 Johannes Andenaes, ‘Some Further Reflections on General Prevention’ (1968) Working Paper, Centre for 
Studies in Criminal Justice.  
339 Zimring and Hawkins (1973) supra n. 320, p.83.   
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‘informal system of control, whereby close relationships … influence you towards 
acting in such a way as to meet the normative expectations of the group, has long been 
considered to be the foundation of social order.’340 
 
In the context of corporate crime the organisation therefore, plays an important role in an 
individual’s normative commitment to obey the law as the ‘cultural environment of a firm is 
closely linked to firm-level patterns of non-compliance.’341  An individual’s assessment of the 
moral wrong worthiness of conduct therefore, can be influenced not only by the known 
sanction for engaging in such conduct, but also the prevailing attitudes of the environment in 
which they work.  For example,  
 
‘In companies that care less about [ethical conduct], ethically inclined managers may 
be ordered to engage in misconduct or encouraged to do so by superiors who turn a 
blind eye to how a goal is accomplished.’342 
 
Over time, this can ‘lead to norm erosion and in the extreme, an organizational culture that 
supports illegitimate but expedient practices.’343  So once ‘a system of socialization is in place, 
persons learn the range of expectations of primary group members and comport their behaviour 
accordingly.’344  Indeed, in the recent and very well-publicised trial of Tom Hayes for his 
engagement in the manipulation of the LIBOR rate, he testified that the practice of such 
manipulation was ‘industry wide.’  He states that,  
 
‘I acted with complete transparency to my employers.  My managers knew, my 
manager’s manager knew.  In some cases the CEP was aware of it. … It was so endemic 
within the bank [at UBS], I just thought … this can’t be a big issue because everybody 
knows about it.’345 
																																																						
340 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Why Nudge? The Politics of Libertarian Paternalism’ (Yale University Press: 2014) 
p.195.   
341 Sally S. Simpson and Nicole Leeper Piquero, ‘Low Self-Control, Organizational Theory and Corporate 
Crime’ (2002) 36 Law & Society Review 509.   
342 Ibid.   
343 Ibid.   
344 Cass R. Sunstein (2014) supra n. 339.  
345 Erika Kelton, ‘Everybody Does it: Convicted UBS Libor “Ringmaster” Tells It Like It Is On Wall Street’ 7th 
August 2015, Forbes.  Quoting Tom Hayes.  Available at: 
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In an interview following his release from prison, Bryan Allison, one of the Marine Hose Cartel 
participants still felt that because the ‘majority of people causing cartels are usually doing it 
not for personal gain but for their business’346 he still does not ‘view it as dishonest.’347 He 
goes on to explain that he believes that people cartelise ‘because it’s expected of them, because 
they’ve always done it’348 and makes reference to conversations that he had with his cartel 
predecessors when he returned to the UK.  All of this is indicative of the business culture in 
which he was operating and the influence it had upon him.  Allison explains that he knew that 
cartelising was prohibited and that he was aware of the introduction of a criminal sanction for 
individuals who engage in cartels in the UK and the USA, but that nevertheless, he did not 
think that they would be discovered because ‘we [were] not involved with consumers, who 
[were] we hurting?’349  
 
Whilst the views of Allison are anecdotal, they provide a view of the moral blameworthiness, 
or indeed lack of it, of cartel agreements from the perspective of a cartelist.  The existence of 
the criminal offence in the USA and the creation of a criminal offence in the UK did little to 
educate him that what he was doing was far from morally neutral and was in fact a serious 
crime, in part because he was of the opinion that they were not directly harming consumers.350  
It could potentially be the case therefore, that an organisational environment of unethical 
conduct can undermine the educative function of the law, and that whilst he has been educated 
by his own personal experience it is clear that the punishment of previous cartelists played no 
role in that education.   
 
If the law is to have an educative and moralising impact it arguably must be reinforced by a 
culture of firm level true compliance as,  
 
																																																						
https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2015/08/07/everybody-does-it-convicted-ubs-libor-ringmaster-tells-it-
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346 Michael O’Kane, ‘Does prison work for cartelists? – The view from behind bars: An Interview of Bryan 
Allison by Michael O’Kane’ (2011) 56(2) The Antitrust Bulletin 483.  Allison seemed to find the idea of 
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347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
350 He also attributes his blasé attitude to the fact that he was an ‘at arms length’ participator in the cartel thanks 
to the part played by Peter Whittle as cartel coordinator.  Michael O’Kane (2011) supra n.345.  
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‘[t]heorists uniformly hold that structures, processes and tasks are opportunity 
structures for misconduct because they provide (a) normative support for misconduct, 
(b) the means for carrying out violations, and (c) concealment that minimizes detection 
and sanctioning.’351 
 
If an environment of normative support for misconduct is created it is arguably unlikely that 
the enforcement actions of the relevant authorities will have an appreciable effect, either as an 
educator or moraliser, or indeed as a deterrent on individual (potential or actual) cartelists.  The 
moralising and educative function performed by enforcement therefore, must permeate the 
organisation and effect those responsible for driving the direction of the firm.  To focus on 
individual members of the cartel whilst neglecting the overriding context of the organisational 
environment ignores the fact that whilst some degree of self-interest will play a role in the 
decision to cartelise,352 crime committed in the context of a corporation is ‘not reducible to 
individuals and their characteristics because the individual and the organization are 
symbiotic.’353 
 
 3.5. Conclusions 
 
There is a naturally strong incentive for businesses to engage in collusion agreements and there 
is a statistically low chance of them being caught for doing so.  The moral neutrality with which 
it appears many people view cartel agreements, together with a relatively simple cost benefit 
analysis that can be conducted in relation to collusion, means that conditions are right for an 
instrumentalist decision making process to be adopted by those in a position to create and 
engage in cartel crime.  Prima facie, it would appear, therefore that an enforcement policy that 
seeks to exploit this cost benefit analysis and alter the calculations in favour of legal obedience 
would be an obvious choice.  However, given the nature of cartels and the particular challenges 
that competition authorities face in protecting consumers and the competitive process from the 
harm that they cause, mean that an enforcement policy that is heavily reliant upon successfully 
navigating those specific challenges, will always difficult to execute.  With a low rate of 
detection and prosecution, together with the likely low sanction means that, according to 
																																																						
351 Diane Vaughan, ‘The dark side of organizations: Mistake, misconduct, and disaster’ (1999) 25(1) Annual 
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352 Sally S. Simpson and Nicole Leeper Piquero, supra n. 340.   
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deterrence theory, when viewed on its own merits the criminal cartel offence appears unlikely 
to be able to create a credible deterrent effect in practice.  The effect that it has on other aspects 
of the anti-cartel regulatory space is also difficult to determine, it being empirically difficult to 
establish whether a leniency applicant for example, came forward because of the more credible 
threat of administrative sanctions, or because of the less likely but more serious threat of 
personal criminal sanctions.   
 
Alongside a deterrent focused approach therefore, a concerted effort needs to be made to alter 
not only the cost-benefit calculation, but also the morality judgement of the conduct.  In doing 
so a culture of genuine compliance at the firm level, and a normative commitment to ethical, 
law abiding behaviour at the level of individual directors and/or managers could be pursued.   
 
Anecdotally, in the case of Bryan Allison of the Marine Hose Cartel, it was his belief that his 
conduct was not that bad together with his assessment that he was unlikely to get caught that 
enabled him (an otherwise law abiding citizen) to commit what he knew to be a crime.  These 
two crucial aspects therefore, the calculation of moral blameworthiness and the subjective 
assessment of the risk of detection, played the most important role in his decision to participate 
in the cartel.  Whilst this is not determinative it reinforces Beyleveld’s thesis that it is the 
deterribility (or not) of the action and not the individual that is important.354  In the context of 
cartel crime this is what should arguably be the focus of enforcement efforts.  As where 
deterrence is unlikely to be adequately achieved in practice because of the specific 
characteristics of the crime for example, a stronger focus should be placed upon altering the 
perception of the morality of the action in an effort to change it from being a deterrible offence, 
to a morally condemnable one.  Given the likelihood that such crimes are much less likely to 
be committed by otherwise law abiding individuals (which cartelists are more prone to be) it 
could result in a significant shift in the balance between having to compel obedience through 
threats and punishment, to a genuine culture of voluntary compliance.   
 
In order to achieve a radical shift in the perception of the morality of an action, steps must be 
taken to educate as to the harmfulness of the act.  The inclusion of dishonesty as the substantive 
test for the original cartel offence is one way in which such an education could be achieved, 
along with a successful enforcement record which resulted in guilty cartelists being adequately 
																																																						
354 Deryck Beyleveld (1980) supra n.229.  
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punished.  Its removal from the definition of the offence which resulted in an offence more 
clearly in line with a utilitarian, deterrence-focused enforcement policy has arguably 
diminished the capacity for the cartel offence to fulfil this educative and moralising role.  
Further, if the symbiotic nature of the relationship between organisation and individual is not 
properly recognised by any attempts to educate as to the moral culpability of cartel crime, the 
resulting impact of any such attempts could be serious inhibited.   
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Chapter 4:  The Regulatory Dynamics of Anti-cartel Enforcement  
 
 
 4.1.  Introduction 
 
 
The preceding chapters of this work have explored the genesis of the criminal cartel offence in 
the UK, and have examined the ideological foundations upon which a criminal sanction can be 
built within the context of anti-cartel enforcement.  The next stage of this work is to address 
the fundamental research question of this work and to analyse the place of the criminal cartel 
offence within the regulatory space of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.  This will help to 
illuminate any issues that may have contributed to the underwhelming impact that the criminal 
cartel offence has had since its creation, and indeed since its later amendment.  In order to do 
that it is important to understand the contours of the regulatory space that is under 
consideration, as well as the various elements that must operate within it and the way in which 
they relate to each other.  These relationships between the various constituent parts of anti-
cartel enforcement in the UK regulatory landscape, are what this work refers to as ‘regulatory 
dynamics.’   
 
The manner in which the anti-cartel regulatory space has been typically approached by the 
legislature when amending or adding enforcement tools to it, is often criticised because of the 
piecemeal way in which those changes are undertaken.355  The failure to take a step back and 
consider the wider impact of any alterations is a failure to acknowledge the reality of a complex 
regulatory system.  The criminal cartel offence was created without a thorough consideration 
of the impact that its existence and inclusion in the anti-cartel framework would have upon a 
regulatory space completely unaccustomed to criminal legal policy or enforcement.  The same 
can be said of its subsequent amendment, and that is despite the fact that in the interim between 
creation and amendment, the Court of Appeal clearly articulated that the criminal cartel offence 
was not a discrete piece of legislation but rather, there existed an ‘inter-relationship between 
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… the criminal offence … and civil liability’356 and further, that it clearly had always been the 
intention that such an inter-relationship would exist.357   
 
R v IB358 was an interlocutory appeal as to the jurisdiction of the Crown Court to hear criminal 
cartel cases which arose in the course of the now infamous BA Executives case. The appellants 
were the four BA Executives and they attempted to argue that the criminal cartel offence was 
a ‘national competition law’ within the meaning of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003359 (‘The 
Regulation’) with the effect that only a designated competition authority, the Office of Fair 
Trading at the material time, had the jurisdiction to enforce it.  In making that argument, the 
appellants were attempting to establish that the effect of The Regulation was to deny the Crown 
Court the jurisdiction to hear the criminal case against the BA Executives, or impose any 
punishment as it was not the designated competition authority in the UK.  This argument was 
rejected at first instance and again at appeal.  In rejecting the argument, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the offence was not, in fact, a national competition law within the meaning of 
The Regulation as it was not a means by which competition law was enforced against 
undertakings directly, which the Court concluded was the focus of The Regulation.  The Court 
went on to state that the impact of the criminal cartel offence on the enforcement of competition 
law against undertakings was subordinate to its primary purpose of punishing individuals.360  
They did however add that should they have determined that issue incorrectly, a possibility due 
to the ‘obscure’361 meaning of The Regulation, the Crown Court was still not precluded from 
the enforcement of the offence as enforcement was not the ‘exclusive province of the 
designated national competition authority.’362   
 
This case highlights two very important issues that are central to this chapter and the next; (1) 
the interconnected nature of the criminal and civil sanctions in the UK; and (2) the complex 
nature of the relationship between enforcement in the UK and the EU.  In addressing the 
interconnected nature of criminal and civil enforcement of anti-cartel laws in the UK this 
chapter turns to regulatory mix theory.  The regulatory mix literature provides some guidance 
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on how to navigate complex regulatory spaces that use a varied enforcement toolkit in pursuit 
of a number of different policy objectives.  Regulatory mix theory has a developed body of 
literature devoted to understanding the mechanics of complex regulatory spaces although, at 
the time of writing, there has been little engagement with regulatory mix theory in the 
competition law literature.  Further, there has been a lack of ‘systematic enquiry concerning 
how … instruments interact with each other and other forms of regulation’363 in anti-cartel 
enforcement literature.  Failure to carry out such a systematic assessment of the dynamics of 
the regulatory space will make achieving an effective enforcement regime incredibly difficult.  
Regulatory mix theorists believe that ‘it is crucial to have a good overview of the generic forms 
of … instrument, because the issue of choosing the appropriate combination is one of the most 
intricate and important’364 in order to create a coherent and effective regulatory strategy.    The 
fact that, as has been the case for the criminal cartel offence, the ‘theoretical promise of a new 
policy instrument … is rarely fully realised in practice’365 is arguably partially attributable to 
this lack of understanding or insight into how it operates within the regulatory landscape in 
which it inhabits.   
 
Recent competition law scholarship has started to engage more with these concepts and 
Wardhaugh for example, identified the importance of engaging with and understanding the 
effects of complex regulatory arrangements, and criticised the approach adopted by the 
Government when reforming the criminal cartel offence;  
 
‘… the reformed offence is … an ad hoc addition to the UK’s competition regime.  As 
an ad hoc response, it attempts to restore one difficulty with the competition regime 
without considering how this partial solution affects the regime as a whole by altering 
those incentives provided by other elements of the regime, or by considering how an 
alteration of the UK regimes may have with comparable regimes elsewhere.’366   
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He goes further and identifies that ‘the recent [CJEU] judgment in Pfleiderer367 and its fallout 
demonstrate that modifications to any aspect of the competition enforcement regime have 
consequences for other aspects [of that regime].’368 More recently Beaton-Wells, in the context 
of leniency regimes, laments that,  
 
‘… the approach taken by authorities (and many commentators) to leniency policy 
adoption and review tends to be inward-looking, focused on the policy in a fairly 
discrete and isolate way and with a tendency to overlook or neglect deeper evaluation.  
More searching assessment of such policies would include consideration of the extent 
to which the policy has implications for or effects on other aspects of the overall system 
for enforcement and compliance.’369   
 
She goes on to argue that the problem is not one isolated to the legal perspectives offered of 
antirust regimes, but can be found in the economic research which closely informs and helps 
shape the how enforcement tools are viewed, assessed and implemented.  She states that the 
economic research has also failed to explore the ‘impact of leniency policies in a broader policy 
setting, in which other interconnected aspects of enforcement are at work.’370  
 
This chapter seeks to explore the literature concerning the various interactions that can occur 
in multi-tool, multi-policy regulatory responses and apply that knowledge to the anti-cartel 
enforcement approach in the UK.  In doing so it is hoped that the importance of such 
scholarship to the field of modern competition law will be highlighted, and some of the causes 
of the underwhelming impact of the criminal cartel will be identified.   
 
 4.2.  What are Regulatory Dynamics? 
 
 
  4.2.1.  Introduction  
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Before exploring the issues in detail, it is important to first define the scope of the discussion.  
The literature on regulatory and policy mix theory is vast and diverse, and it is not the aim of 
this work to add to the theoretical aspects of those discussions, or on how to best create 
regulatory frameworks on a general level.  This work aims to use the exiting literature as a lens 
through which the regulatory choices of the anti-cartel regulatory space can be assessed.  Some 
of that literature attempts to create paradigms which can be used in any field of regulation,371 
and this chapter aims to apply those paradigms to anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.  To do 
this the chapter will examine the knowledge provided by the regulatory and policy mix 
literature and apply it to the peculiarities of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.  The purpose of 
doing so is to provide greater clarity as to the dynamics of the current system and the criminal 
cartel’s place within it.  It is hoped that this in turn, will help to identify areas or dynamics that 
can be improved in order to improve not only the impact of the criminal cartel offence on cartel 
activity, but the regime as a whole.   
 
There has been, at the time of writing, little engagement in the antitrust literature with that 
literature which explores regulatory or policy interaction, and so the central concepts are 
identified below in order to provide context and aid in the analysis that will come later in the 
chapter.  
 
  4.2.2.  Regulatory Space 
 
 
Throughout this work the terms ‘regulatory space’ and ‘regulatory landscape’ have been used 
to describe the conceptual space in which the various elements of the governmental response 
to cartel activity inhabit.  Regulatory mix theory goes further and provides a more in-depth 
explanation.  Regulatory mix theory uses the term ‘regulatory space’ to describe ‘a cluster of 
regulatory issues, decisions or policies that involve the interplay and competition between 
carious interests.’372 Typically that conversation relates to multi-jurisdictional or multi-level 
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interactions,373 but as it is also used to describe the mapping out of complex legal interactions 
and as such, it provides a useful conceptual framework within which the discussion in this 
chapter can take place.  Much of the literature dealing with public policy instrument mixes 
defines them as a ‘set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield their power’374 
in attempting to achieve a defined outcome.  Whilst a lot of that literature focuses on 
environmental protection, housing or agriculture, some of the theory will be useful in the 
context of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK from the perspective of this work, because all are 
attempting to understand and manage analogous complexities; ensuring the most effective 
combination of regulatory tools is employed for the purpose of attaining a specific objective.  
What that specified objective is, is not as important at this conceptual level, and so solutions 
enabled by regulatory mix theory and applied to environmental law, for example can, if done 
carefully, provide insight and potential conceptual solutions to be applied to anti-cartel 
enforcement.   
 
This work then, has appropriated the term ‘regulatory space’ to refer to interrelationships in 
two ways.  The first occurs on a more micro level in that it analyses the interplay between 
various state enforcement tools and the theoretical foundations of those tools, within the anti-
cartel policy sphere in the UK.  The second occurs in the more traditional macro level focus as 
it seeks to examine the interplay in a multi-territorial space which includes the UK and the EU.  
 
The literature concerning 'regulatory space' also employs the terminology of 'legal pluralism' 
which itself can be employed in a variety of ways but includes 'metaphorical notions of space 
... [and] has been defined as "legal systems, networks or orders co-existing in the same 
geographical space" or "social field."'375  It is said that ‘[a]ny sort of “pluralism” necessarily 
implies that more than one sort of thing concerned is present within the field described.  In the 
case of legal pluralism, more than one “law” must be present.’376  This generous definition can 
therefore be applied to the multi-layered, multi-instrumented approach employed to tackle 
cartel activity in the UK, as a Member State of the EU.  It is in this context that the regulatory 
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pluralism of state interventions within the regulatory space of anti-cartel enforcement that this 
section should be read.  The key concept therefore, is that of an interplay of connected 
mechanisms, a network or matrix of actions, the ‘co-existence of legal orders’377 that are 
'involved in the construction of what we can term "governable spaces."'378 
 
  4.2.3.  What is Regulation? 
 
The regulatory space defined in the previous section refers to the conceptual legal space in 
which rules which seek to govern citizens’ behaviour exist.  Before the dynamics of those rules 
can be analysed, it is important to articulate what kind of rules they are.  The literature uses the 
term ‘regulation’ in a relatively broad manner and so this following section aims to add some 
detail to that concept in order to provide additional context to the discussion.  Regulation on a 
general level has been defined as:  
 
‘Any process or set of processes by which norms are established, the behaviour of those 
subject to the norms monitored or fed back to the regime, and for which there are 
mechanisms for holding the behaviour of regulated actors within the acceptable limits 
of the regime (whether by enforcement action or some other mechanism).’379   
  
This definition, whilst providing another level of contextual understanding of regulation still 
requires more specificity to provide the clarity for, and scope of the discussion to follow.  This 
can be achieved by looking at specific forms of regulation which can be subcategorised in the 
following ways: 
 
‘As a specific set of commands- where regulation involves the promulgation of a 
binding set of rules to be applied by a body devoted to this purpose.  An example would 
be the health and safety at work legislation as applied by the Health and Safety 
Executive. 
As a deliberate state influence- where regulation has a more broad sense  and covers 
all state actions that are designed to influence business or social behaviour.  Thus, 
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command-based regime would come within this usage, but  so also would a range of 
other models of influence- for instance, those based  on the use of economic incentives 
(e.g. taxes or subsidies); contractual  powers; development of resources; franchises; 
the supply of information, or other techniques.  
As all forms of social or economic influence- where all mechanisms affecting behaviour 
- whether these be state-based or from other sources (e.g. markets) - are deemed 
regulatory.  One of the great combinations of the theory of 'smart regulation' has been 
to point out that regulation may be carried out not merely by state institutions but by a 
host of other bodies, and voluntary organisations.’380 
 
These definitions of different forms of regulation provide a more detailed explanation of the 
kinds of actions that can be taken by the State when governing it’s citizens’ conduct.  These 
definitions incorporate the variety of tactics available to the State, which include, inter alia; 
 
(1) the ability to command, where legal authority and the command of law is used to 
pursue policy objectives;  
(2) to deploy wealth, where fiscal incentives are used to influence conduct; and  
(3) to inform, where the strategic deployment of information is used to advance policy 
goals.381   
 
This division of responses into three categories is also present in much of the public policy mix 
literature,382 albeit under slightly reformulated headings, but that bare largely similar 
characteristics.  In some of the public policy literature it has been expressed in terms of the 
power exerted to induce or influence, that power being expressed in one of three ways; coercive 
power, remunerative power or normative power.383  Coercive power, it is said ‘rests on the 
application, or threat of application, of physical sanctions…generation of frustration through 
restriction of movement; or controlling through force the satisfaction of needs.’384  
Remunerative powers is defined as the ‘control over material resources and rewards through 
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allocation of salaries and wages, commissions and contributions, “fringe benefits”, services 
and commodities.’385  Normative power is said to ‘rest on the allocation and manipulation of 
symbolic rewards and deprivations through employment leaders, manipulation of mass media, 
allocation of esteem and prestige symbols…’386  These definitions are too context specific to 
be of real use to this analysis; however, they have been adapted for more general theoretical 
use and redefined as three broad categories which sit nicely with the definitions described in 
respect of regulation discussed above, as ‘the stick’, ‘the carrot’ and ‘the sermon.’387  This close 
correlation between the two forms of literature, regulatory mix and public policy mix literature, 
allows for their pluralist use in this work.  The basic point that all three descriptions agree upon 
is that all types of State deployed tool can be reduced into one of these three fundamental 
categories.   
 
The concern of this section then, is to explore how these resources interact with each other in 
order to provide a basis for determining how those interactions can be best exploited for the 
creation of an anti-cartel regulatory space of optimal efficiency generally, and to attempt to 
identify failings of the exiting approach to section 188 in particular. 
 
 
  4.2.4.  Different Types of Dynamics 
 
The ‘Timbergen Rule’ states that the optimal ratio of tools to desired outcomes is 1:1,388 which 
simply means that one tool should, in a perfect world, be deployed to deal with only one 
problem.  Timbergen himself however, acceded the point that ‘supplementary’ or 
‘complementary’ tools would often be needed in the real world, to mitigate side-effects, or to 
reinforce a ‘primary tool.’389  Gunningham and Sinclair agree that the best strategy for effective 
enforcement means identifying and utilising ‘the strengths of individual mechanisms while 
compensating for their weaknesses through the use of additional and complementary 
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mechanisms.’390  Howlett and Del Rio argue that in practice ‘the Timbergen maxim has little 
use in any but the most simple circumstances and types of mixes’391 as it fails to take into 
account the ‘dimensions of likely conflicts.’392 
 
Howlett and Del Rio identify two broad categories of interactions, those that occur horizontally 
which refers to the ‘relationship existing between tools within a single level of policy making’, 
and those which occur vertically.  Horizontal interactions, they argue, ‘can be addressed in 
largely technical ways – so that, for example, some conflicts can be mitigated just by selecting 
certain instruments.’  Vertical interactions are more complex and refer to, 
 
‘not just the number of instruments found in a mix, but also the number of goals they 
expect to address, the number of policy sectors they involve, and the number of 
governments active in these areas.’393 
 
The increased complexity inherent in vertical interactions means that ‘technical analysis must 
be supplemented by other political, administrative and organisational logics.’394 
 
Howlett and Rayner explain that policy mixes fail for one of three reasons which they call 
layering, drift and conversion.395  Layering is described as typically the most harmful to the 
creation of an optimal policy mix, and it occurs when new goals and instruments are added to 
a regulatory space without abandoning previous, and assumedly, unsuccessful ones.396  They 
argue that this leads to ‘incoherent goals and inconsistent mixes of tools.’397  The term ‘drift’ 
is used to describe the situation when the ultimate goals of the policy change over time, but the 
associates instruments employed remain unaltered.398  This again leads to a disconnect between 
the enforcement mechanism and the policy goal with the result that the tool is no longer the 
best tool for the job.  The term ‘conversion’ refers to ‘the attempt to change the instrument mix 
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in a more tractable policy domain in order to meet new goals in a domain where change is 
blocked.’399   Howlett and Del Rio then build upon this work to raise an important point which 
is not directly addressed by the discussion on vertical and horizontal interactions and way the 
layering, drift or conversion of those interactions can lead to the failure of a regulatory space.  
They explain that the multi-dimensional aspect of policy design and instrument implementation 
includes the evolution of a policy mix over time,400 and the impact that its use or misuse can 
have on its impact.401 
The consideration of regulatory dynamics in this chapter therefore, will include, 1) vertical 
interactions; 2) horizontal interactions; and 3) the impact of time.   
 
 
 4.3.  Regulatory Interactions 
 
In order to understand the regulatory dynamics of a complex regulatory space that has a 
complex policy portfolio and enforcement tool mix, the possible interactions that can occur 
within that regulatory space must be examined.  First however, the degree of complexity of the 
space itself must be assessed.  Howlett and Del Rio have constructed a basic table to help carry 
out this assessment.  The table is replicated below.   
 
Table 1 
DIMENSIONS TYPES 
 I II III IV V VI VII VIII 
Multiple 
Governments 
No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Multiple Policies No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Multiple Goals No  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 
Type I can then be described as a ‘simple single-level instrument mix’ or a ‘Simple Timbergen’ 
mix. 
Type II is a ‘complex single-level instrument mix’ or a ‘Compound Timbergen’ mix. 
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Type III is a ‘simple single-level policy mix.’ 
Type IV is a ‘complex single-level policy mix.’ 
Type V is a ‘simple multi-level instrument mix.’ 
Type VI is a ‘complex multi-level instrument mix.’ 
Type VII is a ‘simple multi-level policy mix.’ 
Type VIII is a ‘complex multi-level policy mix.’ 
 
The table helps to illustrate the limitations of Timbergen’s assessments of regulatory mixes 
which fails to address the majority of potential mixes that can be created, and fails in fact, to 
consider the most complex regulatory mix which are the complex multi-level policy mixes 
which are by implication, the ones most in need of careful consideration.  The distinction 
between instrument and policy mixes is also made clear.  This distinction is not always 
observed in the literature but the instrument mixes utilise instruments in the pursuit of one 
policy whereas policy mixes see multiple interacting instruments across multiple policy areas.  
Literature on policy mixes ‘focus on interactions and interdependencies between different 
policies as they affect the extent to which policy goals are realised.’402 Whereas instrument mix 
literature focuses on the interactions and interdependencies of enforcement instruments within 
a regulatory space.  The complexity of a mix increases in line with the number of ‘dimensions’ 
that have multiple factors.  For example, a mix that has no multiples (governments, policies of 
goals) is the simplest type of instrument mix.  However, when a mix has multiples in each of 
the ‘dimensions’ articulated in Table 1. the interactions that occur will be both vertical and 
horizontal.  In mixes which include multiple governments additional challenges must be faced, 
particularly when ‘responsibility for formulation, decision making and/or implementation falls 
on different levels of government’403 who may indeed, be pursuing or prioritising different 
policies and/or goals. 404  
 
Howlett and del Rio produced a table articulating the ‘spectrum of complexity’405 and the place 
each regulatory mix occupied upon it.  That table is replicated below.   
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Table 2. Complexity Spectrum 
Simple ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Complex  
No Multiple 
Variables  
One 
Multiple 
Variable  
Two Multiple 
Variables – 
Single Goal  
One Multiple 
Variables – 
Multiple Goals  
Two Multiple 
Variables – 
Multiple Goals  
Three 
Multiple 
Variables  
Type I  
Type III 
Type V  
Type VII  Type II  Type IV Type VI  Type VIII 
 
 
Assessing where of the spectrum of complexity a regulatory space occupies helps to illuminate 
the level of difficulty and therefore, care needed to ensure than interactions and 
interdependencies occurring within the space avoid inconsistency and incompatibility.  
Further, a truly ‘intelligent [policy] portfolio design’406 aims to not only avoid problems but 
aims to maximise the opportunities for creating beneficial effects. The tables produced by 
Howlett and del Rio provide a much needed starting point for analysing the complexity of 
regulatory spaces.  Vertical interactions need careful prioritisation of actor, policy and goal in 
order to provide a clear framework within which all can harmoniously exist.  The selection and 
employment of enforcement tools within that framework is one way in which harmony can be 
increased, or indeed destroyed.  It is these horizontal interactions that this work is primarily 
concerned with when seeking to determine the place that the criminal cartel offence occupies 
within the anti-cartel regulatory space in the UK.  It should be clear from the above however, 
that any assessment of such interactions cannot ignore the implications of the vertical 
interactions if a confused and underwhelming regulatory space is to be avoided.   
 
 
  4.3.1.  Enforcement Tools 
 
 
The regulatory mix literature identifies a number of interaction outcomes that can occur when 
multiple enforcement tools exist within a regulatory toolkit; (1) strong conflict, which occurs 
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when the additional of an instrument leads to the reduction of the efficacy of the existing 
instrument(s); (2) weak conflict, which occurs when the addition of an instrument leads to a 
positive effect on the combination as a whole, but that effect is less effective than when the 
instruments are used separately; (3) full complementarity, which occurs when the addition of 
a new instrument adds to the efficacy of the existing instrument; and (4) synergy, which occurs 
when the addition of a new instrument magnifies the impact of the existing instrument(s).407  
Others maintain that the potential instrument dynamics can be classified as (1) inherently 
complementary; (2) inherently incompatible; (3) complimentary when sequenced; and (4) 
mixes whose complementarity is context specific.408  The type of outcome that will occur 
between enforcement instruments is heavily influenced by the vertical foundations of those 
tools (i.e. which government is employing them, for the attainment of which policy, for what 
goal).   
 
Before it is possible to determine the outcome of instrument interactions, it is first essential to 
identify the types of instruments available for possible selection within a regulatory space, and 
the way in which they work.  Such an examination will help to begin the process of eliminating 
inherently contradictory mixes of instruments, and will help to identify which enforcement 
instruments may work together to enhance the impact of a regulatory space.   
 
 
 4.3.1.1.  Command and Control Regulation 
 
Command and control regulation has been defined as the ‘exercise of influence by imposing 
standards backed by criminal sanctions.’409  This definition however, is arguably too restrictive 
as it excludes entirely, command and control regulation that may operationalise the function of 
a punitive sanction for the purpose of influencing behaviour, but that is not criminal in nature.  
Such sanctions are rare, but not unheard of, and should not be excluded automatically on this 
basis that the outcome of their use is, if not identical, very similar.  The OECD, within the 
sphere of environmental policy, define command and control regulation as policy that ‘relies 
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on regulation (permission, prohibition, standard setting and enforcement)’410 rather than for 
example, ‘economic instruments of cost internalisation.’411  This definition is perhaps 
unhelpful as it has difficulty defining its own outer limits.  O’Sullivan and Flannery provide a 
more contextual explanation of what is meant by command and control regulation when they 
state that under command and control ‘regulators fix standards …(the command) and uses 
legislation to prohibit behaviour of the regulated entities which do not conform to these 
standards (the control).’412  It appears from this understanding of command and control 
regulation therefore, that it is the punitive nature of a mechanism that leads to its inclusion 
within the scope, as the main advantage of its use lies in the fact that the full strength of the 
law can be mobilised to impose a fixed standard of conduct.413  
 
This provides a usable definition for the purpose of this work because currently the main 
regulatory mechanisms employed by the State in response to cartel activity in the UK are 
punitive, if not always criminal, in nature.  Each of those punitive responses attempt to 
articulate a threshold of acceptable conduct (participation in fair competition) and legislate for 
legal consequences when regulated entities (undertakings and now, natural persons) choose a 
course of action that falls below that standard (hard-core collusion).   As shown in Chapter 3 
of this work, regulatory responses such as these reflect utilitarian concepts of deterrence in that 
the threat of the legal sanction is used to compel the regulated entities to comply with the 
standard set by the State.  It allows for the State to retain a great deal of power (or the perception 
of power) over the attainment of policy objectives.  The benefits of this approach are the 
certainty for both the regulated in respect of their ‘compliance obligations,’414 and the regulator 
in terms of their ‘operational parameters.’415  Command and control regulation has the further 
benefit of demonstrating to the public that the State is working to eradicate behaviour that is 
contrary to the public interest.416  Indeed, in certain circumstances punitive sanctions that are 
repeatedly employed in this manner can ultimately lead to an environment in which compliance 
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by way of ‘moral suasion’417 is achieved, and so reliance upon compulsion by way of legal 
sanctions is reduced.  This was explored in Chapter 3 of this work which showed that this 
moralising impact of the law can be achieved when typically criminal sanctions, founded upon 
retributive theories of justice, can improve society’s voluntary compliance with the law.  
Therefore, the definition of command and control regulation provided by O’Sullivan and 
Flannery is broad enough to encapsulate both retributive and utilitarian examples of regulatory 
responses.   
 
The disadvantages of command and control regulation are its inflexibility and its difficulty in 
responding to changes.  A standard must be set for the regulation to work, and it may not be 
capable of accounting for peculiarities that could arise within specific regulated fields.418  
Additionally, because of the amount of time that it takes to identify and then rectify weaknesses 
within the regulation, command and control mechanisms can fail to response to developments 
with the required speed.419  As it relies upon State intervention, investigation and the judicial 
process it is also an inherently expensive option.  This only becomes problematic however, 
when that expense is disproportionate to the benefits brought by that policy.   
 
Whilst command and control regulation is considered beneficial for the certainty that it brings, 
a certain degree of control over the manner in which the regulation ultimately plays out is 
necessarily relinquished to the court system, and as a result a proportionate degree of 
uncertainty is introduced as a result.420  Any difficulties that arise in obtaining convictions 
together with ‘weak’ sanctioning can have a serious impact upon the beneficial impact that a 
regulation is able to achieve, which in turn has an impact upon the level of expenditure that 
can be justified.  A further disadvantage of command and control regulation is the complexity 
of the legal rules that such regulation has a tendency to create.  Not only does that complexity 
have an impact upon certainty, particularly in respect of compliance obligations, that in turn 
risks the ‘strangling of competition and enterprise’421 as entities may shy away from 
opportunities because it is unclear whether the will fall within the scope of prohibited conduct.  
Highly complex command and control regulatory responses also reduce the likelihood of 
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voluntary compliance by transferring the dissuasive compliance cost from the State to the 
regulated.422  
 
 4.3.1.2.  Incentive Based Regimes 
 
Incentive based regimes are the use of economic instruments to incentivise the regulated 
entities to conduct themselves in the desired way.423  This type of regulatory response is often 
referred to as ‘the carrot’424 or the ‘remunerative power’425 of those who employ it to assert 
influence.  In this context, the State use financial incentives such as the imposition of positive 
or negative taxes or the deployment of grants, subsidies or licenses, in a coercive way.426  The 
types of economic responses available therefore, can be subdivided into two broad categories; 
positive incentives, and disincentives.427  Grants, soft loans and reduced subsidies are all 
examples of positive incentives, whilst taxes, fees and custom duties are examples of 
disincentives.  Unlike command and control regulation that utilises pecuniary sanctions, 
economic disincentives do not seek to prevent a particular action, merely make it more costly 
and so dissuade or reduce participation in the targeted activity.428  This type of behaviour 
manipulation by the State has been incorporated into the anti-cartel enforcement space of the 
UK, through the creation of the leniency regime.  The leniency programme relies heavily, 
although since the cartel offence no longer exclusively, on the theory that the State can coerce 
cartelists to admit their guilt and provide evidence of it, by exempting them from, or 
significantly reducing, the fiscal punishment they would otherwise suffer if caught.   
 
This type of regulatory action is considered to be less expensive than command and control 
regulation although when detection and enforcement mechanisms are required to ensure 
compliance, then that is arguably not the reality.  Incentive based regimes do however, mitigate 
the risk of capture, as a system for applying the incentive is set up and then an arms-length 
interaction with the regulated actors is created.  Regulatory approaches that incentivise conduct 
																																																						
422Andrei Shleifer, ‘Understanding Regulation,’ (2005) 11(4) European Financial Management 439. 
423 Ibid.   
424 Marie-Louise Bemelmans-Videc, Ray C. Rist, and Evert Verdung. ‘Sticks, Carrots, Sermons: Policy 
Instruments and Their Evaluation,’ (New Brunswick: New Jersey, 1998) 
425Amitai Etzioni, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations,’ (MacMillan Publishing: New York, 
1971) p.490.  
426 Ibid.   
427 Kieron Flanagan, Elvira Uyarra and Manuel Laranja, ‘Reconceptualising the ‘policy mix’ for innovation,’ 
(2011) 40(5) Research Policy 702.   
428 Andrei Schleifer (2005) supra n.421.  
 100	
	
through financial advantage fit within economic theories of law obedience; firms will carry out 
a cost versus benefit analysis of whether to take a particular course of action, and if that benefit 
outweighs the cost, they will comply.  A very real disadvantage of incentive based regimes 
however, is that they risk adding further layers of complexity and bureaucracy to the areas in 
which they are applied.   
 
A fundamental disadvantage of incentive based schemes is that there is a risk they will be 
perceived as a weak response to behaviour that is contrary to the public good and as such, 
socially harmful conduct is not being properly punished or condemned.429 
 
4.3.1.3.  Self-Regulation 
 
Self-regulation is not an entirely precise concept but can be regarded as a 'process whereby an 
organized group regulates the behaviour of its members.'430  Typically this takes the form of 
industry level self-regulation and the setting of rules or codes of practice relating to the manner 
in which firms within the industry conduct themselves.431  It is ‘an attractive alternative to 
governmental regulation because the State simply cannot afford to do an adequate job on its 
own.’432   One example can be seen in the international pharmaceutical industry where ‘a 
number of the more reputable companies have corporate compliance groups, which send teams 
of scientists to audit subsidiaries’ compliance with production quality codes.’433  Internal 
compliance may be able to more effectively route out problems for a number of reasons, the 
most obvious being proximity to the regulated behaviour and understanding of the regulated 
activities enabling the identification of potential problems to happen more quickly and more 
easily. Additionally, the non-adversarial nature of investigations arguably leads to better access 
to more information.  Whilst it is the case however, that such internal or industry compliance 
programs ‘are more capable, they are not necessarily more willing to regulate effectively.’434  
This is the major weakness of self-regulation particularly where the sanctions for misconduct 
are high and the potential for detection by third parties is low.  In these circumstances, regulated 
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entities have an increased incentive to turn a blind eye to misconduct or even take measures to 
disguise it.   
 
So whilst a voluntary program will stop many violations that cost the company money and 
others that are cost-neutral, the impact upon violations that are cost neutral or beneficial is less 
certain.  A programme of self-regulation will halt some violations that benefit the company 
financially in the short-term, for the sake of the long-term benefit of fostering employee 
commitment to compliance435 however, those breaches which are cost-neutral or financially 
beneficial are more likely to be ignored.  This is exacerbated in cases where the financial benefit 
to the company is very high, or long-term.  Perhaps the most pertinent disadvantage of a system 
of self-regulation in the context of this work, is that it could only be realistically achieved when 
the conduct that such a system seeks to prevent, is limited to a definable groups of regulated 
entities.  In the context of anti-cartel enforcement for example, the prohibited conduct (hard-
core cartel agreements) is not limited to a particular market or type of business.  
 
Braithwaite articulates a variation of self-regulation to address some of the flaws identified 
above, albeit one that he recognises some may regard as impractical; government enforced self-
regulation.436  Under a system of government enforced self-regulation the corporations would 
be responsible for compiling a best-standards approach to their business activities that could 
be ratified by the relevant State regulator.437  This would then provide a standard by which their 
activities could be judged.  Any deviation from the ratified best-standards would be a strong 
indicator of misconduct to be investigated by the relevant authority.438  Where appropriate a 
criminal sanction could be imposed for failing to report breaches of the best-standards, or 
attempts to ignore compliance directives.439  The advantage of this approach would be that the 
State regulator would be able to optimally deploy its limited resources by targeting the 
corporations that could be more clearly identified as being at high risk of breach.  There are of 
course disadvantages of such a system which include, but are not limited to, the risk that 
corporations, as authors of the code of best-standards would be well placed to create 
compliance regimes that enabled them to obviate the letter of the law.  Such an approach would 
also involve a high initial cost in creating and ratifying the compliance regimes which would 
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most likely be passed on to the end consumer.  Further, the independence of the internal or 
industry compliance regulators could not be guaranteed.   
 
Whilst there could be some advantages to a system of government enforced self-regulation in 
some industry sectors, in the context of anti-cartel enforcement it is unlikely that such a system 
could be implemented to good effect.  Firstly, the standard of the conduct required for legal 
obedience is already clearly defined.  Secondly, the anti-cartel enforcement standards are 
applicable to all undertakings operating within the UK who may face very different 
circumstance rather than a discrete, easily defined market sector.   
 
  4.3.1.4.  Voluntarism  
 
Voluntarism in this context refers to the unilateral decision taken by firms to do the right thing.  
'At a general level this category embraces voluntary agreements between governments and 
individual business that are a means of achieving improvements in behaviour which go beyond 
regulated requirements.'440  Often referred to as corporate social responsibility (‘CSR’) its exact 
definition has evolved over the years.  The ‘classical view of Adam Smith [was] of perfect 
markets and the “invisible hand”’441 which have been said to be the ‘core perception of business 
responsibility for the past three hundred years.’442 Oliver Sheldon argued that it ‘encouraged 
management to take the initiative in raising both ethical standards and justice in society through 
the ethic of economising.’443  Modern conceptions of corporate responsibility accept that 
companies must better understand and be aware of, the societies in which the operate.444 In its 
‘broadest sense, contemporary CSR represents companies’ responsibility to improve all their 
impacts on society, when not required to do so by law.’445  In more practical terms however it 
can be regarded as excluding ‘any corporate action resulting from compliance with legal 
prohibitions, as well as reactions to direct social pressures such as boycotts.446  Engel asks 
whether it is ‘desirable for corporations organized for profit voluntarily to identify and pursue 
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social ends where this pursuit conflicts with the presumptive share holder desire to maximize 
profits.’447   
 
The experience in the UK began with privatization programme adopted by the government in 
the 1980s which, 
 
‘shifted public expectation of the private sector.  Whilst until then, social objectives had 
been mainly the responsibility of government, the privatisation of gas, water and 
electricity introduced a new paradigm.  It created public companies owned by 
shareholders pursuing the same kind of financial returns as in any other public 
company, but the companies had also clear social objectives.’448  
 
In the UK, an initiative was taken by Business in Community called the Corporate Impact 
Initiative which is essentially a ‘framework for companies to measure and report on responsible 
business practices in the areas of market place, environment, workplace, community and 
human rights.’449  Given the voluntary nature of corporate social responsibility, how it fits in 
as a regulatory tool of the State may not be immediately obvious, but Reich argues that 
government should exert a degree of influence over business activities pursued for the benefit 
of society through for example, tax incentives or tax credits. 450 This is because ‘CSR issues 
fall in the arena of public policy which is the primary government task.’451 
 
It is clear therefore, in the case of both self-regulation and voluntarism that there is an inherent 
belief that undertakings, by way of the individual agents that bind their actions, cannot be left 
without some degree of State oversight, to determine the best way to regulate their conduct in 
the best interests of society.  An obvious conflict of those interests with those of the undertaking 
and its responsibility to generate profitability for shareholders, means that the impact of self-
regulation and voluntarism can only go so far.  This is particularly true when the financial gain 
for conduct harmful to society is high, the risks of getting caught are low, and perhaps most 
importantly, the harmful conduct is largely considered to be morally neutral.  Together these 
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create perfect conditions for firms to engage in illicit conduct and incentivise shareholders to 
either ignore the details of that prohibited conduct, or actively disguise it.   
 
  4.3.1.5.  Information Strategies 
 
Information strategies is a broad term that includes 'education and training, corporate … 
reporting, community right to know and pollution inventories and product certification'452 
within the scope of its definition.  Often however, information strategies play an ancillary or 
subordinate role to the use of one of the preceding regulatory mechanisms.  They are mean by 
which those mechanisms are made more effective and are inherently complimentary to most, 
if not all of them.  Nevertheless, it should be considered that there are instances where the 
promulgation of information may inhibit the operation of a particular regulatory tool, or aspect 
of it.453  A particular disadvantage of information strategies as a discreet regulatory tool is that 
for example, 'community right to know provisions, although they can be a potent instrument, 
provide no assurance that individual firms will actually improve their environmental 
performance.'454 
 
 4.3.2. Inherently Complimentary Tool Interactions and Anti-cartel Enforcement  
 
The regulatory and policy mix literature shows that certain combinations of regulatory tools 
will be inherently complementary, inherently incompatible, complementary only when 
sequence, or only within a specific context.  This is believed this to be true 'irrespective of the 
specifics of the relevant … issue or the prevailing political and cultural background.'455  The 
framework provided by the regulatory mix literature, it is believed, ensures that policy makers 
can confidently create regulatory spaces that abide by this combination guidance, in the 
knowledge that it will create an efficient or optimal governance.   
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Information strategies are considered to be complementary in almost all circumstances, as they 
enable actors to make rational decisions regarding which actions to take or not take.  They can 
be designed in such a way as to ‘rectify or compensate’456 for the failing of other tools which, 
for the most part, rely in varying degrees, upon the dissemination of their success and/or their 
standards.  In the context of anti-cartel enforcement, information plays a pivotal role, indeed it 
is the currency with which leniency is paid for, and which allows culpable offenders to escape 
any form of punishment, a situation that is unique in English criminal law.  Information plays 
another crucial role to the success of the CMA’s enforcement actions.  Publicising the 
successful sanctions and prosecutions is crucial to the creation of deterrence, and competition 
law advocacy is critical to creating an atmosphere of compliance, just as the publicity of its 
failures have arguably had the opposite effect.  In the specific context of competition law, the 
dissemination of information of compliance parameters is particularly important as uncertainty 
can lead to legitimate business opportunities, beneficial to the consumer, being avoided for fear 
of overstepping the legal boundaries.   
 
Voluntarism and self-regulation are both inherently complementary with command and control 
regulation because the command and control regulation creates a baseline,457 whilst voluntary 
measures are a commitment by firms to take additional steps above that baseline, and with self-
regulation providing a means by which standards are monitored and enforced within the 
industry itself.458  Self-regulation is not a feasible option for anti-cartel enforcement as shown 
in the above discussion,459 but anti-cartel compliance regimes do represent a form voluntarism 
often seen in large corporations.  Undertakings are not required by the regulatory framework 
that currently exists at the time of writing, to have compliance programmes in place, and failure 
to do so will not increase the level of fine awarded. They are entirely voluntary, although they 
are encouraged.  They do however, represent a way in which organisations, often with complex 
management structures, are able to educate employees about what conduct is illegal, and how 
to detect any prohibited conduct should it occur.   
 
The discussion above however, illustrates that without some form of State oversight, voluntary 
compliance programmes are unlikely to have a significant impact upon cartel activity.  Were 
																																																						
456 Ibid.  
457 Ibid.   
458 Ibid.  
459 See section: 4.3.1.3.  Self-Regulation 
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they to be officially brought within the antitrust regulatory space by making voluntary 
compliance schemes a condition of corporate immunity,460 it would still be voluntary measure 
as firms would not be under a legal obligation to create a compliance programme, but would 
create an incentive that may entice undertakings, particularly large complex undertakings to 
take extra steps to ensure legal obedience.461  Further, it could dramatically improve the impact 
of such programmes on the fight against cartel activity as they could be regarded as a public 
demonstration that the undertaking was committed to complying with competition law, thereby 
signalling to competitors that they will not engage in collusion, and it would help to foster a 
culture of compliance within the undertaking itself as the programmes would require employee 
training.462  Were an undertaking to be found to have engaged in a cartel despite the existence 
of an internal compliance programme, it could represent a rebuttable presumption that the 
undertaking took all reasonable steps to ensure legal obedience, and that the cartel was the 
result of the rogue actions of an agent.  If the presumption was not rebutted by evidence to the 
contrary, it could result in a reduction in the fine imposed upon the undertaking, and could be 
an aggravating factor in the prosecution of the rogue individual agent.   
 
Supply-side incentives, such as tax concessions or soft loans, which are usually granted to 
policy preferred technologies or processes, are considered to inherently complement command 
and control regulation when that regulation targets performance standards related to those 
technologies or processes.463  Tax concessions on a particular technology that help to achieve 
																																																						
460For a full discussion, see Brent Fisse, ‘Reconditioning Corporate Leniency: The Possibility of Making 
Compliance Programs a Condition of Immunity’, Nov 2014, available at:  
https://www.brentfisse.com/images/Fisse_Compliance_Programs_as_Condition_of_Corporate_Immunity_2011
14.pdf.  Last accessed 26th Jan 2016. 
461 The CMA has acknowledged the impact that pre-emptive action taken by undertakings to ensure compliance 
can have on their efforts to protect consumers from the harmful effects of cartels.  As a result the CMA, together 
with the Institute of Risk Management (the ‘IRM’) published a short guide advocating for an organisational 
culture of compliance and ethical conduct.  See, CMA and IRM, ‘Competition Law Risk: A Short Guide, 
Version: 2.0.’ Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/587464/cma-
risk-guide-2016-revised.pdf.  Last accessed 18th March 2019.  The CMA have also articulated that they may 
take into account steps taken by undertakings to ensure obedience of competition law when calculating fines.  
See, CMA, ‘CMA’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of penalty,’ 18th April 2018, CMA 73, para. 2.19.  
For further discussion see, Nathalie Jalabert-Doury, David Harrison and Jens-Peter Schmidt, ‘Enforcers’ 
Consideration of Compliance Programs in Europe: A Long and Winding – but Increasingly Interesting – Road,’ 
(2015) 2 CPI Antitrust Chronicle 1.  Available at: https://www.mayerbrown.com/-
/media/files/news/2015/06/enforcers-consideration-of-compliance-programs-in/files/art_jalabert-harrison-
schmidt_2015/fileattachment/art_jalabert-harrison-schmidt_2015.pdf.  Last accessed 18th March 2019.     
462 For comment on why compliance programmes may not be effective in the fight against cartel activity, see, 
Andreas Stephan, ‘Hear no Evil, See no Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes may be Ineffective at 
Preventing Cartels’ (2009) CCP Working Paper 09-09.   
463 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) supra n.407, p.58.  
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a policy standard, will obviously complement the command and control regulation that 
determines and enforces that standard.464  The supply-side incentives provide an additional and 
importantly, financial incentive to meet a particular standard, whether it be performance or 
technology based.  In some policy areas, the advantage of such a combination when referring 
to process-based standards may not be obvious because such standards do not necessarily 
require a change in technology for example, they emphasise the need to implement systems 
with the aim of preventing problems before they arise.465  Whilst the fit is not an easy one in 
the context of competition law, there is some potential to argue that process-based standards 
could possibly be utilised with regard to internal compliance procedures.  It would however, 
be difficult to envisage a scenario where a subsidy, tax concession or soft loan could be used 
in this manner.  There is the potential for a reduction in fine could be attributed to a guilty 
undertaking in accordance with the process-based standards should such internal compliance 
procedures be in place as discussed in respect of voluntarism above, however, given the 
diversity of market sectors with which competition authorities must concern themselves, it 
seems unlikely that a set of detailed process-based standards could or would be articulated by 
the CMA, upon which such financial incentives could definitively be based.  The CMA have 
indicated that were appropriate, they may take the existence of such compliance programmes 
into account when calculating fines.466 
 
The rationale for command and control regulation and broad-based economic instruments 
which target different aspects of a common problem is fundamentally different, however if 
used to target different aspects of a common problem, they could in fact be complementary.467 
In environmental policy the phasing out of leaded fuel is a good example of this: 
 
‘In Australia, all vehicles post-1985 were required to be fitted with catalytic converters 
that necessarily entail the use of engines that only operate on unleaded fuel (a 
conventional technology-based command and control measure).  At the same time, the 
federal government introduced a (phased) price differential on the price of fuel such 
																																																						
464 Ibid.   
465 Ibid.  
466 The CMA state that ‘it will be for each undertaking to frames [sic] its own compliance activites in a way in 
which works for their business.’ CMA, ‘CMA guidance as to the appropriate amount of penalty: summary of 
responses to the consultation,’ 18th April 2018, CMA73resp, para. 2.21.  Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/700560/summ
ary_of_responses_penalties.pdf.  Last accessed 19th March 2019.     
467 Ibid, p.59. 
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that leaded fuel became more expansive than unleaded fuel (a broad-based economic 
instrument, in the form of a pollution tax).  The reason these two radically different 
policy approaches complement each other is that by addressing different aspects of the 
same problem, they provide the market with mutually supportive signals...’468 
 
What makes them a complementary mix in this example, is that they are targeting ‘different 
but contributory aspects of the same problem.’469  The various tools in the antitrust enforcement 
package in the UK aim to target different but contributory aspects of the same problem; the 
individuals that implement the arrangements and the undertakings that profit from them, as 
well as compensating those who suffer as a result.  However, it is not clear what form of broad 
based economic instrument could be utilised in order to target any one aspect of these aspects 
of the cartel problem.  It does illustrate analogously however, that complex objective driven 
mixes, can be created to create a complementary and more effective regulatory response.    
 
Complementarity is also achievable between liability rules and command and control 
regulation when the standard imposed by the regulation is different to that set by the liability 
rule.470  A minimum standard is created which when the need arises, can be escalated by the 
courts.471 It is recommended that the substantive test for blameworthiness for each, is different 
with the liability rules relying upon a negligent or recklessness standard, for example.  If 
however, the liability standard is higher in any way than that imposed by the command and 
control regulation ‘it undermines the notion that the regulatory system sets standards where the 
benefits are balanced against the costs...[and] the town systems would work at cross-
purposes.’472  
 
All of the regulatory relationships discussed so far, are inherently complementary when 
implemented correctly.  These horizontal relationships should therefore, in theory allow for the 
creation of a system of multi-tooled enforcement in order to tackle an identified problem.  The 
implementation of the tools and their enforcement over time, will play a significant role in 
ensuring that complementarity is achieved in practice and maintained long-term.   Further, the 
implication of the above discussion is that the tools are being employed to achieve one policy 
																																																						
468 Ibid. 
469 Ibid.  
470 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) supra n. 407. 
471 Ibid.  
472 Ibid.  
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(or at least multiple complimentary) objectives.  However, as the discussion in section 4.3. 
above showed, complex regulatory spaces often include multiple policies, some of which will 
be seeking to achieve wholly different objectives.  This can have a trickle down effect upon 
the dynamics of the enforcement tools implemented in pursuit of those objectives, and so extra 
care must be taken to consider the tool interaction in light of the number of policy objectives 
and governmental actors, present.   
 
 
 4.3.3.  Inherently Counterproductive Tool Interactions  
 
 
Certain enforcement mechanisms are inherently counterproductive, and as such should be 
avoided because in practice the result of counterproductive interactions is that the impact of 
each mechanism is compromised by the existence and use of the other mechanism(s).  This 
ultimately reduces the impact that not only the individual mechanisms have, but also the 
regulatory regime as a whole.  The following discussion considers some of the inherently 
counterproductive tool interactions that may not be, prima facie, easily identifiable as such.  
 
Command and control regulations and broad-based economic instruments which target the 
same aspects of a common problem can create inherently contradictory tool interactions.473  A 
lot of the performance-standard and technology-based standards imposed by command and 
control regulation in the sphere of environmental policy, for example, aim to achieve a 
specified outcome, often leaving little room for an independent assessment by individual firms.  
Economic instruments are usually utilised to do the opposite as they 'maximise the 
flexibility’474 available to firms when making decisions as how to reach a particular outcome.   
These are therefore clearly incompatible regulatory mechanisms for achieving a policy goal.  
Economic instruments seek to manipulate the principle that firms that can achieve a policy 
outcome most cheaply ‘carry the greater share of the abatement burden.  The result is that...for 
a given level of expenditure’475 a greater level of success is achieved with respect to whatever 
the particular policy goal is. Incentive based costs, in a way similar to that of the economic 
																																																						
473 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999), supra n. 407. 
474 Ibid, p.61  
475 Ibid, p.61.  See also, Theodore Panayotou, ‘Conservation of biodiversity and economic development: The 
concept of transferable development rights,’ (1994) 4(1) Environmental and resource Economics 91.   
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instruments mentioned, seek to distribute regulatory costs amongst the regulated, with those 
able to bare the larger costs most efficiently baring the larger burden.476  This then works to 
provide incentive for those firms to find innovative ways to meet the policy objective, which 
reduces the financial burden upon themselves.  Liability rules would counteract this form of 
cost allocation and would undermine the incentive to innovate.477 
 
The apparent incompatibility of certain regulatory tools can be mitigated or even avoided, if 
they are correctly sequenced.478  This is the case for example, when a particular mechanism is 
used only as a tool of last resort, when other mechanisms have failed to achieve the stipulated 
policy aim.  Logically therefore, the most interventionist mechanism with the most severe 
consequence would be that last resort tool.  Sequencing can also refer to the introduction of an 
entirely new regulatory tool to deal with a problem, where previous tools have been deemed to 
have failed.479  The regulatory mixes that are most likely to fit into this category involve an 
element of self-regulation.  Typical examples are self-regulation and sequential command and 
control regulation or, self-regulation and sequential broad-based economic instruments.480  The 
definition of sequencing provided by the regulatory mix literature, at first instance, appears 
very similar to the evolution of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK where a criminal cartel 
offence was added to improve the deterrent impact of the anti-cartel regime when it was felt 
that a gap in deterrence existed.  However, the practical implementation and enforcement of 
the offence has meant that in reality, the criminal offence has neither become a mechanism of 
last resort, used when all else has failed, and nor has it been able to deal with the identified gap 
in deterrence that it was implemented to plug.   
 
The regulatory mix literature argues that it is often not possible to determine whether a 
particular mix of regulatory tools will be complementary of counterproductive without a 
consideration of their context, as has been done for the preceding discussions.  This is the case 
for complex regulatory portfolios with multiple considerations.  It is the position of this work 
that the dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement mechanisms cannot properly be understood and 
therefore, optimised without considering the vertical interactions.  The interactions that occur 
within the antitrust regulatory space of the UK, are not limited simply to the types of instrument 
																																																						
476 Ibid.   
477 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) supra n. 407, p.65 
478 Ibid.  
479 Ibid.  
480 Ibid.  
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used in the fight against cartels, the various competing policies and goals of each mechanism, 
as well as the various multiple government actors that are present, all add a level of complexity 
that has the potential to impact the efficacy of the overall regime.  Further, the discussion in 
Chapter 3 of this work showed that the enforcement of the criminal cartel offence, or perhaps 
more accurately the lack of enforcement, has had an impact upon its ability to have an impact 
upon cartel activity.  This is corroborated policy and regulatory mix literature which maintains 
that how mechanisms are used, and therefore how they evolve over time can have a significant 
impact upon the regulatory dynamics of a regulatory space.   
 
 4.3.4.  Impact of Time 
 
Regulatory spaces are not a static snapshot of time that exist in a vacuum.  They develop and 
change as political, social and economic conditions change, and those changes can impact the 
effectiveness of the tools within that space.  Kovacic explains that,  
 
‘US experience indicates that the development of successful criminal antitrust 
programme is a cumulative process through which individual enforcement techniques 
are tested, implemented, and refined.’481 
 
This means that periodic review, analysis and adjustment are likely to be necessary in 
maintaining an impactful enforcement environment over time.  This is particularly true of 
‘some policy processes [which] simply take a long time to play out.’482  When that is the case, 
every use of a particular tool ‘conditions and constrains the evolution’483 of the regulatory space 
which they inhabit.  The manner in which the instruments are used in practice, can even lead 
to them losing their legitimacy and to them becoming disjointed from their original aims.  This 
has been referred to an ‘exhaustion risk’484 and occurs when ‘policy regimes become self-
undermining over time.’485  Damage to the effectiveness of an overall regime can occur when 
‘interrelated policy regimes and component parts [are treated] in insolation from one 
																																																						
481 William E. Kovacic, ‘Criminal enforcement norms in competition policy: Insights from US experience,’ in 
Caron Beaton-Wells and Ariel Ezrachi (eds) Criminalising cartels: Critical studies of an international 
regulatory movement (Hart Publishing: 2011) pp.45-73. 
482 Christopher Pollitt, ‘Time, Policy, Management: Governing with the Past’ (Oxford University Press: 2008) 
483 Ibid.  
484 Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Ann Thelan (eds) ‘Beyond Continuity: institutional Change in Advanced 
Political Economies’ (Oxford University Press: 2005) p.29. 
485 Ibid. 
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another.’486  This can lead to ‘incomplete reform efforts with resulting poor outcomes at the 
macro, meso or micro-level.’487  Conversely, the perception of seemingly weak responses can 
be improved over time through effective, transparent and consistent implementation without 
any further need for legislative interference.   
 
 
4.4.  The Regulatory Dynamics of Anti-Cartel Enforcement in the UK 
 
 
  4.4.1.  Introduction 
 
The previous section of this chapter sought to understand the types of interactions that exist 
within a complex regulatory mix, and alluded to the nature of some of the specific enforcement 
instrument interactions that occur horizontally in the anti-cartel regulatory mix in the UK.  This 
section uses the analysis in section 4.3. as a framework within which the various horizontal 
and vertical dynamics of the anti-cartel regulatory space in the UK can be examined in more 
detail.  The process of so doing should highlight any inherently contradictory instrument mixes, 
or indeed those which have become contradictory over time given the manner of their 
implementation and/or enforcement, or any enforcement instruments that have become 
disjointed from the policy objectives that justify their use.  Further, any instrument mixes that 
have not been maximised will be identified.  Understanding the dynamics of anti-cartel 
enforcement will help to determine the place that the criminal cartel offence occupies within 
the regulatory space and may help to established whether that place is contributing to the 
underwhelming impact that the offence has had to date.  Further, examining where and why 
interactions have failed and succeeded will allow for a more meaningful discussion of how the 
overall impact of the regime scan be improved through the exploitation of beneficial 
interactions and the avoidance of damaging ones.   
 
There are a variety of perspectives that could provide the context for an assessment of a 
complex regulatory space, be it public versus private enforcement, or criminal versus civil 
enforcement, or even deterrence versus ‘other objectives’ perspective.  This work however, 
																																																						
486 Jeremy Rayner and Michael Howlett. ‘Introduction: Understanding integrated policy strategies and their 
evolution’ (2009) 28(2) Policy and Society 99. 
487 Ibid.  
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attempts to address the complex matrix of interactions, both vertical and horizontal, from a 
more neutral standpoint in order to allow for the full spectrum of considerations to be part of 
the analysis.  It is hoped that in doing so, a more inclusive and therefore, arguably accurate 
picture is created of the regulatory dynamics that have been created to fight hard-core cartel 
activity in the UK.   
 
In order to carry out the analysis of the UK’s anti-cartel regulatory space the first step is to 
identify variables present as shown in section 4.3.488 above.  This will clarify the degree of 
complexity of the regulatory space and identify its place upon the spectrum of complexity.489 
This then provides the context for understanding the types of horizontal and/or vertical 
interactions that policy makers in the UK need to be aware of when regulating against cartels.  
The next step is to look more closely at the specific variables present at each level of the 
regulatory space, and to then consider the manner in which they interact.  Finally, the horizontal 
interactions between specific enforcement mechanisms must be considered.   
 
 
 4.4.2.  Howlett and del Rio’s Interaction Matrix and the Anti-cartel Regulatory Space 
 
 
In the Howlett and del Rio matrix above, three levels of interaction are identified; 
governmental, policy and goal.  The degree of complexity within any regulatory space 
therefore, is determined by the number of variables identifiable at each level.  For example, if 
there is only one governmental actor, one policy objective and one goal to be achieved, the 
result is a very simple single-level instrument mix in which there exists no room for 
incompatibility.  If however, there are multiple government actors, multiple policy objectives 
and multiple goals a regulatory mix at the opposite end of the complexity spectrum has been 
created, a complex multi-level policy mix, in which contradictions are more likely and difficult 
to resolve.  The following section therefore, examines the variables present in the anti-cartel 
enforcement regulatory space in the UK in order to identify the its place upon the complexity 
spectrum.   
 
																																																						
488 See Section 4.3.   
489 See Table 2. Complexity Spectrum, section 4.3.   
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  4.4.2.1.  Government Actors 
 
Anti-cartel enforcement in the UK does not exist in an entirely discrete manner.  It is influenced 
by the UK’s current membership of the European Union.  Competition law in the UK therefore, 
is underpinned by this relationship and the principles, objectives and political priorities of the 
EU, as well as being governed by the principles, objectives and political priorities of the UK.  
Competition law and the fight against cartel activity is a matter of exclusive EU competence, 
but as a result of Regulation 1/2003490 the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU has been put 
within the competence of the Member States.  This ‘uneven allocation of competence’491 
requires a complex regulatory design in order to work which includes National Competition 
Authorities (‘NCAs’), who are ultimately responsible for the investigation and detection of 
anti-competitive conduct within their own jurisdictions.492  The European Commission (‘the 
Commission’) remains at the apex of administrative enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, and 
retain the power to take over an investigation that has already been started by an NCA, thereby 
requiring that all other national investigations be put on hold.493  Nevertheless, the requirement 
that NCAs apply Article 101 TFEU when inter-Member State community trade could be 
affected, the Commission determines the legal standard by which agreements are judged, 
thereby ensuring consistency and legal certainty throughout the EU.  In doing so, the EU is 
also limiting the autonomy of the Member States and creating a relationship of significant 
influence over more than just legal form.494 
 
Present within the regulatory matrix of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK therefore, there is the 
European Commission, the UK Government and the Competition and Markets Authority.  The 
ideological foundations of EU and UK competition law will influence the policy objectives 
																																																						
490 Council Regulation (EC) No.1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
[101] and [102] of the Treaty, 16 Dec 2002, OJ L 001.  Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32003R0001&from=EN.  Last accessed 20th March 2019.     
491 Dermot Hodson and Imelda Maher, ‘Economic and Monetary Union: balancing credibility and legitimacy in 
an asymmetric policy-mix,’ (2002) 9(3) Journal of European Public Policy 391.   
492 The EU recently enacted a Directive to improve the enforcement impact of Member State competition 
authorities.  See, Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the 
competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market, 11th Dec 2018, OJ L11/3.  Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019L0001&from=EN.  Last accessed 20th March 2019.     
493 Regulation (EC) 1/2003, Article 11(6),. 
494 This in part is due to the duty of loyal or sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU which requires that not only 
should Member States make sure they take steps to ensure the attainment of EU objectives, but that they also 
refrain from measures that may jeopardise those objectives.  See Chapter 5 of this work for more discussion.   
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and political priorities of both governmental actors operating within the regulatory space, as 
will the enforcement priorities and implementation record of the CMA.  The criminal cartel 
offence requires a degree of prosecutorial discretion on the part of the CMA and that will (and 
has) had an impact upon the dynamics of the regulator space of anti-cartel enforcement as it 
has developed over time.   
 
It is clear from this brief discussion that there are multiple variables present at the governmental 
level of the Howlett and del Rio interaction matrix.  The next step is to determine whether there 
are multiple policy objectives operating within the regulatory space in order to establish 
whether anti-cartel enforcement in the UK is a complex or simple, multi-level mix.   
 
  
  4.4.2.2.  Policy Objectives 
 
Despite competition law ‘one of the most important values of the European Union’495 
identifying all of the various policies that together make up competition policy, and identifying 
the primary unifying principles for them all is far from simple.  The term ‘competition policy’ 
itself refers to a collection of sub-policies that work together to create a ‘competitive market.’  
Competition law, which seeks to implement those policies, covers a range of activities from 
mergers, monopolies, cartels and State aid.  Whilst each of these prohibitive activities is 
regulated by separate legislative mechanisms which are pursuing different policy objectives, 
ultimately they are all pursuing the same overriding objective of protecting competition for the 
purpose of protecting the consumer.496  Further, the CMA highlighted the practical implications 
of the enforcement priorities of a competition authority can expose the interaction that occurs 
in the real world between different competition policy tools, and can therefore have an impact 
upon the attainment of those separate policy objectives; 
 
																																																						
495 Oles Andriychuk, ‘Can We Protect Competition Without Protecting Consumers?’ (2009) 6(1) The 
Competition Law Review 77.  
496 The CMA ‘work to promote competition for the benefit of consumers, both within and outside the UK. Our 
aim is to make markets work well for consumers, businesses and the economy.’  See, CMA, ‘What the 
Competition and Markets Authority does.’  Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority.  Last accessed 20th March 
2019.     
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‘cartel enforcement and merger review are usually complementary.  Since greater cartel 
enforcement will cause more companies to consider a merger as an alternative to 
collusion resulting in more potentially anticompetitive mergers.’497 
 
The enforcement priorities of a competition authority can be influenced by the socio-political 
and economic climate at any point in time, as well as budgetary allocation of resources.  If 
cartel enforcement is regarded as being weak, companies who may otherwise have been forced 
to consider merging to achieve their company objectives, may be enticed to engage in hard-
core collusion instead.  Whilst there is currently no mandatory notification required when 
mergers take place, ‘merging parties are encouraged to engage with the CMA at an early stage, 
particularly were the transaction may raise potential competition concerns in the UK.’498  
Should the CMA’s recommendation to create mandatory notification be implemented it could 
have a significant impact upon cartel activity in the UK.499  It is beyond the scope of this work 
to consider the full impact of the interactions between the various competition law policies 
upon the cartel regime, but this again highlights the complex intricacies that are intrinsic within 
competition law enforcement.500   
 
Despite the fact that competition law is as entrenched in both the UK and EU, some 
disagreement still exists as to the overriding policy objective that it should pursue and the 
																																																						
497 CMA, ‘The deterrent effect of competition authorities’ work: Literature review,’ 7 Sep 2017, para. 3.24.  
Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642801/deterr
ent-effect-of-competition-authorities-work-lit-review.pdf.  Last accessed June 2018.     
498 CMA, ‘Guidance on the functions of the CMA after a ‘no deal’ exit from the EU,’ March 2019, CMA 106.  
Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/786749/EU_E
xit_Guidance_Document_for_No_Deal_final.pdf.  Last accessed 20th March 2019.     
499 The Chairman of the CMA, recently outlined a summary of reform proposals that included the proposal to 
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significant impact that the UK’s exit from the EU will have on the number of multi-jurisdictional mergers that 
the CMA will have to review, that would previously have been reviewed by the European Commission.  See, 
CMA Correspondence, ‘Summary of proposals from Andrew Tyrie, CMA Chair, to the Secretary of State for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy,’ 25th February 2019.  Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/letter-from-andrew-tyrie-to-the-secretary-of-state-for-business-
energy-and-industrial-strategy/summary-of-proposals-from-andrew-tyrie-cma-chair-to-the-secretary-of-state-
for-business-energy-and-industrial-strategy.  Last accessed 20th March 2019.     
500 Some commentators question ‘why strategies of market dominance and concentration (mergers) which may 
achieve the same of comparable outcomes to “hard-core” cartels, do not attract the same degree of vilification 
and associated legal control’ particularly given that mergers may not only remove competition, but also 
competitors.  See Caron Beaton-Wells, Christopher Harding and Jennifer Edwards, ‘Leniency and Criminal 
Sanctions in Anti-Cartel Enforcement: Happily Married or Uneasy Bedfellows?’ in Beaton-Wells and Tran 
(eds) Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: Leniency Religion (Bloomsbury Publishing: 2015).  
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answer is largely dependent upon the ‘theoretical school’501 that proponents follow, each 
producing potentially very ‘different conclusions as to which types of conduct should be 
subject to legal prohibition and what types of legal test should be applied to determine 
liability.’502  The Chicago school ‘with its neoclassical price theory’503for example,  maintain 
that: 
 
‘non-economic goals [have no] place in the application of competition policy, both 
because of their non-quantifiable nature, and because of the desirability of promoting 
efficiency as the sole goal.’504 
 
In Europe however, consumer welfare, an economic goal, is considered to be of central 
importance.  Indeed, former European Commissioner for competition policy, Neelie Kroes 
stated that,  
 
‘Consumer welfare is now established as the standard the Commission applies when 
assessing mergers and infringements of the Treaty on rules on cartels and monopolies.  
Our aim is simple: to protect competition in the markets as a means of enhancing 
welfare and ensuring the efficient allocation of resources.’505 
 
This has not always been the approach adopted in the EU however, and over the years some 
policy objectives have not been ‘rooted in notions of consumer welfare in the technical sense 
at all, and some were plainly inimical to the pursuit of allocative and productive efficiency.’506  
Policy objectives, which can strongly influence the manner in which legislative mechanisms 
are employed and understood, are an ‘expression of the current values and aims of society and 
																																																						
501 The most prominent ‘range from the Harvard school (Mason, Bain, Jayser and Tuner), with its largely 
structural theory of competition, the Chicago school (Stigler, Bork and Posner) with its neoclassical pricing 
theory, the post-Chicago school (Salop, Shapiro, Ordover and Williamson), with its strategic, game-theorectic 
theory of firm behaviour, and more recently the behavioural economics school (Sunstein, Gerla, Stucke and 
Tor), with its challenge to the rational assumptions that underpin other economic theories.’ Caron Beaton-Wells, 
Christopher Harding and Jennifer Edwards, ‘Leniency and Criminal Sanctions in Anti-Cartel Enforcement: 
Happily Marrired or Uneasy Bedfellows?’ supra n.499. 
502 Caron Beaton-Wells, Christopher Harding and Jennifer Edwards (2015) supra n. 499, n.  p.241.  
503 Ibid.  
504 Mark Furse, ‘The Role of Competition Policy: a survey,’ (1996) European Competition Law Review 250.   
505 Neelie Kroes, ‘European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better Choices,’ 15th 
September 2015, Speech/05/512.  Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-512_en.htm.  
Last accessed 20th March 2019.     
506 Richard Whish and David Bailey, ‘Competition Law’ 7th edn (Oxford University Press: 2012) p.19.   
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[are] as susceptible to change as political thinking generally.’507  The very concept of the 
internal market for example, requires that all internal barriers to trade be dismantled.508  
Competition law therefore, was one way in which the EU could prevent artificial barriers to 
trade and so, in the beginning, the creation, protection and maintenance of the internal market 
was an important policy objective of competition law.  Now that the internal market is 
thoroughly matured and established, other objectives have taken a more prominent role.  Even 
more recently, some have argued in favour of a shift towards ‘more of a focus on a total welfare 
model rather than a consumer welfare model’509 as a consequence of the 2008 global economic 
crisis, whilst others maintain that ‘the ultimate objective of … intervention in the area of 
antitrust … should be the promotion of consumer welfare.’510   
 
Consumer welfare itself is defined in terms of its ‘outcomes which are more important than the 
process of competition.’511 This utilitarian approach to competition policy is reflected in the 
fact that some would argue that ‘[f]ree competition is not an end in itself – it is a means to an 
end.’512  This perhaps starts to illuminate the strong relationship between competition law and 
the utilitarian enforcement mechanisms that it typically favours.  Competition as a process 
deserved of protection however, is not without its proponents because ‘[v]igorous competition 
between firms is the lifeblood of strong and effective markets.’513  Competition policy 
however, is nuanced enough to prevent it from being ‘seen as a zero sum game’514 in that it is 
entirely possible to pursue one overriding objective whilst bringing about other ‘positive 
externalities.’515  
 
It can be said therefore, that at the very least competition law has at least one policy objective, 
which in Europe is broadly agreed to be consumer welfare.  Anti-cartel law, which is a sub-set 
of competition law, therefore must contribute to the attainment of this overriding objective.  
																																																						
507 Ibid, p.20.  
508 Ibid.  
509 Phil Evans, ‘The Consumer and Competition Policy: welfare, interest and engagement,’ in Ariel Ezrachi (ed) 
Research Handbook on International Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, 2012) p.545.   
510 Philip Lowe, ‘The design of competition policy instruments for the 21st century – the experience of the 
European Commission and DG Competition,’ (2008) 3 Competition Policy Newsletter.   
511 Oles Andriychuk (2009), supra n. 494. 
512 Neelie Kroes, ‘“Free Competition” is not an end in itself…’ (2007) Concurrences No. 3-2007.  
513 DTI, ‘Productivity and Enterprise: A World Class Competition Regime’ July 2001, Cm 5233.  Available at: 
https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics2/pdf2/cm5233.pdf.  Last 
accessed 20th March 2019.     
514 Oles Andriychuk (2009) supra n. 494.  
515 Ibid.  
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Anti-cartel regulation however, particularly since the introduction of a criminal cartel offence, 
has its own policy concerns that, whilst arguably subordinate to the overriding policy objective 
of consumer welfare (as that is the primary concern of competition law) need to be counted 
when determining the number of variables present in the regulatory space for the purpose of 
the Howlett and del Rio complexity spectrum assessment.  The most obvious policy addition 
to the regulatory space is of course criminal law policy.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 of this work, the criminal law can be used in pursuit of either 
consequentialist or non-consequentialist objectives.  Consequentialist objectives are essentially 
utilitarian and justify the use of criminal sanctions if such usage has beneficial future outcomes 
(deterrence, for example).  In practice, the use of criminal sanctions for consequentialist 
purposes is tempered by the need that such sanctions be fair and justified, i.e. the condemned 
man has done something wrong.  Criminal sanctions are therefore never appropriately imposed 
upon an innocent man purely for the purpose of creating future beneficial outcomes like 
deterrence.  Non-consequentialist objectives justify the use of criminal law sanctions because 
harm done to society deserves to be punished, and in practice will result in some beneficial 
outcomes, even a certain degree of deterrence.  In addition criminal policy, because of the very 
serious implications that criminal sanctions necessitate, must abide by fundamental concepts 
of both fairness and justice.  This is implicit in the procedures and evidential burdens associated 
with the investigation and prosecution of criminal conduct.  
 
Nevertheless, the criminal cartel offence was introduced as a mechanism by which the 
utilitarian objective of deterrence could be enhanced, but maintained that it was justified 
because cartel activity is morally blameworthy.  However, the instrumentalist way in which 
the offence has been implemented would imply that the criminal cartel offence is not part of 
the wider criminal policy landscape. Nowhere is that more evident that in the dynamics that 
occur between the criminal cartel offence and the leniency programme that is so integral to the 
administrative regime.   
 
The leniency programme is regarded as vital to the success of the administrative anti-cartel 
regime in the EU, and therefore the UK.  The administrative regime is the primary mechanism 
by which the EU fights cartel activity, an area of exclusive competence for the EU.  The 
importance of the Member States protecting the leniency programme cannot be understated.  
The creation of a criminal cartel offence within the Member States therefore, cannot jeopardise 
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the efficacy of the leniency programme and thereby, the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, a 
fundamental legislative mechanism for protecting consumer welfare and the integrity of the 
internal market.  Consequently, legislators in the UK were forced to create a means by which 
the immunities offered in the leniency programme for the administrative regime could be 
replicated for the section 188 offence.  Had they not, the immunity from a fine for an 
undertaking would have lost its appeal as the individual agents of that undertaking would have 
instead be sent to jail.  This resulted in the creation of ‘No Action’ letters which provide 
culpable cartelists with immunity from criminal prosecution if certain criteria are satisfied.516  
Legislators felt comfortable with allowing equally culpable offenders to escape prosecution for 
a criminal offence considered to be so grave that it allows for terms of imprisonment of up to 
5 years, so that they would not be dissuaded from blowing the whistle on the cartels of which 
they had become a part.  This is atypical for criminal law in the UK.  The apparent cognitive 
dissonance of allowing a blameworthy participant escape any form of punishment despite 
having engaged in what is regarded as a serious and harmful criminal offence, was made 
practicable because of the instrumentalist manner in which the criminal cartel offence has been 
implemented in the UK.  It has appropriated the moral language of criminal policy whilst 
simultaneously ignoring the normative nature of those sanctions.  In so doing, it has also failed 
to adequately engage with the fundamental criminal policy considerations of fairness and 
justice.517 
 
These concerns are less problematic when considered from a purely utilitarian perspective, but 
when a predominantly utilitarian ideology is used to justify the creation of a criminal cartel 
offence, the question of under-enforcement becomes more relevant.  When criminal sanctions 
are used simply as part of ‘the law’s continuum of deterrent threats’518 arguably adding to the 
blurring of the distinction between civil and criminal law by ignoring the normative 
implications of the criminal law, it can lead to both ‘the overuse of criminal law outside its 
																																																						
516 OFT, “Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases: OFT’s detailed guidance on the principles and 
process’ July 2013, OFT1495.  Available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284417/OFT1
495.pdf.  Last accessed 17th January 2019.     
517 Beaton-wells explains it as a ‘largely instrumental justification for criminalisation (that is, using criminal 
sanctions to bolster leniency policies), as distinct from a more normative justification (that is, using criminal 
sanctions to reflect and punish the harmful and delinquent nature of cartels),’ in Caron Beaton-Wells (2017) 
p.10.  
518 Robinson, ‘The criminal-civil distinction and the utility of desert,’ (1996) 76 Boston University Law Review 
201.   
 121	
	
traditional context, and its under-enforcement.’519  The risk of under-enforcement has indeed 
been played out in the context of the criminal cartel offence in the UK as a result of,  
 
‘the tendency for enforcement agencies to rely principally on easier-to-prove 
administrative regimes and administrative sanctions, with criminal law being only used 
as a last and final resort.’520 
 
Whilst it is proportionate for a criminal sanction to be reserved for only the most serious cases, 
as shown in Chapter 3 of this work, in order for it to be a deterrent, it must actually be used 
(and used successfully) in those serious cases.  The deterrent threat cannot be fully realised if 
the certainty of detection, prosecution and sanction are low without the threatened sanction 
being raised to wholly disproportionate and unjust levels.  In the context of the criminal cartel 
offence, it appears that even when serious cartels have been detected and the threshold for a 
criminal prosecution has been met, there is still a reluctance from the CMA to pursue criminal 
sanctions.521  If the real world enforcement of the cartel offence implies that deterrence is not 
the primary focus, the dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK may be a serious problem: 
 
‘perceived unfairness of unacceptable compromise in relation to leniency policies also 
has consequences for the readiness of members of the business sector to comply with 
cartel laws voluntarily.  In particular, it may have adverse implications for normative 
compliance, where compliance is internalised by a sense of duty and does not require 
activation by some external force or pressure.’522   
 
Further, from a purely retributive perspective, if cartel activity is so harmful as to deserve the 
imposition of a criminal sanction, its under-enforcement, together with the consistent 
enforcement of the administrative regime against  undertakings, would seem to indicate that a 
considerable number of culpable cartelists are escaping the punishment that they deserve.   
 
																																																						
519 Jones and Williams, ‘The UK response to the global effort against cartels: is criminalisation really the 
solution?’ (2014) Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 100.   
520 Ibid.   
521 See for example: OFT Decision, CA98/02/2009, ‘Bid rigging in the construction in England,’ 21 September 
2009 (Case CE/4327-04). 
522 Caron Beaton-Wells (2015) supra n.499, p.246.  
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The blurring of the lines between the criminal and civil law in respect of anti-cartel enforcement 
does not just occur on a theoretical level.  The section 188 offence, as amended, introduces a 
range of potential defences to liability as a means of limiting the scope of the offence by carving 
out situations in which the offence would not apply:  
 
 (a) Customers would be given relevant information about the arrangements 
 before they enter into agreements for the supply to them of the products or 
 services so affected;  
(b)  In the case of bid-rigging arrangements, the person requesting the bids would be 
given relevant information about them at or before the time when the bid is made, or;  
 (c)  Relevant information about the arrangements would be published,  
 before the arrangements are implemented.523   
 
The idea is that arrangements that lack the clandestine characteristic of a traditional cartel and 
are made openly, will not be caught by section 188.  The rationale for articulating the offence 
that way was that cartel arrangements that are made openly, where details are available to those 
affected by the arrangement allow consumers to inform themselves about the agreements and 
so can make an informed decision as to whether to contract with the cartelists or elsewhere.524  
The type of agreements that would benefit from the carve out would be, for example, joint 
selling agreements like those used in professional sport for the sale of the collective sale of 
broadcasting rights for televised games.  The idea is that only legitimate agreements could be 
discussed and implemented openly.  Illegal agreements would be unable to benefit from the 
carve out because should such agreements be made openly in the manner envisaged by the Act, 
administrative sanctions by way of the Competition Act 1998, or indeed any other aspect of 
the anti-cartel enforcement quiver, would very quickly follow.   
 
The contours of the newly amended criminal offence are therefore, defined by the existence of 
the civil penalties and could not operate in the intended manner on its own.  In articulating the 
criminal offence in this way, the regulatory dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement have been 
further altered, and the relationship between the various enforcement mechanisms have become 
																																																						
523 Enterprise Act, s. 188A  
524 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on 
Options for Reform’ (March 2011), para. 6.52, available at: 
http://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31411/11-657-compliance-
regime-for-growth-consultation.pdf   
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even closer.  This could operate to the advantage of the overall regime.  However, if one 
particular aspect of the regime operates in an appreciably under-whelming way, that close 
relationship could mean that the underwhelming enforcement of one mechanism could have a 
negative impact upon other mechanisms within the enforcement toolkit.  This was explored in 
Chapter 5 of this work in respect of Article 4(3) TEU and the duty of loyal cooperation, and 
was played out in Sweden when the issue of cartel criminalisation was raised.   
 
The Swedish Competition Authority, the Konkurrensverket (the ‘KKV’) acknowledged that 
hard-core anti-competitive agreements like those subject to criminal sanctions in the UK are 
not only economically harmful, but morally blameworthy.  However, the Swedish Constitution 
places an absolute duty to prosecute criminal offences, upon the relevant authorities.525  This 
absolute duty therefore prevents Sweden from implementing a system of leniency that utilises 
immunity from criminal prosecution.  The KKV concluded that a legislative mechanism that 
sought to punish individual cartelists criminally, without an associated leniency programme 
providing for such immunity would damage the pre-existing system of administrative fines in 
Sweden, and so could not be added to their anti-cartel regulatory landscape.526  Criminalisation 
was therefore, rejected.527  Interestingly, in a letter from DG Comp to the KKV dates the 29th 
April 2005, issues regarding the potentially negative impact of criminalisation upon anti-cartel 
enforcement practices against undertakings was alluded to.  DG Comp states that there are 
three conditions which must be present in order for criminal sanctions to be an advantageous 
addition to an anti-cartel framework.  The conditions were:  
 
1.  Far reaching investigative powers are needed to satisfy not only the higher 
evidential standard in criminal cases, but also the increased rights enjoyed by 
defendants in criminal proceedings;  
2. The judiciary themselves must be willing to impose the sanctions provided for by 
the law 
																																																						
525 Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure, Chapter 20, section 6.  
526 See, Interventions by Claes Norgren, Director General, Swedish Competition Authority, ‘Criminal 
Enforcement of Antitrust Laws,’ Fordham Law Seminar, New York, September 14 2006.  
527 The Swedish Competition Authority also noted that another ‘ground for rejecting the idea [of immunity for 
culpable defendants] has been that the system would give the police and prosecutors the right to grant the relief.  
Such a power outside of the court system is seen as non-acceptable (sic).’  See, Interventions by Claes Norgren, 
Director General, Swedish Competition Authority, ibid.  
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3. An effective leniency programme that is applicable to both criminal and civil 
proceedings is required.528   
 
It went on to say that a ‘failure to meet any of these conditions will in [its] view not only result 
in less efficient enforcement of criminal offences but will also lead to under enforcement of 
the competition rules against companies’ (emphasis added).529  
 
In the UK, it remains to be seen whether all three of DG Comp’s essential criteria can be 
satisfied.  Whilst it is clear that the UK has sufficient investigatory powers and procedural 
protections, along with a leniency programme that provides for immunity from criminal 
sanctions, it remains unclear whether the judiciary are prepared to impose the sanctions 
provided for by section 188.  When able to impose sanctions free from the effects of a 
Department of Justice plea bargain, the UK judiciary have chosen only to impose suspended 
sentences.530   
 
Competition policy in the UK is an amalgam of policies that at a minimum include consumer 
welfare, criminal policy and the policy objectives of the EU.  This demonstrates that not only 
is the regulatory space in the UK multi-governmental, it is a multi-policy space and adds a 
further layer of complexity to the regulatory mix that can now be identified as a multi-
government policy mix.  As the degree of complexity grows, so do the opportunities for 
inconsistencies, particularly when the various elements contained within the policy mix are 
poorly understood or misused.  This is perhaps most evident when the criminal policy aspect 
of the regulatory space is considered. This work agrees with those commentators who prescribe 
to the view that the way in which the cartel offence has been utilised in the UK,  
 
																																																						
528 DG Comp, Letter to Swedish Competition Authority, 29th April 2005.  See ANNEX 1: DG Comp letter to 
Swedish Competition Authority.  As discussed in Chapter 5 of this work, any domestic measure of a Member 
State that risked the attainment of a Union objective, particularly one as fundamental as the protection of 
competition within the internal market, could amount to a breach of the duty of loyal cooperation contained in 
Article 4(3) TEU. When put into a practical context such as the Swedish example above, that could amount to 
an enforceable obligation to create a system of immunity from prosecution should a criminal sanction for 
individuals be introduced to a Member States’ domestic anti-cartel regulatory space.   
529 Ibid.   
530 Peter Nigel Snee, who pleaded guilty to a breach of section 188 Enterprise Act 2002, received 6 months 
imprisonment suspended for 12 months.  His co-cartelists were acquitted at trial having pleaded not guilty.  
Barry Kenneth Cooper received a sentence of 2 years imprisonment, suspended for 2 years as well as a 
competition disqualification order for 7 years, having pleaded guilty.   
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‘in jurisprudential terms, … reflects a tension between the resort to criminal law on the 
one hand for retributive or normative purposes and on the other hand for instrumental 
purposes.  The result is inconsistency in policy and practice, and a strategy that may 
then be, to some extent, self-defeating.’531 
 
It is also perhaps an indication of the lack of serious engagement with the idea of creating a 
culture of compliance.  The way in which ‘immunity policies … reduce law enforcement to a 
“game” – the company that is first to “the confessional” wins, the winner takes all’532, and as 
there is ‘no requirement to implement, improve, or update a compliance program’533 in order 
to benefit from immunity, ‘it is difficult to imagine how this scenario promotes respect for the 
law.’534 
   
  4.4.2.3.  Goals  
 
Given the complexity that is apparent from the preceding discussions, it is perhaps to be 
expected that anti-cartel enforcement in the UK is also seeking to attain multiple goals.  It is 
clear from the pre-legislative discussions and CMA publications that the primary goal in the 
UK is that of deterrence as a means of reducing cartel activity.  The civil regime which is the 
primary means by which cartels are dealt with, is also predominantly in the pursuit of 
deterrence.  The criminal cartel offence was primarily introduced to enhance that deterrence, 
and the leniency programme was created (and protected) to improve detection rates, and 
therefore enable that deterrence. However, despite the UK’s almost singular pursuit of 
deterrence, it is not the sole goal of anti-trust enforcement.  Unfortunately, whilst there has 
been explicit clarity as to deterrence being the primary goal of the administrative regime and 
the criminal offence, there has been arguably less clarity as to the direct and indirect goals of 
the other enforcement mechanisms.  All of the enforcement mechanisms must be enforced in 
pursuit of direct goals that ultimately feed back into the overriding objective of competition 
law, and so must in some way, enhance consumer welfare.  In so doing however, the use of an 
enforcement mechanism may have an indirect impact upon some ancillary goal.   
 
																																																						
531 Caron Beaton-Wells (2015) supra n. 499, chapter 12, p.248.   
532 Caron Beaton-Wells, ‘Normative Compliance: The End Game’ (2012) 2 (1) Antitrust Chronicle.  
533 Ibid. 
534 Ibid.   
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An analysis of the enforcement tools within the toolkit will help to provide greater clarity as to 
the goals of they seek to achieve, both directly and indirectly.  The least interventionist 
regulatory tool that the CMA have at their disposal are the advocacy and education information 
strategies.  In the broadest sense competition advocacy is defined as: 
 
‘all those activities conducted by the competition agency that have to do with the 
promotion of a competitive environment by means of non-enforcement mechanisms, 
mainly through its relationships with other government agencies and by increasing 
public awareness of the benefits of competition.’535 
 
The direct benefit of advocacy work therefore, is to raise awareness as to the benefits of 
competition and thereby, educate individuals, undertakings and governments to help enable 
them to make pro-competitive choices.   Therefore, advocacy has an important role to play in 
creating a culture of voluntary compliance with competition laws, which could be said to the 
the direct goal of such strategies.  Indirectly, advocacy work of this kind also contributes to 
ensuring that society, and therefore the pool of potential jurors, are more aware of the harm 
done by anti-competitive conduct and regard interventions by the competition authorities as 
just, fair and necessary. The indirect goal therefore, is arguably is to contribute to the efficacy 
of the sanctioning of cartels, and the legitimacy of competition law actions.  As well as this 
broad definition of the advocacy role of competition authorities, the CMA has a legal power to 
‘provide information and advice on matters relating to any of its functions to ministers or other 
public authorities.’536  Given that the ‘scale of Government influence over markets and the 
potential for it to promote or harm the interests of present and future consumers is 
considerable,’537 the ability of the CMA to intervene, whether formally or not, with advice and 
recommendations is an important function.  This is particularly true given that in ‘the real world 
“policy instruments” are, as a piece of social technology have a high degree of … interpretative 
flexibility carrying quite different meanings from time to time.’538  The ability of the CMA 
therefore, to provide advice to the Government on the implications of their policy choices in 
																																																						
535 ICN, Advocacy Toolkit Part 1.  Available at: https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/09/AWG_Toolkit1.pdf.  Last accessed 24th December 2018.    
536 Enterprise Act 2002, s. 7.   
537 John Kirkpatrick, ‘Making a case for competition in policymaking – lessons from CMA advocacy 2014 – 
2018,’ (2018) 14(1) European Competition Journal 152.  
538 Kieron Flanagan, Elvira Uyarra and Manuel Laranja, ‘Reconceptualising the ‘policy mix’ for innovation,’ 
(2011) 40(5) Research Policy 702.   
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the context of their current use, is an invaluable tool for the protection of competition and 
thereby, consumer welfare. 
 
Third party damages claims play an important, although perhaps underutilised role in the anti-
cartel regulatory space.  They are principally compensatory in nature as they aim to allow those 
who have suffered economic harm as a result of a cartel, to be compensated for that harm.  
However, despite the fact that the CJEU in Courage v Crehan539 ‘highlighted the possibility 
for victims of antitrust violations to claim damages before national courts’540, and then in 
Courage and in Joined Cases C 295/04 to C 298/04 (Manfredi et al.)541 the CJEU went on to 
acknowledged the risk that the lack of such a mechanism for individual victims of antitrust 
violations would pose to the effectiveness of the Treaty provisions,  ‘most victims, particularly 
SMEs and consumers, rarely obtain compensation.’542  The right to compensation, whilst being 
a right derived from EU law, is exercised and governed by national rules which ‘often make it 
costly and difficult to bring antitrust damages actions.’543  This has been addressed in the 
Damages Directive544 which seeks to harmonise the process of private actions for damages 
across the EU Member States after a 2004 Report found that they were in a states of ‘total 
underdevelopement.’545 The Damages Directive emphasises that: 
 
‘The full effectiveness of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, and in particular the practical 
effect of the prohibitions laid down therein, requires that anyone — be they an 
individual, including consumers and undertakings, or a public authority — can claim 
																																																						
539 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd. v. Bernard Crehan (2001) ECR, I-6297.  
540 Andrea Renda et al., ‘Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and 
potential scenarios: Final Report,’ Report for the European Commission, DG COMP/2006/A3/012, 21st 
December 2007, p.28.  Available at: 
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I-06619. 
542 European Commission, ‘Actions for Damages: Overview’, Antitrust, accessed 28th April 2018.  Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html     
543 Ibid.  The Commission sought to address this problem by introducing Directive 2014/104/EU on Antitrust 
Damages Actions which entered into force on 26 December 2014.  Member States were required to implement it 
into their domestic legal systems by the 27 December 2016.  Complimentary to the Directive, was the 
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544 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of 
the European Union, 26 November 2014, OJ L349/1.   
545 Ashurst, ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC  
Competition rules’, Brussels, 2004, 27.  
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compensation before national courts for the harm caused to them by an infringement of 
those provisions’546  
 
The EU is clearly therefore, stating that private enforcement of damages claims against 
undertakings for the harm caused by their collusion is a vital aspect of the fight against cartels, 
even though it is not a mechanism by which Article 101 TFEU is directly enforced against 
those undertakings. 
 
In the UK there are a variety of ways in which victims of cartel agreements can seek redress in 
private actions.  Broadly speaking they can be categorised as ‘follow-on’ actions that rely upon 
a UK or EU competition authority infringement decision as the basis for the action,547 
‘standalone’ actions, and actions for injunctive relief.  In follow-on actions there is no need for 
the claimant to establish that an infringement has occurred, only that they have suffered damage 
as a result.  The Consumer Rights Act 2015 (the ‘CRA 2015’) provided for ‘standalone’ actions 
which are not dependent upon a pre-exiting infringement decisions and it is now the case that 
most: 
  
‘significant competition cases today are hybrids… A typical case will have a follow-on 
element that relies on a pre-exiting decision, but will also have a standalone element 
that adduces other evidence to establish a broader infringement that has been described 
in the decision.’548 
 
Prior to the CRA 2015 the cost of a private action operated as a deterrent in cases where the 
harm suffered by individual victims was small and meant that the process of making a claim 
was not cost effective.  This was despite that fact the collective harm of all the individual 
victims may have been significant. It was for this reason that the CRA 2015 introduced 
collective proceedings that enable a group of victims to claim for damages together.549  
																																																						
546 Damages Directive, Rectial (3), supra n. 543. 
547 Decisions of the CMA and the European Commission are binding.  The decisions of other European 
competition authorities are not binding but will be considered persuasive by the UK courts.   
548 Slaughter and May, ‘Private enforcement of competition law in the UK’, August 2017.  Available at: 
https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/2534704/private-enforcement-of-competition-law-in-the-uk.pdf   
549 Competition Act 1998, s 47B (as amended by Schedule 8 Consumer Rights Act 2015). 
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Nevertheless, individual claimants have found it to be difficult to be classified as a group by 
the court for the purpose of a collective action in practice.550   
 
As well as recognising the important role that private action claims for damages play in the 
fight against cartels, both as an instrument of corrective justice for harmed consumers, and as 
tool for ‘discouraging anticompetitive behaviour’551 the European Commission also recognised 
the potentially harmful impact that an increase in damages actions could have on the leniency 
programme.  The argument being that were victims able to rely on leniency statements in order 
to obtain damages for the harm that they suffered, it could deter cartelists from coming forward, 
thereby reducing detection rates and the efficacy of the administrative regime.  This need to 
balance the interests of the victims of a cartel to obtain corrective justice against the interests 
of protective public enforcement of competition law via leniency programmes was articulated 
in the Damages Directive: 
 
‘Leniency programmes and settlement procedures are important tools for the public 
enforcement of Union competition law as the contribute to the detection and efficient 
prosecution of, and the imposition of penalties for, the most serious infringements of 
competition law...  To ensure undertakings continued willingness to approach 
competition authorities voluntarily with leniency statements or settlement submissions, 
such documents should be exempted from the disclosure of evidence.’552 
 
When victims can obtain sufficient evidence to pursue a claim, there are further obstacles that 
ultimate consumers face when trying to obtain corrective justice.  Quite often the claimant in a 
private action claim is not the end consumer but someone further up the supply chain, who has 
passed on the harmful cartel pricing to its own consumers.  The defendant in a private action 
claim can rely therefore, on the ‘passing-on defence.’553  The problem for the ultimate 
consumer is that they are not a direct victim of the cartel but have still suffered as a result of 
its unfair and anticompetitive overcharge.  The EU Damages Directive seeks to mitigate this 
																																																						
550 Gowling WLG, ‘Class Actions for Competition Law Infringements Come to the UK’ 30th September 2015.  
Available at: https://gowlingwlg.com/en/insights-resources/articles/2015/class-actions-for-competition-law-
infringements/.  Last accessed 24th December 2018.   
551 Green Paper, ‘Damages actions for breach of the [EU] antitrust rules’ COM (2005) 672, 19 December 2005, 
3.  Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0672&from=en.  
Accessed 1st May 2018.  
552 Recital (26), Damages Directive, supra n. 543.  
553 Theon Van Dijk and Frank Verboven, ‘Cartel Damages Claims and the Passing-On Defence’ (2008) CEPR 
Discussion Paper No. DP6329. 
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problem by creating a rebuttable presumption that an indirect purchaser has suffered harm if 
they can ‘prove that an overcharge was suffered by a direct purchaser from whom [they] 
purchased the goods or services in question.’554  This may be simple when a case has been 
litigated in court and the defendant has been able to prove passing on as part of his defence, 
but as a significant number of private damages actions may well be settled out of court, this 
could arguably amount to a serious obstacle for end of line consumers who already suffer as a 
result of the ‘information asymmetry’555 that is at the heart of most antitrust actions. 
 
 So whilst consumer welfare is served by the creation of a competitive market on a general 
level, the leniency programme necessitates that those who have participated in cartels but who 
come forward, are not sanctioned proportionately to the harm that they have inflicted upon 
consumers.  The leniency programme then goes on to limit the availability of information to 
those consumers for the purpose of private damages claims, further limiting the availability of 
corrective justice.  This is then exacerbated by the challenges faced by consumers to whom the 
economic harm created by the cartels are passed on to (as illustrated above) in obtaining 
compensation for the actual harm they have suffered in specific cases.  The impact of protecting 
the leniency programme therefore, may in practice serve to undermine aspects of consumer 
welfare as a policy objective.  
 
The direct goal of competition disqualification orders is incapacitation as the court is obligated 
to make a disqualification order when the director against whom the order is sought has 
committed a breach of competition law, and that their conduct in so doing makes him unfit to 
be concerned in the management of a company.556  The determination of the court when an 
order is thus made, is that the subject of the order should be prevented from occupying a 
position of managerial influence over a company.  The effect of such an order is to make it a 
criminal offence for the subject to, inter alia, be a company director for the duration of the 
ordered disqualification.557  The indirect effect of a disqualification order therefore, is the 
prevention of recidivism.  Further, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this work, competition 
disqualification orders have been found to exert a powerful deterrent effect.558 
																																																						
554 Marc Israel, Charles Balmain, Mark Powell, Aqeel Kadri, ‘Competition Damages – UK implementation of 
the EU Damages Directive’, White & Case Publications, 27 January 2017.  Available at: 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/competition-damages-uk-implementation-eu-damages-directive   
555 Ibid. 
556 Company Director Disqualification Act 1986 s 9A(1) – (3). 
557 The maximum period of disqualification is 15 years by virtue of section 9A(9) CDDDA 1986.   
558 For more discussion see, section 4.4.2.3. 
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The goals that can be identified as operating within the anti-cartel regulatory space in the UK 
therefore, are deterrence, presence of multiple goals again increase the level of complexity that 
is present in a regulatory space, and with it increases the likelihood that conflicts will occur.  
As was the case in the previous discussion about policies, the operation of the leniency 
programme creates a greater risk of such conflicts occurring.  For example, if, 
 
‘[c]riminalisation is borne of the view that cartel conduct is both seriously  harmful 
and inherently delinquent, and hence warrants the most stringent and condemnatory 
response available to the state,’559  
 
it is hard to reconcile this position with the granting of immunity to culpable defendants in 
exchange for information.  Further, there is a view that leniency policies ‘impair the ability of 
private complainants to access [evidence, and so] seriously impair private litigants’ ability to 
pursue follow-on damages claims’560 thus diminishing the compensatory nature of anti-cartel 
enforcement mechanisms.  In Europe for example, almost all stand-alone damage claims fail.561   
The proper functioning of the leniency programme thereby,  
 
‘transgresses the principle of corrective justice (that injured persons be made whole and 
the one who caused the injury pays), as it allows a culpable person to avoid paying a 
pro rata share of damages...’562  
 
The operation of a leniency programme which increases the likelihood and the number of civil 
actions yet diminishes the compensatory side of anti-cartel enforcement some may find 
difficult to ethically or practically justify.563  Further, despite all of the moral rhetoric that was 
employed to justify the addition of a criminal sanction to the legislative quiver in the UK, 
leniency plays a role in undermining that very aspect of its justification.  These problematic 
aspects of the leniency programme are further compounded by the fact that it has been 
‘repeatedly pointed out that leniency policies display a bias towards uncovering collusive 
																																																						
559 Caron Beaton-Wells (2015) supra n. 499, chapter 12, p. 234.   
560 Ibid, p,266.   
561 Ibid.   
562 Ibid, p.268.   
563 Ibid, p.267. 
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conduct close to breaking point, that is to say at the end of the life of a cartel.’564  In fact, a 
‘dataset of European Commission cartel decisions between 1995 and 2012, established that 
over 3/4 of the leniency applications by first-in applicants took place after, not before, a cartel 
collapse.’565  This could be used to demonstrate that cartels are not being deterred, or even 
significantly de-stabilised by anti-cartel enforcement and that the enforcement bias should be 
more heavily in favour of compensating injured parties, and punishing wrongdoing.  However, 
the leniency programme is a critical aspect of a successful administrative regime against 
undertakings, which is the primary means by which cartel activity is sanctioned in the UK and 
the EU.  The Commission state that the ‘interests of consumers … in ensuring that secret cartels 
are detected and punished outweigh the interest in fining those undertakings that enable the 
Commission to detect and prohibit [cartels].’566 The operation of the leniency programme 
therefore, is considered by the EU to be essential for the effective enforcement of Article 101 
TFEU, and as discussed above in section … , Article 4(3) TEU could be interpreted as a legal 
obligation for Member States to create and implement a similar leniency regime so far as their 
constitutional arrangements permit them to do so, rather than such a programme of leniency 
being merely a recommended best practice.   
 
The above discussion illustrates that not only is the anti-cartel regulatory space in the UK a 
multi-level policy mix, but that given the number of goals it pursues, it is a situated at the most 
complex end of the complexity spectrum articulated by Howlett and del Rio.  The degree of 
complexity and the number of horizontal and vertical interactions, gives rise to a significant 
risk of challenging, potentially contradictory interactions to occur within the space.  This is 
arguably exacerbated by the fact that currently, the anti-cartel regulatory space in the UK has 
failed to properly acknowledge and engage with the fact that mechanisms may pursue multiple 
goals but not in an equal manner.  For example, the criminal cartel offence was introduced in 
order to increase the deterrent effect of not only the regime as a whole, but also specific tools 
within in.  However, it serves another function related to its normative character, and that is to 
punish wrong-doing.  This additional goal then leads to a third goal that is linked to the 
advocacy and educative function of the CMA and anti-cartel enforcement, and that is to act as 
																																																						
564 Caron Beaton-Wells (2015) supra n. 499, p.282-3.  See also, Abrantex-Metz and Bajari, ‘Screen for 
Conspiracies and Their Multiple Applications, (2009) 24 (1) Antitrust 66.   
565 Gartener and Zhou, ‘Delays in Leniency Applications: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer’s Door?’, 
(2012). 
566 Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases, 2006, OJ C298/17.  
Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52006XC1208(04)&from=EN.  Last accessed 28th March 2019.     
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an educative mechanism that helps to create a culture of compliance.  Whilst each of these 
goals plays an important function within the regulatory landscape, they are not of equal 
importance.  The same can be said of administrative fines.  Their primary function is to deter 
hard-core collusive conduct, but they have an additional function of disgorging the unjust 
enrichment that a successful cartel will inevitably benefit from.  Private damages claims are 
principal compensatory but also have an impact on deterrence,567 and whilst director 
disqualification orders are principally used in order to incapacitate directors, they have been 
shown to also have a significant impact upon deterrence.568 
 
  4.4.3.  Leniency  
 
The operation of leniency programmes are considered by many to have ‘revolutionised’569 anti-
cartel enforcement and to be integral to the effective enforcement of anti-cartel laws.  The 
argument is that the success of Article 101 TFEU was in fact, ‘triggered, and is driven, by the 
introduction of leniency programmes, which have led to a flood of applications from 
undertakings willing to cooperate with the authorities in return for immunity or a reduction in 
fines.’570  Indeed, more ‘than 30 countries have criminalised cartel conduct in some form … 
and the list appears to be growing.’571  It is critical therefore, that this growing wave of leniency 
devotion is accompanied by a critical analysis of its effect upon the wider dynamics of anti-
cartel enforcement in the context of a multi-level complex policy mix.  This need is starting to 
be addressed in the academic literature and indeed, more recently there have been: 
 
‘a number of published commentaries … questioning the value of leniency policies, 
cautioning against over-reliance or myopia in their use, and drawing attention to the 
																																																						
567 In the USA treble damages mean that private damages claims have a much more significant deterrent effect.  
Treble damages has been rejected in the UK and the EU because of the significant risk that they pose in respect 
of over-deterrence.  Unlike State enforced fines, the more successful private damages claims will lead to an 
increase in further claims leading to a near impossible task of calculating appropriate fine levels for the purpose 
of general deterrence.   
568 CMA, ‘The Deterrent Effect of Competition Authorities’ Work: Literature Review’, 7 September 2017, at 
para. 4.66.  
569  
570 Cornelis Canenbley and Till Steinvorth, ‘Effective Enforcement of Competition Law: Is There a Solution to 
the Conflict Between Leniency Programmes and Private Damages Actions?’ (2011) 2(4) Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 315.   
571 Caron Beaton-Wells, Christopher Harding and Jennifer Edwards, ‘Leniency and Criminal Sanctions in Anti-
Cartel Enforcement: Happily Married or Uneasy Bedfellows,’ in Beaton-Wells and Tran (eds) (2015) supra n. 
499.  
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potentially deleterious effects of such policies on private enforcement, criminal trials, 
and on engendering a culture of compliance amongst the business community.’572 
 
The major failing of the leniency programmes, it is contended, is the ‘inward-looking’573 
manner in which they are adopted and considered, focusing upon the policy of leniency in a 
‘discrete and isolated way’574 that fails to engage with the wider implications of leniency and 
‘neglects deeper evaluation’575 of its impact upon the entirety of the regulatory space in which 
they operate.  
 
The term ‘leniency programme’ in the UK is a generic term that covers both leniency and 
immunity.  The immunities can be divided into three categories; Type A, Type B, and 
Corporate Immunity.  The leniencies can be divided into two categories; Type B and Type 
C.576   
 
Type A Immunity 
 
When granted, Type A immunity provides for total and automatic immunity from 
administrative fines and a blanket and automatic immunity from criminal prosecution for all 
cooperating current and former employees and directors.   It can only be granted to the first 
undertaking to approach the CMA to provide evidence, and only when the CMA has not 
already opened an investigation into that particular cartel.  In order to benefit from Type A 
immunity (or indeed any form of immunity), the undertaking must acknowledge that it was a 
party to a cartel, it must provide the CMA will all of the documents, evidence and information 
about that cartel, and provide complete and continuous cooperation until the conclusion of any 
action.  Further, an undertaking cannot have been a coercive party within the cartel.   
 
   Type B Immunity 
 
																																																						
572 Caron Beaton-Wells (2015) supra n. 499, p.4-5.   
573 Ibid.  
574 Ibid.  
575 Ibid. 
576 CMA, ‘Applications for leniency and no-action in cartel cases: OFT’s detailed guidance on the principles 
and process’ July 2013, OFT1485. 
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Type B provides the same protection as Type A Immunity in terms of administrative fine, but 
is discretionary as opposed to automatic.  It is available to the first undertaking to come forward 
to the CMA when the CMA has already opened an investigation.  The undertaking must 
however, come forward before a Statement of Objections is issued.  Once Type B Immunity 
has been granted a blanket immunity is provided for all current and former cooperating 
employees and directors.   
 
  Corporate Immunity 
 
Corporate Immunity is available in the same circumstances as Type B Immunity, but for 
reasons of public interest, the CMA are unwilling to provide for a blanket immunity to all 
current and former employees and directors.  Immunity for individuals can still be granted 
however, but it is at the discretion of the CMA.  
 
Type B Leniency 
 
Type B Leniency differs from Type B Immunity only in that it is discretionary in terms of the 
level of reduction from sanction that a qualifying undertaking can expect.  Under Type B 
Immunity, once that immunity has been granted the undertaking will receive an automatic 
100% immunity from administrative fine.  In the case of Type B Leniency, that level is 
discretionarily awarded and can be anything up to 100% reduction.  The CMA must be satisfied 
that value is being added to their investigation by the information provided.  That value will be 
taken into account when the level of reduction in fine is calculated.   
 
  Type C Leniency 
 
Type C Leniency is available to undertakings that are not the first to come forward to the CMA.  
The amount of reduction in fine that they receive is entirely at the discretion of the CMA and 
will be dependent upon the value that the information that they are able to provide, and is 
capped at 50%.  Blanket immunity for current and former employees and directors is 
 136	
	
unavailable, although it may be granted on a person-to-person basis.  In practice however, the 
granting of individual immunity in Type C cases is unlikely.577  
 
Leniency programmes have become a critical element of successful anti-cartel enforcement 
and ‘optimising the design and administration of leniency policies is therefore a key objective 
for competition authorities.’578  As they have evolved they have ‘proved to be a powerful law 
enforcement tool… [and] a commendable example of bold innovation in public 
administration.’579  The risk posed of poorly implemented leniency policies to effective cartel 
enforcement, or indeed consumer welfare has until recently, received significantly less 
attention, and recent ‘studies of cartel formation and operations have emphasised the 
adaptability and ingenuity of business managers in responding to ever more severe public 
enforcement campaigns against collusion.’580  Therefore, the continuous analysis and review 
of leniency programmes, and their impact upon the regulatory space in which the exist, must 
become a central feature of modern anti-cartel enforcement.  
 
The basic principle is that leniency programmes lead to better detection and deterrence of 
cartels thereby reducing cartel activity, thereby increasing consumer welfare.  However, it is 
claimed that in practice,  
 
‘it is unclear whether they are actually increasing welfare by generating a strong 
deterrent, or whether they are actually reducing welfare through the larger 
administration and prosecution costs they generate, without any compensating increase 
in deterrence.’581   
 
Further, the fact that undertakings engage in cartels as a result of the actions of their agents 
means that ‘the threat underpinning most leniency policies – administrative fines against the 
undertaking – do not constitute a direct cost for these individual decision-makers.’582  Indeed, 
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this remains the case even when a direct cost for individuals has been included in the threatened 
toolkit, but is not used by the competition authority who instead rely too heavily upon 
administrative fines directed at undertakings.   
 
When placed within a regulatory space as complex and interconnected as the anti-cartel 
regulatory space, the effect upon the dynamics of the constituent elements must be a critical, 
and continuing part of the evaluation process.  As has been the case in the UK, when criminal 
sanctions are introduced instrumentally in order to improve the leniency policy (despite the 
normative rhetoric employed by politicians and legislators to justify criminalisation) its risks 
undermining the moralising and educative effect of the criminal law.  Therefore,  
 
‘not only do … leniency agreements bypass the usual institutions of justice, they also 
fail to fulfil the function of ‘explaining to the public’ that a wrong has been done and 
will be sanctioned.’583   
 
This has a significant effect upon the impact that criminal sanctions can have on the creation 
of a compliance culture not so heavily dependent upon State intervention.  Additionally, the 
application of leniency could be regarded as inconsistent with the compensatory function of 
private actions for damages,584 as well as failing to engage with the broader principles of 
corrective justice.  Corrective justice in broad terms is ‘not merely concerned with ensuring 
that an injured person is made whole.  It is also concerned with ensuring that the party who did 
the injuring pays.’585  Therefore, permitting a culpable undertaking from avoiding paying its 
pro rata share of the damages arising from its own involvement in the prohibited conduct, and 
‘offloading a higher share of the damages to the other participants in the cartel’586 is an ‘aspect 
of corrective justice that is almost entirely neglected in contemporary antitrust discourse.’587 
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If ‘cartel conduct is seriously harmful and inherently delinquent’ and thereby deserving of 
criminal punishment and condemnation, a leniency policy could still be regarded as legitimate 
and ‘morally defensible’ as an important tool for ensuring that cartels are detected and (most 
of) the wrongdoers punished.  However, when used purely as a means of improving leniency 
policy for other elements of the enforcement landscape, the serious risks to the legitimacy of 
the offence should not be ignored.  Criminal sanctions represent the most serious and 
interventionist action taken by the State and they should not be employed merely as a means 
of making other enforcement tools more effective.  Jurisprudentially it creates a tension 
between the normative purpose and the instrumental implementation arising from 
‘inconsistency in policy and practice, and a strategy that mat then, to some extent, be self-
defeating.’588  The devotion to leniency is exacerbated when the impact upon corrective justice 
in general, and compensation in particular are brought within the scope of consideration.  It 
appears that the ‘momentum in Europe … seems to lean in the direction of inducing co-
operation to stimulate deterrence, even it is has adverse effects on private rights of action for 
compensation.’589  Given that unlike in America where private enforcement is deterrence 
focused, private enforcement action in Europe is ‘orientated towards compensation’590 the zeal 
for the current approach to leniency policy presents ‘an obvious conflict.’591 
 
 
  4.4.5.  Complexity of Anti-cartel regulatory dynamics: conclusions 
 
It is clear from the preceding discussion that a complex multi-level policy mix has been created 
within the anti-enforcement regulatory space in the UK.  This means that careful consideration 
of the potential implications of amendments and additions must be conducted in order to 
prevent inconsistencies and conflicts arising to the detriment of specific instruments within the 
enforcement environment, and indeed the overall regime.  The goals and policies that are 
encapsulated in anti-cartel enforcement in particular, and competition policy in general are 
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littered with potentially conflicting elements, and are therefore, one of the reasons anti-cartel 
policy was described as a paradox, at war with itself.592   
 
The specific instruments that are utilised to achieve the goals in pursuit of the policies are 
therefore crucial if those inconsistencies are to be mitigated.  A more thorough understanding 
of each of the goals, their primary, secondary and in some cases tertiary functions and how 
they each relate to the policy objectives, is needed.  Further, a proper consideration of what 
those policy objectives are and from which level of government they come, is important if an 
accurate overall picture of the complex regulatory dynamics is to be mapped.  Without such a 
detailed depiction of the enforcement environment it is unnecessarily difficult to identify the 
potentially contradictory elements, which in turn makes an already complex regulatory 
landscape even more difficult to navigate, and ensures that changes to aspects of the regime 
are done blindly and without a real understanding of their implications.   
 
Understanding the multiplicity of each tool, and their hierarchy is important to creating an 
optimal enforcement environment.  The compensatory goal of private actions together with the 
punitive element of the criminal sanction, are potentially contradictory to the deterrence goal 
of the administrative sanctions, so ‘unless mechanisms … can be employed to resolve the 
conflict, antitrust systems will need to decide on the relative priority’593 of its goals.    The 
preceding analysis of this work shows that, for example:  
 
The primary, direct goal of the criminal cartel offence should be the punishment of the 
serious, criminal harm of a cartel for the policy objective of protecting promoting a just 
and fair society in which wrongdoers are punished.  The secondary benefit of such an 
offence would be the moralising and educative effect of the offence which would aid 
in the policy objective of creating a culture of voluntary compliance which would see 
cartel activity reduced, thereby protecting consumers.  The incidental benefit of the 
criminal cartel offence would be its deterrent value, that would induce some potential 
offenders to obey the law, thereby reducing cartel activity and protecting consumers.   
 
																																																						
592 Robert H. Bork, ‘The Antitrust Paradox: a policy at war with itself’ (New York, Basic Books Inc. Publishers: 
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593 Ibid, p.270.   
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The primary, direct goal of the administrative sanctions is to deter others from engaging 
in hard-core collusion, thereby reducing cartel activity, protecting the competitive 
process and protecting consumers from the harm of cartels.  The secondary benefit of 
the fines against undertakings is to disgorge them of their unfairly obtained cartel rents, 
thereby promoting a just and fair society where transgressors are prevented from 
financially benefitting from the fruits of their illicit behaviour.  The additional benefit 
of the administrative regime is that it ensures the UK’s compliance with its EU 
membership obligations. 
 
The primary, direct goal of the competition disqualification orders should be the 
incapacitation of unfit directors, thereby protecting consumers from the harm they 
could otherwise be subject to.  The secondary benefit of a CDO would be the deterrent 
effect of the imposition of the orders on others who may consider engaging in hard-
core collusion, thereby reducing cartel activity and protecting consumers.  The 
incidental benefit of such an order is that for the duration of the order, recidivism is 
reduced there again, protecting consumers from harm.   
 
The primary, direct benefit of third party claims for damages should be corrective 
justice thereby allowing harmed individuals to claim compensation for the harm 
suffered, and promoting a just and fair society.  The secondary benefit of these private 
actions is the deterrent value that they have.  The incidental benefit of third party claims 
is the further disgorgement of cartel rents. 
 
The primary, direct benefit of advocacy strategies is to educate as to the serious harm 
of a cartel and in so doing, improve society’s normative commitment to obeying anti-
cartel laws, for the purpose of improving the culture of compliance and so reducing 
cartel activity, thereby protecting consumers from harm.  The secondary benefit of such 
strategies is that they boost the efficacy of the other more interventionist mechanisms 
thereby protecting consumers.  
 
The above summary shows multiple policy objectives being addressed via multiple goals and 
using a variety of enforcement mechanism, but that ultimately each of them feed back into the 
overriding objectives of protecting consumers and promoting a fair and just society in which 
wrongdoing does not go unpunished.  The current approach in the UK is based upon an almost 
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singular pursuit of deterrence, a deterrence that is arguably not being achieved, at the expense 
of other goals.  This has arguably contributed to the failure to create a truly impactful regime.  
Any complex regulatory matrix that is too heavily weighted in favour of one particular element, 
risks damaging the impact of the other elements and the legitimacy of the whole regime and 
lacks the self-understanding required to identify and remedy any problems.  Galloway argues 
that the,  
 
‘enforcement strategy underpinning UK competition law is so heavily focused upon 
traditional deterrence theory, with the result that enforcement in practice has tended to 
resort to the use of the wrong enforcement tools at the wrong time.’594 
 
In this way, Galloway argues that this blinkered desire to achieve deterrence results in a sub-
optimal anti-cartel enforcement matrix as the full breadth of the available enforcement tools 
are not properly considered when the CMA are deciding how to deal with identified cartels, 
relying only on the administrative fines and in rare cases, the cartel offence.595  That is despite 
the fact that they themselves acknowledge that the threat of a competition disqualification order 
is considered to be a significant deterrent.596  Perhaps that is as a result of the lack of real 
discussion of the multifaceted functions that each mechanism within the matrix is capable of 
performing and the competition disqualification orders being seen as primarily a tool which 
incapacitates and prevents recidivism.  This is exacerbated by the failure to acknowledge the 
impact that the passage of time has on the impact of any regime, and how the manner in which 
the mechanisms are employed by the relevant authority can help to mitigate problems in 
drafting, or indeed exacerbate them.  Competition Authorities must not be afraid to engage in 
serious, periodic review, and governments must not be afraid to amend as required, based on 
those reviews.  The creation of a sufficiently considered and robust legal framework provides 
room to making changes to policy or enforcement goals as required without having to alter the 
legal basis upon which they are built.   
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 4.5.  Horizontal Instrument Interactions 
 
 
The previous discussion considered the complexity of the anti-cartel regulatory space in the 
UK and looked at some of the vertical interactions that can add complexity to that space and 
the challenges that exist when attempting to ensure that they remain aligned over time.  This 
section aims to consider the horizontal relationships that occur between specific instruments 
on a practical level in the context of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.  In order to do this, it 
is important to determine what kind of mechanism each individual tool is according to the 
descriptions provided in section 4.3.1 of this chapter.   Once such categorisation has been 
achieved, a typology of regulatory enforcement mechanisms can be created for anti-cartel 
enforcement in the UK.  This will then create a clear and uncomplicated view of the interactions 
that exist in this context, which in turns allows any conflicts to be more simply identified.  This 
then make it possible to better address any serious conflicts, either by irradiating them of by 
mitigating them. 
 
The most recognisable mechanisms are, of course, the prohibition contained in Chapter 1 of 
the Competition Act 1998, which represents the UK’s commitment to sanctioning agreements 
described in Article 101 TFEU, and the criminal cartel offence as contained in section 188 of 
the Enterprise Act 2002 (amended by the ERR 2013).  Other statutory tools include a 
competition disqualification orders by virtue of section 9A of the Company Directors 
Disqualification Act 1986, as inserted by section 204 of the Enterprise Act 2002.  As previously 
mentioned there is also the availability of third party damages claims.  These however, 
represent only the legislative mechanisms available for anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.  In 
addition to these tools are the requirement that the CMA are advocates of rigorous competition, 
a duty that is to be fulfilled by publishing guidelines and papers, and by providing information 
regarding prosecutions and investigations.597  Internal company compliance regimes, 
advocated by the CMA, but which remain voluntary, are another aspect of attempts to create a 
culture of compliance, and are another element of anti-cartel enforcement regularity matrix.  
The leniency programme which links every legal antitrust mechanism, could also be considered 
as a tool in its own right; its importance being so great for modern day enforcement.  A 
simplified enforcement typology has been created in Table 3. Enforcement Typology below.   
																																																						
597 Competition Act 1998, s 52; Enterprise Act 2002, s.6. 
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In that typology, the criminal cartel offence has been categorised as a piece of command and 
control regulation using the definition described in section 4.3.1.1. above.  It is a clear example 
of the State’s attempts to influence behaviour by prescribing an acceptable standard of conduct, 
and backing that prescription up with criminal sanctions.  The standard that the is being 
prescribed is conduct free of hard-core anti-competitive manipulation. 
 
The Chapter 1 prohibition is slightly more challenging to definitively categorise.  It could be 
considered as another example of a command and control regulation as there is not an absolute 
requirement that the sanction be criminal so long as it is punitive in nature.  The sanctions that 
back up the acceptable standard in this case are administrative fines which are acknowledged 
as being ‘penal or quasi –criminal’598 even though they are ‘formally of an administrative 
nature.’  This is in part, due to the significant amount that the undertakings are routinely fined 
which in practice makes them punitive in nature.599  Indeed the CJEU stated that it was ‘both 
the deterrent effect and the punitive effect of the fines’600 which make their use justified.  There 
is an argument however, according to the definition provided by Gunningham and Sinclair, 
that it is an incentive based mechanism.  Gunningham and Sinclair describe three subdivisions 
within this form of regulatory action; broad-based economic incentives, supply side incentives, 
and legal liabilities.   
Table 3. Enforcement Typology 
 Command 
and Control 
Incentive 
based 
regimes 
Self-
regulation 
Voluntarism Information 
Strategies 
Criminal 
cartel offence 
✓     
																																																						
598 Caron Beaton-Wells, Christopher Harding and Jennifer Edwards, ‘Leniency and Criminal Sanctions in Anti-
Cartel Enforcement: Happily Married or Uneasy Bedfellows?’ in Beaton-Wells and Tran (eds) (2015) supra n.  
599 Case 41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661, [173]; Case T-329/01 Archer Daniels 
Midland v Commission [2006] ECR II-3255, [141]; Case C-289/048 Showa Denko v Commission [2006] ECR I-
5859, [16].   
600 Case T-329/01 Archer Daniels Midland v Commission [2006] ECR II-3255, [141].   
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Chapter 1 
(and Article 
101 TFEU) 
 ✓    
CDO ✓     
Third Party 
Damages 
 ✓    
Compliance 
Programmes 
   ✓  
Advocacy 
and 
Education 
    ✓ 
Leniency   ✓   ✓ 
 
 
The latter category is described as the imposition of after the fact financial penalties for a firm’s 
past failures.601  Administrative fines for undertakings engaged in cartel activity could 
therefore, fall into this category. The fact that the majority of cartel investigations that occur 
are as a result of leniency applications and evidence suggests that those applications relate to 
cartels that are already at the end of their life or that have already ceased to operate,602  is an 
argument that in practice, behaviour is not being manipulated by punitive sanctions in the 
manner envisaged by command and control regulation.  Indeed, in the vast majority of cases 
the fines provided for by the Chapter 1 prohibition will not be imposed until after the fact of 
significant cartel activity, perhaps indicating that rather than an example of a command and 
control regulation, it is a legal liability incentive based mechanism.  
 
Despite the fact that the majority of cartel investigations start as a result of a leniency 
application, it is not the sole method of detecting cartels.  In fact, the CMA has been clear that 
they are developing other detection techniques in order to reduce their reliance on the leniency 
																																																						
601 Gunningham and Sinclair (1999) supra n. 362. 
602 Caron Beaton-Wells (2015) supra n.499. 
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programme.603  Therefore, the clear standard of conduct backed up by punitive sanctions, are 
perhaps indicative of the administrative fines being a command and control regulation.  
However, one important aspect of a command and control regulation is its ability to have an 
educative function that contributes towards creating a culture of compliance with the law.  
Despite the punitive nature of the sanctions imposed for it breached of Chapter 1 CA 1998 and 
Article 101 TFEU, there is little academic support for the idea that fines play a significant role 
in this aspect of anti-cartel regulation as a result of being regarded as morally neutral.  
 
Unlike command and control regulations, economic incentives and disincentives do not 
actively seek to prevent a particular action.  Their aim is to make to make the undesired conduct 
more costly to engage in and so to dissuade or reduce participation in it.  This approach is 
clearly rooted in utilitarian ideology, like administrative action against cartels.  Given that 
sanctions are imposed by the Competition and Markets Authority and not the judiciary as with 
the cartel offence, the State is able to retain an even higher degree of control over the 
enforcement of the administrative regime and thereby certainty over impact of the civil fines, 
and in theory exert varying degrees of dissuasive influence as needed.   The conclusions of this 
brief analysis indicate that the Chapter 1 prohibition, despite its punitive nature, should be 
classified as an incentive based legal liability.   
 
Competition disqualification orders operate in a manner most consistent with a command and 
control regulation.  A clear standard of conduct exists and the disqualification order is imposed 
when the conduct of the subject of the order falls below that standard.  It is punitive in nature 
so is consistent with the definition of a command and control regulation despite not being a 
criminal sanction.   
  
Third party claims for damages are the next anti-cartel mechanism in the Enforcement 
Typology.  Private damages actions cannot be considered to be command and control 
regulation because they are not pursued by the State.  Parker, Braithwaite and Stepanenko 
argue that a command and control regulation is a public demonstration of the State working 
																																																						
603 Dr Michael Grenfell, ‘UK competition enforcement – progress and prospects’ Speech delivered on 9th 
November 2016.  Transcript available at CMA: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/michael-grenfell-on-
the-cmas-progress-in-enforcing-competition-law.  Last accessed 24th December 2018.    
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to eradicate harmful behaviour.604  The primary function of private damages claims in the UK 
is not to prevent cartel agreements in the way that a command and control regulation seeks to, 
but as a tool of corrective justice that also has acts as a disincentive, in the manner envisaged 
by incentive based economic instruments.  However, the mechanism for obtaining third party 
damages is a manifestation of State power.  Individuals are granted a legal right by the 
Government to seek compensation for harm they have suffered as a result of legally 
prohibited conduct.  Further, they must go through an arm of the State, the courts, in order to 
obtain that compensation, and the promotion and protective of justice within society is a 
fundamental function of the State.  Nevertheless, third party claims for damages are private 
actions that are not punitive, but compensatory in nature and so do not fall within the 
definition of command and control regulation.   
 
Compliance programmes are by their very nature voluntary and so are easily to categorise.  
Their potential impact on the anti-cartel enforcement landscape is often overlooked, and not 
enough has been done to incentivise undertakings to engage with compliance programmes. 
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this chapter their categorisation is simple as they are entirely 
voluntary.  They therefore, are an example of voluntarism.  Advocacy and education 
strategies are similarly easy to categorise as information strategies.  
 
Finally, it is necessary to discuss the role of the leniency programme as a mechanism for 
tackling cartels.  As has been previously stated, the role that the leniency programme plays 
within the anti-cartel regulatory matrix is so crucial that it could be considered as an 
enforcement mechanism in its own right.  The purpose of the leniency programme is not to 
prevent certain conduct but to incentivise cartelists to provide information about prohibited 
conduct in order to improve detection rates, and the quality of evidence required to impose 
sanctions.   It is for this reason that it has been classified as both an economic based incentive 
regime and an information strategy.  The economic approach to regulatory action fits with 
economic theories of obedience to the law, and with utilitarian theories of behaviour 
manipulation.  The use of administrative fines together with the operation of a leniency 
programme are the two aspects of the anti-cartel law enforcement matrix that sit most 
compatibly with the utilitarian, deterrence focused enforcement policy adopted in the UK.   
																																																						
604 Parker, Braithwaite and Stepanenko, ‘ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Project Working Paper on ACCC 
Compliance Education & Liaison Strategies’, Centre for Competition and Policy, Australian National 
University,(2004). 
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The ant-cartel regulatory matrix is largely made up of command and control regulations and  
incentive based economic mechanisms.  The voluntarism mechanism and the information 
strategies are arguable ancillary to a certain extent.  Now that they have been categorised, it is 
possible to move onto the next step and explore their dynamics.  Two command and control 
regulations seeking to achieve the same outcome are inherently complementary.  The criminal 
sanction sits at the top of the enforcement pyramid, reserved for the most serious examples of 
collusion, whilst the CDOs have a much wider scope, are easier to establish because of lower 
evidential burdens and could be applied with much more frequency.  According to the analysis 
of horizontal interactions in section 4.5. of this Chapter, the administrative regime provided for 
by the Chapter 1 prohibition, is inherently complementary to the cartel offence.  This is true at 
the level of enforcement so long as the standard for determining the tort (liability rule) is lower 
or less stringent than the applicable command and control standard605 as is the case in this for 
the criminal cartel offence and the civil sanctions.   
 
This creates a pyramid approach to anti-cartel enforcement as described by Braithwaite,606 and 
is considered to be one aspect of responsive regulation.   It advocates for a system of 
enforcement whereby the least serious instances of prohibited conduct are dealt with by the 
least interventionist methods of enforcement.  As the gravity of the conduct increases, so does 
the seriousness of the enforcement action chosen to deal with it.  The approach to enforcement 
creates a pyramid because the number of serious cases will decrease proportionately to the 
increase in wrongfulness.  The apex of the pyramid is reserved for the most serious conduct 
that is ‘genuinely criminal in nature.’607  Pyramid enforcement theory has been influential as it 
provides a mechanism by which the problem of how to choose between compliance and 
compulsion style enforcement.608  There are various advantages to utilising a pyramid 
enforcement paradigm, not least because it helps to create a perception of legitimacy609 for the 
																																																						
605 Gunningham and Sinclair, quoting Rose-Ackermand, ‘Altruism, nonprofits, and economic theory’ (1996) 
Journal of Economic Literature 701.   
606 Braithwaite, Coglianese and Levi-Faur, ‘Can regulation and governance make a difference?’ (2007) 
Regulation & Governance 1.   
607 Comino, ‘The Challenge of Corporate Law Enforcement in Australia’ (2009) Australian Journal of Corporate 
Law. 
608 Mancini, ‘Why was the enforcement pyramid so influential? And what price was paid?’ (2013) 7(1) 
Regulation & Governance 48.   
609 The issue of legitimacy is an important one with this particular regulatory matrix because of the purely 
utilitarian manner in which the cartel offence has been deployed in practice.  It is something that will be 
considered in more detail in chapter/section … of this work.  For further reading also look at, Jonathan 
Galloway, ‘Securing the Legitimacy of Individual Sanctions in the UK’ (2017) 40(1) World Competition 121. 
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regulatory environment in which the various enforcement tools operate.  It does so by 
demonstrating a logical approach to enforcement tool selection and avoids the perception that 
there is no order or fairness in their use.  When regulation is seen to operate in a way that 
enhances the appearance of legitimacy, ‘compliance with the law is more likely.’610  This 
approach to enforcement recognises that not all contraventions of the law can in practice, be 
detected and punished and that compliance is a far more effective means of ensuring obedience 
of the law.  Based upon the analysis of this work, an illustration of public anti-cartel 
enforcement in the UK as a pyramid enforcement strategy has been created below.  The 
importance of targeting the individual agents who bind undertakings into prohibited cartels is 
reflected in the presence of CDOs alongside fines directed at those undertakings.   
 
Figure 1. Pyramid of Public Anti-cartel Enforcement 
 
 
One of the underlying principles of this is approach to regulation is that all regulatory responses 
will on some occasion fail.  One of the aims of an enforcement pyramid then is to create a 
framework in which regulatory responses can work together to mitigate the weaknesses in any 
one particular mechanism through the strengths of another.  According to this approach: 
 
																																																						
610 Ibid.  
Criminal	Cartel	Offence
Adminstrative	Fines	against	
undertakings	and	CDO	imposed	
upon	individuals	- supported	by	
leninecy	applications	
Advocacy	and	education	information	strategies	
and	voluntary	compliance	programmes	
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‘the naiveté of believing that firms will of what is “right” is covered by the cynicism 
of the deterrence model assumption that firms will do what is profitable however 
irresponsible.  The weakness of the deterrence model - that it can be pointless to punish 
managers too incompetent to manage… - is covered by incapacitate remedies that 
remote these managers.’611 
 
The interrelated nature of this system of enforcement means that compliance and compulsion 
strategies are not divided as in practice, they are inextricably linked.  Therefore, any attempt to 
deal with them independently is ‘misleading.’612  The dynamics of the pyramid theory 
recognise that:  
  
‘enforcement activity is effective when it leads to improved possibilities for compliance 
and compliance activities are generally only effective when they are backed up by, and 
indeed facilitated by, tough enforcement action.’613  
 
This sentiment was articulated by Sonya Branch in her speech at the Business Crime -2014 
Conference in which she stated that,  
 
‘As important as it is that we take strong enforcement action to protect consumers, the 
CMA needs … to balance tough sanctions - where appropriate - with compliance and 
awareness-raising.  This is why the CMA attached significance to out compliance 
initiatives.   
 … 
As with enforcement, the CMA is looking to step to what we can achieve in this area, 
and to help promote a business environment in the UK with a ‘culture of compliance’.  
This includes drawing attention to the competition regime, assisting businesses in 
understanding what our enforcement work means to them, and increasing our own 
understanding of the drivers of awareness and compliance.  The CMA recognises that 
most businesses and  individuals want to comply with competition law - and we want 
to support them in doing so.  
																																																						
611 Parker, Braithwaite and Stepanenko, ‘ACCC Enforcement and Compliance Project: Working Paper of 
ACCC Compliance Education & Liaison Strategies’, Centre for Competition and Consumer Policy, Australian 
Natural University (2004) 
612 Ibid. 
613 Ibid. 
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 … 
 Another benefit of targeted compliance efforts of this kind is that - to the  extent that 
any wrongdoing remains - we expect that new links and directed engagement with the 
industry will lead to new intelligence, and ultimately to further enforcement success, in 
something of a virtuous circle.’614   
 
However, despite recognising the crucial importance of creating a culture of compliance that 
is not so heavily dependent upon compulsion to obey the law, the legitimacy issues created by 
building an enforcement matrix around a deterrence policy that relies very heavily on granting 
leniency and immunity to culpable defendants, have largely been ignored.  
 
 
 4.6.  Conclusions 
 
In determining that the anti-cartel regulatory space in the UK is a multi-level, complex policy 
mix, a number of fundamental things have been achieved.  Firstly, it has explicitly highlighted 
that the response to cartel activity is highly complex, indeed, it was shown to be the most 
complex type of all the regulatory environments according to the regulatory mix literature.  
This assessment in turn, indicates the degree of care which must be taken when attempting to 
make changes, or additions, to the regulatory environment.  The discussion in section 4.3. went 
on to show that there was cause for a complex, multi-level policy mix to in fact, be made even 
more complex.  This occurs when ‘responsibility for formulation, decision making and/or 
implementation falls on different levels of government.’615  This is clearly the reality for anti-
cartel enforcement in the UK as a Member State of the EU, where the EU have retained 
responsibility for the formulation of the civil regime for fighting cartel activity, but has, by way 
of Regulation 1/2003, delegated primary responsibility for the enforcement of that regime to 
the Member States.  Further, the Member States retain responsibility for decision making and 
implementation of enforcement mechanisms that exceed the minimum standards required by 
the EU, for example, the creation of criminal sanctions.  The requisite degree of care however, 
																																																						
614 Branch, ‘Competition, the revised cartel offence and the CMA - a new landscape’, speech to the Business 
Crime - 2014 Conference.  Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/sonya-branch-speaks-about-
the-cartel-offence-and-the-cma.  Last accessed 24th December 2018.    
615 Pablo del Rio and Michael Howlett (2008) supra n.44.  
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was not taken when the criminal cartel offence was included within the regulatory landscape 
of anti-cartel enforcement, and thus therefore, the problems began.   
 
The analysis of the regulatory dynamics of the anti-cartel enforcement space in the UK showed 
that the various enforcement mechanisms were not inherently contradictory.  What can be 
extrapolated from this finding is that the failure of the criminal cartel offence to have an impact 
upon the reduction of cartel activity was not inevitable.  Arguably, the root of the section 188 
problem was the attempt to uncritically deploy it for traditional utilitarian motives.  The stage 
was not properly set for the introduction of a criminal offence, and the ideological reasons for 
so doing, were wrong.  What occurred therefore, was a hybrid of layering and drift as explained 
in section 4.2.4.  Layering because a new instrument was added to the regulatory space without 
understanding what the achievable goal of that instrument was.  The offence therefore brought 
with it an additional goal (compliance through normative education) without prior 
consideration of how it would could co-exist with the pre-existing policies, goals and 
enforcement instruments.  In addition, and as a result, drift occurred which meant that the cartel 
offence was not the best tool for the job of improving deterrence.   
 
The almost stubborn focus upon deterrence meant that alternative and more appropriate cartel 
prevention strategies have been overlooked.  The educative and moralising impact of a criminal 
sanction that taps into the moral wrongfulness of a cartel has already been addressed in Chapter 
2 of this work.  That moralising effect however, and its impact upon the creation of an 
environment in which individuals choose to comply with the law, could be complimented by 
compliance programmes.  Compliance programmes are yet to be made a compulsory feature 
of anti-cartel enforcement and there are some who would argue that they would not work.616  
However,  the potential impact of compliance programmes should not be overlooked, and not 
because of their potential to be used instrumentally, but because of their potential to reduce 
cartel activity normatively.  As: 
 
‘[f]rom an organizational perspective … corporate crime results when managers take 
organizational needs and pressures into account when solving business problems or 
																																																						
616 Andreas Stephan, ‘Hear no Evil, See no Evil: Why Antitrust Compliance Programmes may be Ineffective at 
Preventing Cartels’ (2009) CCP Working Paper 09-09. 
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when managers act in accordance with the dominant culture of the firm, subunit, or 
team in which they work.’617 
 
Therefore, if a firm has made a clear and genuine commitment to legal obedience as evidenced 
by a competition law compliance programme, a cultural commitment to comply with the law 
emanates from the top down and a greater opportunity for normative acceptance of that 
compliance culture is created.   
 
The failings of the criminal cartel offence have therefore, occurred because of a disconnect that 
starts at the ideological reasoning for adopting certain policy objectives, the goals which they 
can achieve, and ultimately the enforcement instruments chosen in pursuit of them.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
																																																						
617 Sally S. Simpson and Nicole Leeper Piquero, ‘Low Self-Control, Organizational Theory, and Corporate 
Crime’ (2002) 36(3) Law & Society Review 509. 
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Chapter 5: The Loyalty Principle and the Criminal Cartel Offence 
 
 
5.1.  Introduction  
 
The previous chapters have illustrated the complex regulatory dynamics that exist in the anti-
cartel regulatory space in the UK, which must be understood as the regulatory space that is also 
affected by the UK’s experience as a Member State of the European Union.  This chapter 
focuses in on one particular complexity that arises specifically from that history and experience 
of membership, the principle of sincere cooperation contained in Article 4(3) TEU.  In the field 
of competition law, which is a matter of exclusive EU competence under Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, 
the dynamics that are typically analysed are those which flow down from the EU to the Member 
States.  However, the complex and interconnected matrix of anti-cartel enforcement, 
exemplified in a more limited fashion by the policy underpinning and operation of a leniency 
programme, mean that a more holistic analysis, including domestic regulatory elements 
alongside the broader EU framework, is necessary in order to more fully understand the 
regulatory dynamics at work in the anti-cartel regulatory space.  This chapter therefore analyses 
the nature of the regulatory dynamics between criminal cartel enforcement in the UK and civil 
cartel enforcement in the EU, particularly considering any potentially negative impact upon 
the primary EU regime.   
 
On 23rd June 2016 a referendum was held in the UK to determine whether it should remain a 
member of the European Union, and with a majority of 52% to 48%, the UK sadly voted to 
leave.618  At the time of writing, and indeed immediately prior to submission of this thesis,619 
the UK has still failed to make clear what is intended for the future relationship with the EU.  
Nevertheless, the following discussion occurs within the context of the UK as a Member State 
																																																						
618 BBC, ‘Referendum Results.’  Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.  Last 
accessed 10th March 2019.     
619 The legal mechanism by which Member States can leave the EU is contained in Article 50 TEU.  It requires 
that the Prime Minister notify the European Council/Parliament of their intention to leave.  Once this notification 
has been made, the remaining EU Member States and the Leaving State have 2 years to negotiate the separation 
and the terms of their relationship after the Leaving State has gone.  Should it not be possible to come to an 
agreement at the end of the 2 years, the Leaving State simply ceases to be a Member State and reverts to World 
Trade Organisation rules should it wish to trade with the EU. The notification was made by Prime Minister 
Theresa May on the 29th March 2017.  There has now been two extensions granted to the UK to prevent it leaving 
without a deal initially on the 29th March 2019 and subsequently on 12th April 2019. It remains unclear as to 
whether a deal can be arranged prior to the new deadline of 31st October 2019.   
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of the EU, which has informed and helped to determine its regulatory history and experience.  
Whilst the implications of the analysis of this chapter are less likely to be directly applicable 
to the UK once it has left the EU, this does depend upon the future relationship between the 
UK and EU, and in any case the history and experience of EU membership will undoubtedly 
affect many areas of regulation across the UK for many years to come. As such the analysis in 
this chapter may continue to be relevant to other regulatory spaces within the UK beyond 
competition law as well as within, and the experience ought to inform debate and analysis of 
competition regulatory regimes in some of the remaining 27 States, especially those with pre-
existing criminal sanctions, or the jurisdictions who may consider introducing such sanctions 
in future.   
 
As a current Member State of the EU, the UK is subject to certain legal obligations that 
inevitably influence and shape domestic competition law.  Specifically, Article 3 of the Treaty 
on European Union (the ‘TEU’) requires that the Union shall establish an internal market.620  
Protocol 27 to the TEU explains that this includes a ‘system of ensuring that competition is not 
distorted’621 and that creating and maintaining a highly competitive market is an objective of 
the Union.   The Modernisation Regulation EC 1/2003622 (‘Regulation 1/2003’) decentralises 
the enforcement of competition law such that Member States are required to apply Union 
competition law, in the form of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, when dealing with infringements 
of competition law within their own jurisdictions that may affect trade between Member 
States.623  In addition to these competition law specific obligations however, as a Member 
State, the UK is also subject to general principles of EU law.   
 
This chapter focuses on one principle of EU law in particular, the duty of sincere cooperation 
in the attainment of Union objectives, enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU. This chapter aims to 
further analyse the interplay between UK domestic law and EU law in the regulatory dynamics 
of anti-cartel law in the UK, and its focus is partially motivated by the observation, left 
unexplored, by Joshua and Klawiter in 2001 when the criminal cartel offence had yet to make 
it onto the statute books.  The co-authors reasoned that ‘adopting substantive national criminal 
																																																						
620 ‘The Union shall establish an internal market.  It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based 
on balanced economic growth and price stability, [and] a highly competitive social market economy…’ Article 
3(3) TEU.   
621 TEU, Protocol (No 27) on the internal market and competition, OJ 115, 09/05/2008, P.0309.   
622Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L1, 4.1.03, p1)  
623 Ibid, Article 3(1).  
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legislation that hampers the effectiveness of the [Union] legal regime could place a Member 
State in breach of its obligations under [Union] law.’624  The implication of this statement is 
that if the operation of a criminal cartel offence jeopardises the effective enforcement of Article 
101 TFEU it could result in the UK being breach of its obligations under EU law, and in the 
context of the current analysis, specifically Article 4(3) TEU.   
 
The decentralised enforcement of Article 101 TFEU by way of Regulation 1/2003 has meant 
that the Union objectives of protecting consumer welfare and the integrity of the internal 
market by way of a competitive market, have largely become the responsibility of the Member 
States.  Article 4(3) TEU is one way in which the Union’s interests can be safeguarded when 
Union objectives are placed in Member State hands.  Indeed, Regulation 1/2003 could in fact, 
be regarded as a manifestation of Article 4(3)TEU within the specific context of competition 
law as it places an obligation upon the Member States to assist in the attainment of a 
competitive market by enforcing Article 101 TFEU when applying their own domestic 
competition laws.625  It also places a duty upon Member States to refrain from prohibiting 
conduct that would be permitted by Article 101 TFEU.626  However, Regulation 1/2003 only 
applies to mechanisms that fall within its scope; national competition laws. Article 4(3) TEU 
alternatively, has much wider scope and applies to all national legislation and Member State 
action.  It states that: 
  
 ‘Pursuant to the principles of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States 
 shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow  
 from the Treaties.  The Member States shall take all appropriate measures, general 
 or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or 
 resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.  The Member States shall  
 facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which 
 could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.’627 
 
This chapter explores the same issues that Joshua and Klawiter raised, albeit the focus in this 
chapter is specifically upon Article 4(3) TEU, thus considering whether a Member State can 
																																																						
624 Joshua and Klawiter, ‘Step Forward or Another Complication - The UK Criminalization Initiative’ (2001) 
16(3) Antitrust 67.   
625 Regulation 1/2003, Recital (6). 
626 Ibid, Article 3(2). 
627 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of European Union, Article 4(3), 2012, OJ, C 326, hereinafter TEU. 
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be in breach of its Union obligations, and the principle of sincere cooperation, through the valid 
adoption of national legislation within its own borders.  The competence of the UK to adopt 
the criminal cartel offence is not in question.  However, if the adoption of such legislation led, 
because of the complex regulatory dynamics of the regulatory space in which it now inhabits, 
and the frictions that occur within that space, to sub-optimal enforcement in the UK (i.e. 
reduced efficacy) and thereby in the EU, the question is whether that could lead to a breach of 
the UK’s obligations to ensure the attainment of a Union objective.     
 
When considering Article 4(3) TEU and its impact on upon the legislative autonomy of the 
Member States, it is important to have regard to Article 4(2) TEU.  Article 4(2) TEU guarantees 
respect for and preservation of the sovereign identity of the Member States (the ‘Identity 
Principle’) and the general EU principle of proportionality.  Article 4(2) TEU therefore acts as 
an addition restraint upon the exercise of Union competence.   
 
This chapter will address two specific secondary research questions: (a) if the criminal cartel 
offence in the UK sufficiently weakened the efficacy of the UK administrative sanctions (by 
undermining the leniency programme, or causing unreasonable delays to civil investigations 
and/or decision making, for example), could that place the UK in breach of Article 4(3) TEU; 
and if so, (b) what action (if any) could be taken against the UK as a result?  
 
 
5.2.  Article 4(3) TEU: an introduction 
 
 
Article 4(3) TEU has been referred to as the ‘most important and dynamic single Article in the 
[EU] Treaty’628  having been a consistent feature of the Treaties since the European Coal and 
Steal Community (the ‘ECSC’).629  It is regarded so highly by some for three main reasons.630  
																																																						
628 General Report: ‘The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts and the Community 
Institutions under Article 10 E.C. Treaty’, in XIX F.I.D.E. Congress (Helskini, 2000), Vol. I, at. 373-426, p.  
629 Marcus Klamert, ‘The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law,’ (Oxford University Press: 2014) p.10.  
630 Others see Article 4(3) TEU as ‘the sort of spiritual and essentially vacuous clause that is more commonly 
found in constitutional orders such as that of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.’  See Ian Ward, ‘A Critical 
Introduction to European Law’, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.65.  
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Firstly, as the Union acts primarily through national authorities,631 anything that sets the 
parameters of the relationship between the Union and the bodies that carry out its work will of 
course be vital to the Union’s success.632  This is particularly crucial given that:  
 
‘the Member States are much more likely, by accident or design, to interfere with the 
way [Union] laws and policies are intended to operate…[which] necessitates some 
principles limiting the extent of permissible interference.’633   
 
Secondly, very little has otherwise been said about the relationship between the EU and those 
national authorities, which thus increases the prominence of Article 4(3).  Most constitutional 
principles are derived from case law rather than the Treaties, unlike Article 4(3) TEU.   Finally, 
Article 4(3) TEU is regarded as critical to the EU legal order because of its universality.  It 
‘applies to all national authorities, legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial, national, 
local and regional’.634  Temple Lang argues that: 
  
‘[Article 4(3)] has already given rise to some of the most important principles of 
[Union] law, such as the duty and power of national courts to give effective protection 
to rights granted by [Union] law, the duty to give direct effect to directives against the 
State, the duty to interpret national laws so as to be compatible with [Union] law, the 
right to judicial review, and the duties not to interfere with the effectiveness of [Union] 
competition law or with the working of the common agricultural policy. It is the basis 
for the duty to avoid conflicts between national and [Union] decisions.’635  
 
There has however, been a lack of ‘consistent and methodical’636 usage of Article 4(3) TEU 
and its previous incarnations by the CJEU and academics alike.  The terms ‘loyal 
																																																						
631 de Larragán, Javier de Cendra, ‘United we stand, divided we fall: The potential role of the principle of loyal 
cooperation in ensuring compliance of the European Community with the Kyoto Protocol’ (2010) 1 Climate 
Law 159.  
632 Marcus Klamert (2014) supra n 628. 
633 John Temple Lang, ‘The duties of National authorities under Community constitutional law’, European Law 
Review (1998) 109.  
634 Ibid.  
635  John Temple Lang, ‘Article 10 EC–The Most Important “General Principle” of Community Law,’ in 
General Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International: 2008) 75 
636 Ibid, p.1-2. 
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cooperation,’637 ‘duty of loyalty,’638 and ‘sincere cooperation,’639 appear to have been used 
interchangeably,640 whilst the term ‘Loyalty Principle’ has emerged as a more inclusive phrase 
of general use.641  This lack of terminological consistency has persisted despite its longevity 
within the EU legal order, and is compounded by the fact that it remains an: 
 
‘under-researched subject in European Union Law…Despite its overwhelming 
importance for defining and shaping the fabric of [Union] law, the loyalty principle has 
not received the special attention it arguably deserves.’642   
 
More recently the contours of sincere cooperation in the field of EU external relations have 
been explored in the academic literature,643 whereas the impact of Article 4(3) TEU and its 
predecessors, on the internal vertical dynamic as between the EU and its Member States, has 
still failed to attract the same level of academic scrutiny.644   
 
Whilst the wording of the Loyalty Principle has remained largely similar to its most recent 
predecessor, the normative context has changed considerably as a result of its current location 
in the Treaty of the European Union,645 and its coupling with Article 4(2) of that Treaty which 
governs the protection for Member State constitutional identity (The Identity Clause).  
 
 5.3.  The Evolution of Article 4(3) TEU 
 
																																																						
637 Case C-375/89 Commission v Belgium (Directive 76/491EEC) [1991] ECR I-367, para.15. 
638 Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (MOX Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635, para.168. 
639 Joined Cases C-213/88 and C-39/89 Luxemburg v European Parliament [1991] ECR I-5643, para.29.  
640 Marcus Klamert (2014) supra n. complete 
641 Ibid.   
642 Ibid, p.1.  
643 Much of the discourse in the field of EU external relations identifies a need for the Union to speak with a 
‘single voice’ because ‘the polyphonic nature of the Union’s external action whose audibility ultimately depends 
on the degree of harmony achieved among its key players.’  See, C. Hillian, ‘Mixity and coherence in EU 
External relations: The significance of the “duty of cooperation”’ in C. Hillian and P. Kourakes (eds) Mixed 
Agreements Revisited (Oxford. Hart. 2010) p.87.  The President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy 
has said that he ‘prefer[s] to compare the European Union to a convoy’ connected under the waterline 
‘economically and monetarily’ so that ‘[t]hey cannot sail away from the other just like that.’, Address to the 
College of Europe, ‘The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World’, Bruges, 25th February 2010. Available 
at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/113067.pdf.   Last accessed 18th July 
2017.  
644 ‘German literature [however] has produced systematic and comprehensive studies on loyalty.’ Marcus 
Klamert (2014) supra n. 628. 
645 Ibid. 
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Its first appearance in the Treaties in its modern form was in Article 5 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community (EEC) which stated that: 
 
‘Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to 
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action 
taken by the institutions of the Community.  They shall facilitate the achievement of 
the Community’s tasks. 
 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of this Treaty.’646   
 
Temple Lang, in an article discussing the constitutional impact of Article 5 EEC, felt that the 
‘implications extend much further than is generally realised.’647  He attributed this lack of 
understanding to the fact that it was a ‘general principle that [was] also expressed in special 
Articles to cover specific situations,’648 and as a result of that the CJEU did not always 
specifically refer to it as a basis for its decisions.649  He further felt that lawyers were dissuaded 
from relying upon it because of the generality of its drafting.650  Temple Lang goes on to 
highlight that the Court felt that,  
 
‘the wording of the second and third sentences of Article 5 indicates that the duties of 
cooperation imposed on the Member States by that article may under certain 
circumstances transcend specific legally binding duties laid down elsewhere.’651   
 
Following Article 5 EEC, the Loyalty Principle found its home in the post-Treaty of 
Amsterdam Article 10 European Community Treaty (the ‘EC Treaty’) and was considered by 
some to be 'one of the foundations of the Community legal order as a whole,652 if not one of 
																																																						
646 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Art. 5, March 25th 1957. 
647 Temple Lang, ‘Article 5 of the EEC Treaty: The Emergence of Constitutional Principles in the Case Law of 
the Court of Justice’, Fordham International Law Journal, Volume 10, Issue 3, 1986, p.5. 
648 Ibid.  
649 For specific examples, see Klamart (2014) supra n.628, p.22-23.   
650 Ibid.   
651 Case 231/83, Centre Leclerc v Au Ble Vert, 1985, ECR. (Conclusions of the Advocate General), Comm. Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH), para. 14,111 as quoted in Temple Lang, supra n.12, p.6. 
652 See Opinion 1/91 European Economic Area (I) [1991] ECR I-6079, where the Court also refers there to ‘the 
very foundations of the Community’; H G Schermers, ‘Commentary on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92’ (1992) 29 
CMLRev 991; A Dashwood, ‘The relationship between the Member States and the European Union/European 
Community’ (2004) 41 CMLRev 355 at 377. 
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the constitutional principles of the EC Treaty.'653  The wording however, remained the same, 
with the obligations resting on the shoulders of the Member States.654    The CJEU 
jurisprudence on Article 10 EC ‘can be summarised by saying that national authorities and 
courts have a legal duty to make the Community legal system work in the way that it was 
objectively intended to work.’655  Casolari claims that in its current form, it 'should in fact be 
capable of acting as a master key for the proper functioning of the EU legal order'656 given that 
the removal the pillar system has meant that Article 4(3) TEU now applies to all EU policy.  It 
was not until the Loyalty Principle found its home in Article 4(3) TEU however, that the 
conversation became one in which obligations were placed not only upon the Member States, 
but upon the Union as well, and so for the first time it became ‘a two-way street…thereby 
codifying the Union’s previous case law.’657  Not only that, but it represented the express 
recognition of the existence of a general principle of loyalty in the primary law of the Union 
for the first time.658  Its positioning within the Treaty of the European Union which articulates 
the fundamental framework of the Union, rather than in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, further concretises it as a critical aspect of Union integration. Unlike the 
doctrine of supremacy,659 Article 4(3) TFEU does not require there to be a conflict between 
EU and domestic law in order to be applicable, making it wider in scope and of more general 
application.  Its ‘interplay with the principle of primacy [however,] clearly emerges from the 
Costa v E.N.E.L. ruling.’  In that case the CJEU stated that,  
 
																																																						
653 Hillion, Mixity and coherence in EU external relations: the significance of the duty of cooperation. Centre 
for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER), 2009, fn.16. 
654 Klamert maintains that a ‘reverse loyalty’ has been imposed upon the EU by the CJEU, that mirrors the 
obligations placed upon the Member States by Article 4(3) TEU.  See Case C-2/88 Imm. Zwartveld [1990] ECR 
I-3365.    
655 Temple Lang, ‘General Report: Duty of Cooperation’, The Report for FIDE Congress, Helsinki, 373-426.  
Hereafter, ‘The Helsinki Report.’ 
656 Casolari, ‘EU Loyalty After Lisbon: An expectation gap to be filled’, in “The EU After Lisbon” (2014) 
Springer International Publishing 93, p.105.  
657 Previously the Court had recognised Article 10 TEC as providing for a two-way obligations.  See 
Luxembourg v Parliament 230/81 [1983] ECR 255 at p.38; and C-2/88 Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-4405; and C-
234/89 Stereos Delimits v Menninger Bröu [1981] ECR I-935, at p.53.   
658 Federico Casolari, ‘EU Loyalty After Lisbon: An expectation gap to be filled’, in Lucia Serena Rossi and 
Federico Casolari (eds) The EU After Lisbon (Springer International Publishing: 2014) 93-133, p.105.   
659 The doctrine of the supremacy (or primacy) of EU laws has been fundamental to the success of the Union 
since first being articulated by the CJEU in Case 26/62 NV Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van 
Gen den Loos v Netherlands administratie der belastingen [1963] ECR 1.  It requires that when a conflict with 
national law arises, European law obligations must be applied.   
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‘executive force of [Union] law cannot vary from one State to another in deference to 
subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the attainment of the objectives of 
the Treaty set out in Article 5 …’660 
 
In Factortame, the link between loyalty and the principle of direct effect was addressed when 
the Court stated that:  
 
‘it is for the national courts, in application of the principle of cooperation laid down 
in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, to ensure that the legal protection which persons derive 
from the direct effect of provisions of Community law.’ [emphasis added]661   
 
As Article 4(3) TEU can be regarded as ‘functional to ensuring some of the very foundations 
of the Union legal order (namely, the primacy, direct effect, and effectiveness of EU law)’662 
it would appear that the Loyalty Principle could ‘fall within the category of the constitutional 
principles elaborated by the Court of Justice in the celebrated Kadi II ruling.’663 Given its 
demonstrated importance and pedigree of the Loyalty Principle within the EU legal orders, its 
comparatively wide scope is unsurprising.  The relationship between the EU and the Member 
States is a complex one, and one which is in a constant state of evolution. Arguably therefore, 
Article 4(3) TFEU must be articulated in such a way as to prevent its application becoming 
inadvertently limited, or compromised, over time.    
 
 5.4. Article 4(3) TEU in Practice 
 
Whilst it is true that ‘the [Loyalty P]rinciple … has many possible implications, some but not 
all of which can be foreseen,’664 it can be divided into two broad obligations.  A positive 
obligation to help in the attainment of Union objectives, and a negative obligation to not hinder 
the attainment of those objectives.   
 
																																																						
660 Case C-6/64 Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 593, 594. 
661 Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990] 3 
CLMR 1.  
662 Federico Casolaria (2014) supra n.657.  
663 Ibid.  
664 Temple Lang, ‘The Duty of Cooperation of National Courts in EU Competition Law,’ (2014) 17(1) Irish 
Journal of European Law 27.  
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In exploring the application of Article 4(3) TEU to the anti-cartel regulatory space, and 
dynamics at work, the central Union objective would be the creation and maintenance of the 
internal market (and thereby the protection of consumer welfare), and seeking to protect that 
objective from the harmful effects of cartels. The EU created Article 101 TFEU as the primary 
means by which this objective is to be achieved, and implemented Regulation 1/2003 to 
empower Member States to enforce Article 101 TFEU on the Union’s behalf.  The Leniency 
Notice was created an important way in which the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU could be 
made effective in practice.   
 
In respect of the positive obligation that Article 4(3) TEU places upon the Member States to 
help in the attainment of enforcing Article 101 TFEU, the UK has taken all the required steps 
by implementing domestic legislation, in the form of the Competition Act 1998 and the creation 
of a programme of leniency to reflect the European Commission’s Leniency Notice.  The 
potentially challenging element of Article 4(3) TEU in the context of the current enquiry 
therefore, is the negative duty that it creates to refrain from any measure that could jeopardise 
the attainment of the objective outline above.   
 
 5.4.1.  Duty to Refrain  
 
The obligation for Member States to refrain from acting in a manner contrary to the Union 
objectives has changed little since its original inclusion in Article 5 EEC and then again in 
Article 10 EC.  Where once it was the duty to ‘abstain’665 is it now articulated as the duty to 
‘refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of the Treaty objectives.’666   
This change in terminology may not be significant, or it could imply that with the increased 
scope of Article 4(3) TEU, it was thought that ‘refrain’ better articulated the duty to avoid 
taking actions that impede the Union’s objectives, whilst also recognising that the duty is not 
absolute.   
 
In the context of the present analysis therefore, this obligation amounts to a duty to refrain from 
any measure that could jeopardise the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU and, as the leniency 
																																																						
665 Whilst ‘abstain’ and ‘refrain’ are often interchangeable and overlap significantly in terms of their meaning, 
there are instances in which one would be used and the other would not.  One might say they abstain from 
drinking alcohol to indicate a choice never to drink alcohol, whereas one might prefer to say that they refrain 
from drinking alcohol, just for the evening.   
666 Article 4(3) TFEU. 
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programme is a particularly important element by which the anti-cartel dimension of Article 
101 TFEU is operationalised, Article 4(3) TEU arguably pre-empts Member States from 
jeopardising the European Commission’s leniency programme.  This claim is corroborated by 
the language chosen to articulate the Loyalty Principle, which refers to ‘assisting each other in 
carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties.’667  This would imply therefore, that 
Article 4(3) TEU ‘should make it possible to reinforce the legal status of nonbinding 
instruments under EU law.’668, such as the leniency programme. In respect of Article 5 EEC, 
Article 4(3) TEU’s predecessor, Temple Lang stated that he felt that this duty to refrain 
involved more than ‘merely the avoidance of measures that formally conflict with Union rules, 
but also avoiding measure that interfere with their operation.’669  This, he goes on to explain, 
includes an obligation to avoid measures that negatively impact the ‘practical effectiveness’670 
of EU law and that should such a measure be adopted, the Loyalty Principle requires that the 
Member State authority must take ‘whatever action is appropriate to eliminate the conflict.’671  
He bases his reasoning on the judgment of the Court in a competition law case, Cullet v Centre 
Leclerc Toulouse672  where the Court stated:  
 
 ‘the rules on competition are concerned with the conduct of undertakings and not 
 with the national legislation of Member States.  However, as the Court has recently 
 ruled in its judgment of 10 January 1985, in … Leclerc …, Member States are  
 nonetheless obliged under the second paragraph of Article 5 of the Treaty not to  
 detract, by means of national legislation, from the full and uniform application of  
 Community law or from the effectiveness of its implementing measures; nor may  
 they introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative nature, which  
 may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings.’673   
 
It is clear from this ruling that the effect of Article 4(3) TEU goes further than just the 
prevention of newly implemented national measures that run contrary to the attainment of 
																																																						
667 Ibid (emphasis added).  
668 Marcus Klamert (2014) supra n. 628. 
669 Temple Lang, ‘Article 10 EC – The Most Important “General Principle” of Community Law’ in  General 
Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development (The Hague, Kluwer Law International :2008) p.511. 
670 Ibid. 
671 Ibid.    
672 Case 231/83, Cullet v Centre Leclerc Toulouse, [1985] ECR I-305148.   
673 Ibid, para. 16-18 of the judgment.   
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Union objectives, but also allows for the Union to address measures already enacted, from 
remaining in force if they frustrate the realisation of Union goals.   
 
Thus, Article 4(3) could arguably cover a situation where the enactment of a national measure 
that, in principle, poses no threat to the proper functioning of the Union in terms of the 
attainment of its recognised objectives, but through poor drafting, implementation or 
enforcement, the practical reality of the national measure puts the attainment of the objectives 
at risk.   
 
The fact that the measure in question is a validly adopted legislative action is not an automatic 
bar to a finding of a breach of Article 4(3) TEU as the obligation is made upon ‘any measure’ 
and so wide enough as to capture legislation adopted in the Member States within its scope.  
Indeed, ‘lawmaking by national legislators … is one of the prime targets of the obligations 
under Article 4(3) TEU.’674  That is the case even when Member States are acting ‘within their 
own sphere of sovereignty, obliging them to act in a manner to further the interests of the 
Union.’675   
 
5.5.  Article 4(2)  
 
As highlighted in the introduction to this chapter, the grouping of Article 4(3) TEU together 
with Article 4(2) TEU has important normative significance.  They embody two potentially 
polarising ideas; protection of Member State sovereignty, and a duty to sincerely work towards 
Union objectives.  Article 4(2) TEU states that: 
 
 ‘the Union shall respect the equality of the member states before the Treaties as  
 well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and 
 constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.  It shall respect their 
 essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the state,  
 maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security.’  
 
																																																						
674 Marcus Klamert (2014), supra n. 628. 
675 Ibid.   
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There is therefore, an inherent tension between the two clauses as they seek to protect what 
could be considered, two opposing positions.  Von Bogdandy and Schill argue however, that 
Article 4(2) TEU helps to reconcile:  
 
'the categorical positions of the [CJEU] on one side which supports the doctrine of 
absolute primacy of EU law even over the constitutional laws of the member states, and 
that of domestic constitutional courts on the other, which largely follow a doctrine of 
relative primacy in accepting the primacy of EU law subject to certain constitutional 
limits.'676   
 
The clause can thus be said to have a limiting effect upon the functioning of Article 4(3) TEU 
in that it delineates a line which must be respected by the Union when exercising its 
competences.  It is articulated as an obligation upon the Union, in contrast to Article 4(3) TEU 
which in practice, creates obligations mostly for the Member States.677   
 
The pre-Lisbon jurisprudence contains references to the idea of respecting the identity of the 
Member States.  In Commission v Luxemburg678 for example, the Court stated that, ‘the 
preservation of the Member States’ national identities is a legitimate aim respected by the 
Community legal order (as is indeed acknowledged in Article F(1) of the Treaty on European 
Union.’  Now that this principle is articulated expressly in the post-Lisbon Treaty TEU it 
potentially gives rise to a more definite and justiciable issue.   
 
Working Group V of the 2002-2003 European  Convention provided clarification to what was 
to be meant by 'essential elements of national identities' which the Union must respect,679 and 
determined that it should include, not only fundamental structures and essential functions but 
also their 'basic public policy choices and social values.'680    Nevertheless, much of the 
academic literature expresses the opinion that Article 4(2) TEU should only be invoked in 
																																																						
676 Von Bogdandy and Schill (2011) ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: respect for National Identify under the 
Lisbon Treaty,’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1417.     
677 The CJEU have also imposed a ‘reverse loyalty’ upon the EU that mirrors the obligation placed upon the 
Member States by Article 4(3) TEU, see Case C-2/88 Imm. Zwartveld [1990] ECR I-3365, and for discussion, 
Marcus Klamert (2014) supra n. 628. 
678 Case C-473/93, Commission v Luxemburg [1996] ECR I-3207, para. 35.  
679 European Convention, Final Report of Working Group V on Complementary Competencies, 14th November 
2002, CON 375/1/02/REV, quoted in Federico Casolari (2014) supra n.657. 
680 Ibid.   
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exceptional circumstances,681 and only when not doing so results in a threat to the 'fundamental 
constitutional functions of a national legal order.'682 Some do argue however, that it should be 
used as a 'mainstream tool' for changing the balance of existing EU legal doctrine in favour of 
Member State sovereignty.683 Whatever the position, Article 4(2) TEU was not created as a 
means by which Member States can set aside EU law, nor either as a 'derogation clause'684 but 
as a boundary to the power of the Union when carrying out its functions so that ‘[t]he effective 
implementation of common rules is to be balanced against the autonomy of the Member 
States.’685   
 
In reality the ‘duty to respect’ does not amount to an absolute protection for Member State 
identity, and the fact that it is referred to as ‘identity’ rather than ‘sovereignty’ is demonstrative 
of this.  Instead:  
 
‘when national identity is at stake, Article 4(2) requires that a proportional balance be 
found between the uniform application if EU law, a fundamental constitutional 
principle of the EU, and the national identity of the Member State in question.’686 
 
Therefore, Union action against a national measure protected by Article 4(2) TEU (if 
determined to amount to disproportionate interference) could be regarded as sufficient as a 
matter of Union law for that Union interference to be determined unlawful, and for the CJEU 
to therefore strike it down.687  
 
The burden of establishing that the Member State measure in question was a matter of its 
national identity so falls within the protection of Article 4(2) TEU rests upon the Member State 
seeking to invoke it.  However, Article 4(3) TEU is ‘adverse to the claim that the constitutional 
																																																						
681 Federico Casolari, (2014) supra n. 657. 
682 Ibid.  See also, Kumm and Ferres Comella, ‘The primacy clause of the constitutional Treaty and the future of 
constitutional conflict in the European Union,’ (2005) European Union International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 3; Besselink, ‘National and Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon,’ (2010) 6 Utrecht Law Review 
36; von Bogdandy and Schill, ‘Overcoming Absolute Primacy: respect for National Identify under the Lisbon 
Treaty,’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 1417.  
683 Ibid.  See also Guastaferro, ‘Beyond the Exceptionalism of Constitutional Conflicts: the ordinary functions 
of the Identity Clause,’ (2012) 31(1) Yearbook of European Law 263.   
684 Ibid.   
685 Eleftheria Neframi, ‘Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope Through its Applications in the Field of EU 
External Relations’ (2010) 47 Common Market Law Review 323, p.327.  
686 von Bogdandy, Armin, ‘Founding principles’ (2010) Principles of European Constitutional Law 11-54. 
687 von Bogdandy, Armin, ‘Founding principles of EU law: a theoretical and doctrinal sketch’ (2010) 16(2) 
European Law Journal 95-111.  
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courts of the Member States are entirely sovereign on deciding Article 4(2).’688  It is the role 
of the CJEU to articulate the ‘conceptual framework of what a Member State can determine to 
form part of its national identity,’689 however it cannot go on to decide the content of that 
identity.690  This provides sufficient room to enable respect for the plethora of constitutional 
realities of each of the Member States whilst retaining power to delineate the outer limit of the 
protection of Article 4(2) TEU.   
 
It is possible therefore, to envisage a circumstance where a Member State accused of breaching 
Article 4(3) TEU with the consequence of the offending domestic measure being ruled 
incompatible with Union law, for the Member State to raise Article 4(2) TEU as a defence.  
However, in order to be able to do so the Member State would have to establish, the burden of 
proof being on them, that the national measure in question was necessary in order to respect its 
national identity.  Further, the Identity Clause requires that the Member States’ national identity 
must be ‘construed as that of States that are members of the EU.’691 This would seem to indicate 
that even if a Member State was able to bring a particular measure within the meaning of 
‘national identity,’ were that to be wholly contrary to the fundamental objectives of the Union, 
it is unlikely that it would be able to afford itself of the protection offered in Article 4(2) TEU.   
 
Whilst Article 4(2) TEU provides a limit to the ability of the Union to interfere in the domestic 
matters of its Member States, that limit is in itself constrained.  Establishing that a matter is as 
such as to threaten national identity, means that Article 4(2) TEU is restricted in scope, for the 
obvious reason that otherwise it could in practice become a derogation clause.  Article 4(3) 
TEU in contrast, has a far wider scope of application.  It would itself be limited however, by 
the general principles of proportionality.  There is relatively limited CJEU jurisprudence on the 
meaning of ‘national identity,’ particularly within the scope of Article 4(2) TFEU,692 except to 
say that it can be used only when there is a ‘genuine and sufficiently serious threat to a 
fundamental interest of society.’693 
 
																																																						
688von Bogdandy & Schill, S, ‘Overcoming absolute primacy: respect for national identity under the Lisbon 
Treaty’ (2011) 48(5) Common Market Law Rev 1417. 
689 Ibid.   
690 Ibid. 
691 Ibid.  
692 Neil Murphy, ‘Article 4(2) TEU: A Blow to the Supremacy of EU Law’ (2017) 20 Trinity College Law 
Review 94.  
693 Case C-208/09 Sayn-Wittgenstein v Landeshauptman von Wein [2011] ETMR 12.  
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 5.6.  The Loyalty Principle and the Criminal Cartel Offence 
 
 
The European Commission itself identified that while criminalisation ‘can be an efficient tool 
to increase the effectiveness of enforcement,’694 there are some circumstances in which 
criminal sanctions for individuals can ‘achieve the opposite effect of what was intended, and 
lead to under-enforcement’695 and ultimately ‘fewer successful cartel investigations.’696 This 
section seeks to consider this idea more closely and to determine whether ineffective criminal 
cartel enforcement poses a real risk to the UK’s obligations under Article 4(3) TEU in 
conjunction with Regulation 1/2003.  
  
As previously indicated, a focus for this enquiry is in relation to the European Commission’s 
leniency programme, which is considered key to successful anti-cartel enforcement, both in 
terms of civil and criminal measures.  Cartels are notoriously difficult to detect without 
information being provided by a whistle blower.  Leniency programmes are often considered 
to be the “cornerstone” of effective enforcement and without them, the efficacy of any 
regulatory structure would be greatly reduced.  The result of a well implemented leniency 
programme is that both detection rates are improved, as is the quality of the evidence that is 
gathered as a result of the information provided, thereby improving the success of the 
investigation.  
 
The enactment of criminal legislation for individuals who engage in cartel activity is in theory, 
unproblematic in respect of the UK’s relationship with the Union.  Regulation 1/2003 makes it 
clear that the criminalisation of aspects of competition law ought to be able to be compatible 
with Union competition law.  Article 5 specifically states that national competition authorities 
are permitted to impose ‘fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided for in 
their national law.’  Indeed various Member States have criminal aspects of their domestic 
competition regimes.  
 
																																																						
694 Speech by C. Madero Villarejo, Deputy Director General for Antitrust of DG Competition, Competition Law 
Conference – IBA/KBA, Introductory Remarks for Panel Session, Seoul, 28th April 2011.  Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2011_05_en.pdf.  Last accessed 17th August 2018.   
695 Ibid. 
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The inquiry as to whether the measure in question merely ‘could’ jeopardise Union objectives, 
as opposed to requiring firm proof that it has jeopardised the attainment of an objective, does 
not appear to set a high bar for determining when a breach of Article 4(3) TEU has occurred.  
This is arguably particularly important when the Union competence in question is so 
fundamental to the foundational objectives of the Union itself.  
 
 5.6.1.  Article 4(3) TEU: Jurisdiction and the Criminal Cartel Offence   
 
The first most obvious hurdle to any such claim that the UK could be in breach of Article 4(3) 
TEU is that the cartel offence is criminal in nature and so then outside of the scope of Union 
competence, and thus not subject to the Loyalty Principle contained in Article 4(3) TEU.  
However, as early as 1978 the Court was making statements as to the reach of Union action: 
 
‘In accordance with the principles of the precedence of [Union] law, the relationship 
between provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the institutions on 
the one hand and the national law of the Member States on the other is such that those 
provisions and measures not only by their entry into force render automatically 
inapplicable any conflicting provisions of national law but - in so far as they are an 
integral part of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the territory of 
each of the Member States – also preclude the valid adoption of new national legislative 
measure to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community 
provisions.’697 
 
Despite not being explicitly mentioned, the Loyalty Principle is arguably echoed in the Court’s 
reasoning in that case.  In the Pupino698 judgment the Court went even further and stated that: 
 
‘It would be difficult for the Union to carry out its task effectively if the principle of 
loyal cooperation, requiring in particular that Member States take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under 
European Union law, were not also binding in the area of police and judicial 
																																																						
697 Case C-106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR, 629. 
698 Case C-105/03 Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285 
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cooperation in criminal matters, which is moreover entirely based on cooperation 
between the Member States and the institutions.’699 
 
Therefore, it would appear that the criminal cartel offence would not automatically be excluded 
from the jurisdiction of Article 4(3) TEU solely because it is a national criminal law, if it did 
indeed have an impact upon the attainment of fundamental Union objectives.  There is some 
reason to believe that the only measures that would be excluded from the application of Article 
4(3) TEU would be those that the Member States could prove were within the meaning of 
Article 4(2) TEU. 
 
However, the previous provision within Article 10 EC appears to have only been capable of 
being applied ‘in combination with some other rule of [EU] law which provides specific 
content to the general duty of cooperation’.700 The reasoning for this constraint was that it 
would not be practicable to consider a Member State bound to act or refrain from acting, by a 
provision like the then Article 10 EC, which is so general in application that it provides no 
practical guidance.701  ‘It is always necessary [therefore] to identify some other rule of [Union] 
law or policy with which a national authority should cooperate: there cannot be a legal duty to 
cooperate except for some identifiable purpose.’702  There is no reason why this position would 
have changed under the current Article 4(3) TEU. Indeed, given the increased scope and 
importance of the Principle, this requirement becomes all the more vital.   
 
In the context of competition law this corroborating Union measure would arguably be 
Regulation 1/2003 which states that:  
 
‘In order to establish a system which ensures that competition in the common 
market is not distorted, Articles [101] and [102] of the Treaty must be applied 
effectively and uniformly in the Community.’703 
 
																																																						
699 Ibid, para. 42.  
700 Temple Lang, "Article 10 EC–The Most Important “General Principle” of Community Law." General 
Principles of EC Law in a Process of Development, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 75 (2008). 
701 Neframi contests, however, that ‘era is [now] definitely over in which eminent specialists of EU law [can] 
affirm that the duty of loyalty is a general principle which is not sufficient to limit national rights, but expresses 
principles with are further specified elsewhere - and thus is not like to be invoked separately.’ Supra n. 648. 
702 Ibid.  
703 Regulation1/2003, Recital (1). 
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The Regulation goes on to articulate the Union’s position in respect of national competition 
laws that seek to impose criminal sanctions upon individuals when it states that:  
 
‘This Regulation does not apply to national competition laws which impose 
criminal sanctions on natural persons except to the extent that such sanctions are 
[a]704 means whereby competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced.’705   
 
And further that:  
 
‘In so far as such national legislation pursues predominantly an objective different 
from that of protecting competition on the market, the competition authorities and 
the courts of the Member States may apply such legislation on their territory.’706 
 
Article 3 of the Regulation, which deals specifically with the relationship between Article 101 
TFEU and national competition laws, goes on to add that: ‘[w]ithout prejudice to general 
principles and other provisions of [Union] law’ [emphasis added]707 Regulation 1/2003 does 
not ‘preclude the application of provisions of national law that predominantly pursue an 
objective different from that pursued by Article [101 TFEU].’708   Furthermore Recital (8) of 
Regulation 1/2003 states that it ‘does not apply to national laws which impose criminal 
sanctions on natural persons except to the extent that such sanctions are [a] means whereby 
competition rules applying to undertakings are enforced.’709  Put another way the Regulation 
could in theory preclude a national criminal sanction if it pursued the same objective as Article 
101 TFEU, or alternatively would at the very least mean that the Regulation would apply to 
the use of criminal sanctions if it was a means by which rules against undertakings are enforced.  
In addition and more generally, whether the provisions pursue the same purpose or not, any 
criminal sanctions against natural persons must be also comply with the general principles of 
Union law, of which Article 4(3) TEU is one.   
 
																																																						
704 In IB v R [2010] Crim. L.R. 494, the Court of Appeal determined that ‘the’ should be replaced by ‘a’.   
705 Regulation 1/2003, Recital (8). 
706 Ibid, Recital (9). 
707 Ibid, Article 3(3), emphasis added.  
708 Ibid.  
709 Emphasis added.  
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The issue as to whether the cartel offence fell within the meaning of ‘national competition law’ 
and thereby, was within the scope of Regulation 1/2003 was adjudicated upon in the 
interlocutory hearing IB v R.710 In that case the Court of Appeal determined that as the criminal 
cartel offence is not a means by which Article 101 TFEU is directly enforced against 
undertakings, that for the purpose of Regulation 1/2003, it is not to be considered a national 
competition law and so is outside of its scope.711  The Court determined that the cartel offence 
pursued an objective that was predominantly different from that pursued by Article 101 TFEU.  
Unfortunately, the Court did not refer the point to the Court of Justice by way of the preliminary 
ruling procedure. Arguably however, given that undertakings are ‘fictional entities’ incapable 
of acting independently of their agents, who act on behalf of and bind their firms, State actions 
to prevent those agents from taking action that binds their firms into prohibited hard-core 
agreements is synonymous with taking action against the firms themselves.  Therefore, if the 
criminal cartel offence was created as a means of deterring individual agents from engaging in 
cartel activity rather than, for example, the predominantly different purpose of punishing the 
inherent criminal harm of creating or engaging in a cartel, it is difficult to see why the criminal 
cartel offence would not be included within the scope of Regulation 1/2003, and also therefore, 
potentially precluded by it.   
 
Nevertheless, should the criminal cartel offence rightly fall outside of the scope of Regulation 
1/2003, it is still bound by the obligations contained in Article 4(3) TEU (as contextualised by 
the justiciable detail contained in Regulation 1/2003).  Therefore, Article 4(3) TEU in 
combination with Regulation 1/2003 could give rise to justiciable obligations even when there 
is no direct substantive conflict between the national measure and the Union competition law.  
 
A further difficulty that must be surmounted in considering the application of Article 4(3) in 
this context, is how directly the national measure in question must threaten to frustrate the 
attainment of the Union objective.  In Hasselblad (GB) Ltd v Orbison,712 Orbison was being 
sued for defamation based upon the statements that he had made in a letter to the Commission 
claiming that Hasselblad had breached Article 102 TFEU (ex Article 85 EEC).  In their 
judgment, the Court held that: 
  
																																																						
710 [2010] Crim. L.R. 494. 
711 Ibid, para. 33-36 (emphasis added).  
712 3 CMLR 540 (1984) 679. 
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[S]ince this country is a Member of the European Community, there is a public interest 
in ensuring that the Commission as the primary authority of the Community [in the 
sphere of competition law] should not be frustrated in [its duty] of enforcing 
compliance with Articles [101 and 102 TFEU]…Allowing the defamation claim to 
proceed would risk the flow of vital information to the Commission.713   
 
Temple Lang maintains that this ‘amounts to an argument that the Commission’s ability to 
obtain evidence should not be interfered with’714 since that is the means by which enforcement 
of Article 101 TFEU is made effective, and thereby the Union objective of a competitive 
internal market is achieved, and consumer welfare protected.  This case pre-dates the 
introduction of the Commission’s Notice on Leniency and so it could be said that the 
importance of the Commission’s ability to obtain evidence, particularly by way of the leniency 
programme, has if anything, only increased over time.    
 
Given that the Commission now routinely imposes much higher fines than has previously been 
the case, the effects of leniency which reduces those fines would be frustrated if national 
competition authorities imposed sanctions contrary to the Commission’s approach to 
leniency.715  Therefore, Article 4(3) TEU imposes a legal duty upon Member States to avoid 
such a result.716  The result of Hasselblad seems to be then, that in order to assist the Union in 
the attainment of its objective of a competitive market and consumer welfare, the leniency 
programme, the evidence that it creates and the impact that the provision of that evidence has 
on the imposition of fines, are crucial to the Union being able to achieve its objectives.  
Arguably, therefore, Article 4(3) TEU, in practical terms in this context, requires that Member 
States refrain from adopting any measure that may jeopardise the working of the Commission’s 
leniency regime.   
 
The Hassleblad case also seems to indicate that the link between the national measure in 
question and the threat that it poses to the leniency regime need not be direct so long as the 
impact is clear and tangible.  The ruling in the Hassleblad case does not seek to alter the law 
on defamation, but to merely limit its use in the specific context of that case.  The inquiry raised 
																																																						
713 Ibid, p.692.  
714 John Temple Lang, ‘European Community Competition Law and Member State Action’ (1989) 10 New 
Journal of International Law and Business 114. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Ibid.  
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by Joshua and Klawait and their comments, appear to imply going one step further.  Should 
the cartel offence be creating a situation that hinders the practical effectiveness of the 
Commission leniency regime sufficiently for it to breach Article 4(3) TEU, there may be cause 
to require that it be radically amended or even repealed.  There is jurisprudence that supports 
the possibility that offending legislation may be required to be repealed in order to ensure 
compliance with Union objectives.  In the second of the ‘Fruit Trees’717 cases, the Court held 
that the Loyalty Principle created a legal duty upon Italy to formally repeal legislation that had 
been found to be impermissible by way of ex Article 10 EC.   
 
However, in the more recent case of Pfleiderer v Bundeskartellamt718, the CJEU held that the 
protection of the operation of the leniency programme was not absolute.  In that case, the 
Bundeskartellamt (the German Competition Authority or ‘the GCA’) fined three European 
manufacturers of decor paper EURO 62 million for anti-competitive price agreements and 
artificially limiting supply.  Pfleiderer, a customer who considered that it suffered adversely as 
a result of the agreements sought to obtain documents from the GCA in order to pursue a private 
damages claim.  The documents sought included those obtained by way of an application for 
leniency.  The GCA refused the application, a decision that was appealed by Pfleiderer.  The 
CJEU were ultimately asked to clarify whether Articles 11 and 12 of Regulation 1/2003 
prevented the sharing of information gathered by way of a leniency application.  The CJEU 
held that there was no Union law that laid down a common rule as to the sharing of this type 
of documentation, and so it is for the Member States themselves to establish national rules on 
the issue.719  The Court stated that despite the fact that allowing access to these documents may 
well diminish the effectiveness of the leniency regime and therefore, anti-cartel enforcement,720 
this was insufficient to defeat the well established right of individuals to bring private damages 
claims for damages resulting from anti-completive practices.721  In fact, despite the obvious 
risk of ‘suffocating both further public and private enforcement’ 722 the European Commission 
																																																						
717  Case 30/72 Commission v Italy [1973] E.C.R. 161, para. 11.   
718 Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] ECR I-05161. 
719 Ibid, para. 20. 
720 Ibid, para. 26.  
721 See Case C‑453/99 Courage and Crehan [2001] ECR I‑6297, paragraphs 24 and 26, and Joined Cases 
C‑295/04 to C‑298/04 Manfredi and Others [2006] ECR I‑6619, paragraphs 59 and 61.   
722 Stephan, Andreas, ‘ECJ Ruling in Pfleiderer Heightens Concerns about Encouraging Private Enforcement’ 
on Competition Policy Blog, www.competitionpolicy.wordpress.com, 23rd June 2011.  Available at: 
https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/06/23/ecj-ruling-in-pfleiderer-heightens-concerns-about-
encouraging-private-enforcement/   
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have been eager to encourage private damages actions.723  This pro-consumer stance of the 
CJEU is in line with the overall Union policy objectives discussed in Chapter 3, but that might 
be at odds with more market-based theologies in some Member States.   
 
 5.6.2.  EU Action in Cases of a Breach of Union Obligations 
 
If the European Commission consider that a Member States has failed to satisfy the duty of 
sincere cooperation as contained in Article 4(3) TEU, there is a mechanism by which the 
Commission can seek remedies to address that failure. Article 258 TFEU states that: 
 
‘If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an obligation 
under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the 
State concerned the opportunity to submit its observations.  
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the period laid down by 
the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union.’ 
Therefore, if the European Commission had reason to believe that the detached and ineffective 
enforcement of the section 188 EA 2002 offence in the UK had resulted in a significant 
reduction in applications for leniency (because for example, rather than destabilize cartels, it 
had the opposite effect) or otherwise threatened the EU leniency programme, or another 
important aspect of the EU competition regime, then the Commission would be empowered to 
investigate and adopt a reasoned opinion on the matter, providing the UK and provide them 
with an opportunity to rectify the problem.  If the UK disagreed, or failed to take action, the 
Treaty provides the Commission with the power to escalate the dispute and would allow the 
Commission to bring an enforcement action against the UK before the CJEU.   
The Commission would then have to establish that the effect of the criminal cartel offence in 
the UK has to potential to jeopardise the effective enforcement of Article 101 TFEU by way 
of the Leniency Notice.  It would be a novel use of Article 4(3) TFEU but given the apparent 
																																																						
723 The EU have implemented various measures to further improve the availability and ease with which third 
parties can bring claims for damages since the decision in Pfleiderer, primarily the Directive 2014/104/EU on 
Antitrust Damages Actions, but also the complementary Commission Recommendation on common principles 
for injunctive and compensatory redress collective redress mechanisms in Member States.   
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wide scope of the provision and the language used to articulate its outer limits, there does not 
appear to be any specific bar to an action of this sort, if indeed the operation of the criminal 
cartel offence had such an effect on the EU regime. Certainly the lack of appreciation of the 
broader regulatory dynamics in play at the time of drafting and subsequent amendment of 
section 188 EA 2002 fails to safeguard compliance with Article 4(3) TEU.  As discussed in 5.1 
above, the Loyalty Principle applies to ‘any measure’ that ‘could’ threaten the attainment of 
the Union’s objectives.  Given that the generality of Article 4(3) TEU is arguably made 
justiciable by the detail provided by Article 101 TFEU and Regulation 1/2003, the remedial 
action required by the Commission, for example, could be to reformulate the section 188 
offence so as to pursue a predominantly different purpose, or if the threat was considered 
significant enough, to repeal the criminal cartel offence all together.   
 
In order to defend against such an action it would then be for the UK to establish that the section 
188 (and the matter of its enforcement) was within the protection offered by Article 4(2) TFEU.  
In order to make this claim successfully, the UK would have to prove that the criminal cartel 
offence was part of ‘their fundamental structures, political and constitutional’724 or 
alternatively, that it should be respected as an example of an ‘essential State function’725 which 
includes to ‘maintain law and order.’726   This in turn would require that the UK were able to 
establish that it was a matter of ‘basic policy choices and social values’727 in the UK.  In 
determining if that were the case, the CJEU would have to ascertain whether Union interference 
with the criminal cartel offence would be a threat to the fundamental functions of the UK’s 
national legal order, or whether the UK’s interpretation of their national identity in this context 
would be wholly contrary to the fundamental objectives of the Union.  Given that the Union 
foresaw the possibility of Member States introducing criminal legislation to combat anti-
competitive conduct and in fact specifically dealt with the possibility arising in Regulation 
1/2003,728 it would be incredibly unlikely that the creation of a criminal offence in the UK 
would be considered wholly contrary to the fundamental objectives of the Union.  The CJEU 
would therefore have to determine whether the Commission’s proposed interference with the 
criminal cartel offence under Article 4(3) TEU amounted to a threat to the fundamental 
constitutional functions of the UK.   
																																																						
724 Article 4(2) TEU. 
725 Ibid.  
726 Ibid.  
727 Casolari, Federico (2015) supra n. 657. 
728 Indeed, many of the Member States have so legislated. 
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As mentioned above, the national identities of the Member States in the context of Article 4(2) 
TEU are not limited solely to laws of constitutional significance.  This is implicit in the 
language adopted by the provision when it seeks to protect the ‘national identities’ of the 
Member States rather than their constitutional identities, or their sovereignty, for example.  The 
right to legislate for the purpose of protecting law and order is a fundamental and essential 
State function.  The question then would be whether the criminal cartel offence was an example 
of their basic policy choices and social values.  The fact that the criminal cartel offence has 
been employed instrumentally as a mechanism for improving the deterrent function of anti-
cartel enforcement in the UK would make a claim that it represented the social values of the 
UK difficult to establish.  Further, given the rarity of its use, it would seem unlikely that it 
could be considered as essential to maintaining law and order in the UK.  Whether therefore, 
its importance within the regulatory space of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK was sufficient 
in order for it to avail itself of the protection guaranteed by Article 4(2) TEU would be a matter 
for the CJEU to decide based upon whatever evidence was put before it.  However, the reality 
of its ancillary use since its inception would indicate that when the competing interests of the 
protection of an essential Union objective are weighed against the national interest to legislate 
for the protection of law and order, in this specific context, remedial action to eradicate the 
negative impact of the criminal offence upon the operation of leniency, would not be 
considered wholly disproportionate.   
 
 5.6.3.  Additional Obligations Arising out of Article 4(3) TEU 
 
Article 4(3) TEU together with Regulation 1/2003 creates an obligation upon Member States 
to inform and consult the European Commission on any decision to introduce criminal 
sanctions.729  Such consultation would enable the Commission and the Member State to ensure 
that any criminal legislation adopted in the Member State was compatible with Article 101 
TFEU and that it would not have a cooling effect upon potential leniency applicants.  The UK 
satisfied this requirement.  Margaret Bloom stated that they had ‘worked closely with the 
European Commission to ensure that the interface between [EU] and national law is carefully 
worked out’730 when introducing criminal sanctions, a fact that could be crucial when 
																																																						
729 France v United Kingdom 141/78 [1979] ECR 2923. 
730 Bloom, Margaret, ‘Significant Step Forward: The UK Criminalization Initiative’ (2002) 17 Antitrust 59. 
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determining whether any ‘best-efforts’ obligation that may exist, has been satisfied.  However 
it is notable that consultation with regards to the original drafting and introduction of section 
188 EA 2002 would not necessarily protect the UK where it is subsequently the operation of 
the provision that creates concerns regarding jeopardising the successful attainment of the 
objectives underpinning the EU leniency programme, Regulation 1/2003 and Article 101 
TFEU. 
 
 In the Leclerc judgment however, the Court was clear that Member States should not maintain 
in force legislative measures that may render the competition rules of the Union ineffective.731  
When viewed from the perspective of competition law which is ‘inherently evolutionary in 
nature,’732 this may amount to a requirement to review the impact of enforcement practices on 
the efficacy of civil measures.  Kovacic, when extrapolating from the experiences of anti-trust 
enforcement in the United States, argues that, ‘the experimental quality of competition policy 
demands that the agency periodically assess the effects of chosen policies.’733  Article 4(3) 
TEU could be a means by which the requirement to periodically review the effects of chosen 
policies becomes a legal obligation placed upon the Member States to ensure that the 
attainment of its fundamental objectives are not frustrated over time.   
 
 5.7.  Conclusions 
 
It is important to be clear that any action against a Member State by way of Article 4(3) TEU 
in the manner outlined above would be the first of its kind.  Given the importance of the 
leniency programme to the effective enforcement of Article 101 TFEU however, combined 
with the fact that in practice, that enforcement is effectively left in the hands of the Member 
States, the Union must have a means by which it can require Member State interference, 
whether by ‘accident or design’734 to be remedied.  Article 4(3) TEU could provide such a 
mechanism.   
 
																																																						
731 Case 231/83 Cullet v Centre Leclerc Toulouse [19850 ECR I-305148, para. 16-18. 
732 Kovacic, ‘Criminal Enforcement of Competition Law: Implications of US Experience’ in Caron Beaton-
Wells and Ariel Ezrachi (eds) Criminalising cartels: Critical studies of an international regulatory 
movement (Hart Publishing: 2011) p.37. 
733 Ibid, para. 47, p.39.  
734 John Temple Lang (1998) supra n. 632. 
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The close relationship that exists within the anti-cartel enforcement regulatory space between 
the UK and the EU means that the place which the criminal cartel offence occupies within the 
UK space, and the potential for it to affect the functioning of anti-cartel enforcement in the EU, 
should not be ignored.  The experience of the UK in attempting (and failing) to create a criminal 
offence with any significant impact upon the objectives it was created to achieve, should serve 
as a warning to other Member States who may consider to legislating.  The above analysis 
shows that in order to avoid the risk of breaching the duty of sincere cooperation contained in 
Article 4(3) TEU that any Member State must inform and consult the Commission of its 
intentions, and must, if so permitted by their constitutional arrangements, articulate any 
criminal offence so as to (a) protect the functioning of leniency provisions, and (b) pursue a 
predominantly different purpose that Article 101 TFEU.  Article 4(3) TEU may also impose 
an obligation of periodic review which would help to prevent the frustration of Union 
objectives over time.  As shown in Chapter 4, section 4.3.4. of this work, the passage of time 
and the enforcement of policy instruments can have a significant impact upon the overall 
impact of a complex regulatory space, arguably therefore strengthening the argument that 
Article 4(3) TEU creates an obligation for periodic review.    
 
Whilst some would argue that Article 4(3) TEU should be ‘considered as containing principles 
governing interactions between the Union and national legal orders, which transform the status 
of sovereign States into that of Member States of the European Union,’735 it’s cohabitation with 
Article 4(2) TEU demonstrates, in fact, that the ‘EU is not interested in “Europeanising” the 
Member States.’736  The Loyalty Principle should be understood as a key part of a legal regime 
that ‘is one of the most remarkable phenomena in contemporary world politics’737 and as a 
mechanism for ensuring that the overriding policy objectives of the Union are not inadvertently 
frustrated through the actions of its Member States.   
 
  
																																																						
735 Neframi (2010) supa n.684. 
736 Neil Murphy (2017) supra n. 691. 
737 William Phelan, ‘Why do the EU Member States Accept the Supremacy of European Law? Explaining 
Supremacy as an Alternative to Bilateral Reciprocity.’ (2011) 18(5) Journal of European Public Policy 766. 
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Chapter 6.  Improving the Anti-cartel Regulatory Framework: lessons from the law on market 
abuse 
 
6.1 Introduction: framing the case study analogy 
 
 
The previous chapters of this work sought to examine the theoretical justifications for 
criminalisation (Chapter 2); explore deterrence (and its alternatives) as cartel control measures 
within the context of the criminal cartel offence (Chapter 3); analyse the dynamics of anti-
cartel enforcement in the UK and the place within which the section 188 offence occupies 
(Chapter 4); consider the potential implications of the criminal cartel offence on the UK’s 
obligations owed to the EU by virtue of Article 4(3) TEU (Chapter 5).  Together these chapters 
articulate the complexities of including atypical enforcement tools within an already complex 
regulatory environment, and the problems that inadequately considered implementation of new 
tools may have on the impact on that tool, and the regulatory matrix in which is to operate.  
This chapter aims to build upon the findings of these preceding chapters in order to take a step 
towards devising solutions to the complex challenges that they have highlighted.  This will 
then provide the basis upon which recommendations for improving the framework within 
which the fight against cartels takes place can be addressed in the next chapter.  To achieve the 
objective of this chapter, the following analysis looks beyond the borders of competition law.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters of this work, anti-cartel enforcement has a harmonised core 
as a result of the exclusive competence that the EU retains over matters of competition law738 
within the internal market.  Article 101 TFEU outlines the relevant law on collusion, and the 
jurisprudential development of Article 101 TFEU defines the parameters of the actions that are 
considered to be prohibited forms of agreement.  The task of enforcing Article 101 TFEU 
however, became too much for the European Commission in a single market that was still 
growing (at the relevant time to 25 Member States, later to 28 with the accession of Bulgaria, 
																																																						
738 Member States are permitted to adopt legally binding acts within the field of competition law only ‘if so 
empowered by the Union or for the implementation of Union acts.  Article 3(1)(b) TEU, and Article 2(1) TFEU.   
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Romania and Croatia) and so the decision was taken to decentralise enforcement.739  Regulation 
1/2003 was introduced therefore, to articulate the decentralised way in which those laws should 
be enforced by the Member States within their own jurisdiction,740 as well as outlining the 
powers that national competition authorities ought to have to achieve that enforcement. This 
meant that within the proscribed limits, Member States were permitted to adopt domestic 
legislation to tackle cartel activity in addition to Article 101 TFEU.741  As a result, whilst 
competition law retained its harmonised core, idiosyncratic procedures and sanctions have 
evolved outside of that core, within the Member States’ jurisdictions that nevertheless, remain 
inextricably linked to it.  In practice then, despite the EU retaining exclusive competence over 
matters of competition law within the internal market, the system that has been created has 
some similarities to areas of competence that are shared between the EU and the Member States 
in that Member State rules and Union rules must find a way to cohabit the competition law 
regulatory space together.  The challenge is to find the most beneficial way of achieving that 
cohabitation that does not undermine the overriding EU objectives and respects the autonomy 
and diversity of the (current) 28 individual Member States.742  
 
The diverse nature of the legal systems of the Member States within the Union necessitated 
that they should be able to retain a degree of autonomy with respect to the implementation 
procedures necessary to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in accordance with their own 
constitutional requirements.743  This has meant that there now exists some idiosyncratic 
																																																						
739 For contemporaneous discussion of the need to decentralise the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU see, Alan 
Riley, ‘EC Antitrust Modernisation: the Commission does very nicely – thank you! Part 1: Regulation 1 and the 
notification burden,’ (2003) 24(11) European Competition Law Review 604, and Alan Riley, ‘EC Antitrust 
Modernisation: the European Commission does very nicely – thank you! Part 2: between the idea and the 
reality: decentralisation under Regulation 1,’ (2003) 24(12) European Competition Law Review 657.   
740 The EU have recently sought to empower Member States further, to improve their effectiveness as enforcers 
of competition law.  See, Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 
2018 to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure 
the proper function of the internal market, OJ L11/3.   
741 Regulation 1/2003.   
742 The process of empowering the Member States to enforce competition law has had a significant impact upon 
enforcement of the EU competition rules, with enforcement ‘now taking place on a scale which the Commission 
could never have achieved on its own.  Since 2004, the Commission and the NCAs took over 1000 enforcement 
decisions, with the NCAs being responsible for 85%.’  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and od the Council to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be 
more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market,’ Brussels, 22nd March 
2017, COME (2017) 142 Final, p.2. 
743 This was alluded to in Regulation 1/2003, Recital (35) which states that the ‘Regulation recognises the wide 
variation which exists in the public enforcement systems of the Member States.’  However, it was in the recent 
Directive Proposal in which the European Commission acknowledged that there was ‘untapped potential for 
more effective enforcement of the EU competition rules’ and that ‘Regulation (EC) 1/2003 did not address the 
means and instruments by which the NCAs apply the EU competition rules and many do not have the means 
and instruments to effectively enforce Articles 101 and 101 TFEU.’ Ibid, p.2.  
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sanctions and procedures in the Member States that have evolved outside of that very 
harmonised core, but that nevertheless, remain inextricably linked to it, such as the UK’s 
criminal cartel offence.744  In practice therefore, despite competition law being a matter of 
exclusive competence for the EU, Member State national rules and Union law cohabit the 
competition law space together, the challenge is to find the most efficient way for them to co-
exist.   
 
This chapter turns to the law on market abuse as one such area that has managed to navigate 
many of the same challenges that cartel regulation has faced and continues to face.  Looking 
outside of competition law in an attempt to find ideas to solve the problems it currently faces 
is the practice of comparative law.  Comparative law is essentially ‘the attainment of 
knowledge of [a] legal system in order to enhance the understanding’745 of another.  The 
process of comparing two legal systems can provide an ‘untapped source for legal and 
conceptual solutions.’746  This can be particularly helpful when relatively new legislative 
functions are added to a regulatory landscape and there exists no internal reference mechanism 
for dealing with the challenges that arise as a result.  Looking beyond the confines of 
competition law to analyse how similar problems have been overcome in other legal fields can 
help to create a more comprehensive understanding of those challenges and possible solutions 
that can be deployed to overcome them.   
 
Opening up the conversation in an attempt to draw inspiration from beyond the narrow confines 
of a particular subject area or field of law, and potentially transferring successful aspects from 
one area of law to another, goes beyond comparison and becomes legal transplantation.  There 
is much debate as to the utility of legal transplantation for the purpose of law reform, 
particularly when occurring between different legal jurisdictions,747 but there is less 
controversy surrounding its use as an academic tool for the purpose of finding new techniques 
																																																						
744 Another example can be found in Ireland.  Article 34.1 of The Irish Constitution dictates that the Courts have 
sole and exclusive competence to administer justice.  In the context of competition law this means that in 
practice fines can be issued against individuals or undertakings only after the conclusion of a criminal 
prosecution, and only by the Courts.  Administrative bodies such as the national competition authority are not 
permitted to issue fines therefore, for breaches of the competition rules and are limited to be an investigatory 
role only.  In Germany however, cartels are an administrative offence with the exclusion of bid-rigging which is 
criminalised by virtue of section 298 of the German Criminal Code.   
745 Kai Schadbach, ‘The Benefits of Comparative Law: A Continental European View,’ [1998] 16 University of 
Boston International Law Journal 331.  
746 Ibid.  
747 See for example, Otto-Kahn-Freund, ‘On the Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law,’ (1974) 37 Modern 
Law Review 1; Alan Watson, ‘Legal Transplantation and Law Reforms (1976) 92 Legal Quarterly Review 79.   
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and ideas.748  This is particularly true when the legal areas that are the subject of comparison 
and transplantation exist within the same legal jurisdiction, largely because they occur within 
the same socio-economic and political landscape.  It is this form of legal transplantation with 
which this work concerns itself.  The examination of the laws on market abuse within the EU 
is not done with the aim of transplanting that regulation into the UK.  It is done with the hope 
of stimulating new legal ideas for the purpose of generating new conceptual solutions for the 
challenges that anti-cartel regulation faces as illuminated in the preceding chapters of this work.   
 
 
6.2 Market Abuse and Cartels 
 
Currently, the areas of competition law that exist within the harmonised core have seen relative 
success in achieving some of the policy objectives outlined in previous chapters.  For example, 
the existence of the leniency programme has had success in improving the detection rate of 
cartels, as well as improving the evidential quality of the investigations against the non-
immunised cartels.  However, when the theoretical foundations of enforcement such as 
deterrence,749 retribution, incapacitation and corrective justice are used to judge the harmonised 
administrative core together with the idiosyncratic outer elements (such as criminal sanctions 
and director disqualification orders) the system could arguably be considered to be inefficient 
at best, and dangerously incoherent at worst,750 and the inherent tensions within the regulatory 
dynamics begin to emerge more clearly.    
 
Competition law is not alone in dealing with complex and multi-layered enforcement.  In 
previous chapters of this work the example provided by the field of environmental law has 
provided some insights into how to effectively navigate complex regulatory dynamics in a 
																																																						
748 Kai Shadbach, (1998) supra n. 744.  
749 ‘Over three quarters of the European Commission leniency applications by first-in applicants took place not 
before but after a cartel collapses; Nearly 40 percent of the applications by first-in applicants post-dated cartel 
dissolution by at least a year.  More than half of the applications by first-in applicants arrived after the “dawn 
raids” by which time the [European Commission] was already aware of the cartels’ existence.’  Jun Zhou and 
Dennis L. Gärther, ‘Delays in Leniency Applications: Is there Really a Race to the Enforcer’s Door?’ TILEC 
Discussion Paper No. 2012-044, 10th December 2012.  Available at:    
750 As the discussions in Chapter 3 of this work have shown the argument that leniency programmes result in a 
‘race’ ‘to confess in order to beat their fellow conspirators to the enforcer’s door’ are arguably not supported by 
the empirical evidence.  Further, the deterrent value of the fines that are imposed in practice has been 
demonstrated to be severely limited making them a ‘mere tax’ at worst, or a somewhat effective retributive 
policy at best.  See, Scott, D. Hammond, US Department of Justice, 2004; and Jindrich Kloub, European 
Commission DG Competition, 2001, quoted in ‘Delays in Leniency Applications: Is there Really a Race to the 
Enforcer’s Door?’ ibid.   
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general sense.  The academic literature in the field of environmental law dealing with 
regulatory mix theory is far more developed than similar academic discussions that occur 
within the competition law literature at the time of writing, and so has been used in this work, 
as a guide for understanding the dynamics of anti-cartel regulation.  The process of reaching 
outside of the confines of competition law therefore, has enabled this work to start to develop 
the academic understanding of regulatory mix theory as it applies to anti-cartel enforcement.   
 
Nevertheless, the specific legislative solutions used in environmental law do not provide a 
useful comparator for competition law in general, or cartel prevention in particular, because 
the realities that they face in practice, and the context in which they occur, are far removed 
from those that anti-cartel regulation must address.  This chapter therefore, seeks to utilise a 
comparative style analysis to illuminate how the challenges of complex regulatory dynamics 
discussed in Chapter 4, can be better navigated.  To enable the identification of potential 
practical solutions to the highlighted problems, the comparator for that analysis must, as far as 
is possible, face similar (if not the same) challenges.   
 
There are many consistent features shared between market abuse and cartels, and there are 
even, some would argue, areas of significant overlap.  A recent example of such potential 
overlap can be seen in the manipulation of the London inter-bank offered rate (‘LIBOR’) which 
is the primary benchmark rate for short-term interest rates worldwide.751  LIBOR is often 
referred to as ‘the “world’s most important number” because it is used to set the interest rate 
for $360 trillion worth of financial products worldwide, such as mortgage rates and car 
loans.’752  Each day a panel of banks answers a series of questions which allow the panel to 
estimate what they would be charged if borrowing money from other banks.753  Those estimates 
would then be submitted to the British Bankers’ Association who would then calculate 
LIBOR.754 
 
																																																						
751 For more information see, ICE Benchmark Administration, ICE LIBOR, 
https://www.theice.com/iba/libor?utm_source=website&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=spotlight. Last 
accessed 14th February 2019.   
752 Jacob Hamburger, ‘Crowding the market: is there room for antitrust in the market manipulation cases? 
[2015] International Trade and Regulation 120.   
753 See, Sharon E. Foster, ‘LIBOR Manipulation and Antitrust Allegations,’ (2013) 11 DePaul Business & 
Commercial Law Journal 291.   
754 As a result of the LIBOR manipulation, the BBA no longer administers the rate.  See, BBA Press Release, 
‘BBA to Hand over Administration of LIBOR to Intercontinental Exchange Benchmark Administration Ltd,’ 
17th January 2014.   
 185	
	
Between approximately 2005 and 2010 ‘several panellist banks manipulated LIBOR by 
submitting artificial quotes to the BBA.’755  The internal manipulation occurred as a result of 
traders within the panellist banks convincing the LIBOR data submitters to move that bank’s 
estimate up or down.756  ‘External manipulation occurred when these requests were made on 
behalf of other traders at different banks.’757  In order to carry out the manipulation of LIBOR 
the traders involved in the conspiracy shared commercially sensitive material, ‘including 
confidential information about pricing, customer orders, and their net trading positions,’758 as 
and in so doing, colluded to circumvent ‘natural competition.’759  This enabled the banks to 
make huge profits at the expense of their own clients.760  Many of the practical steps taken to 
bring about the manipulation of LIBOR were the same, or very similar, to those which could 
be expected of a cartel, and therefore, the challenges that the respective authorities faced in 
detecting the illicit activities are themselves, very similar.  It is these similarities that make 
market abuse regulation a good comparator for anti-cartel regulation, which as previously 
discussed in Chapter 3 of this work, can be summarised as: 
 
1. the prohibited conduct is inherently secretive, often sophisticated, and very difficult 
to detect; 
2. civil sanctions are perceived as being insufficient to adequately deter potential 
offenders; 
3. there is a general societal ambivalence as to the moral wrongfulness of the conduce 
despite the very serious harm that it causes; 
4. the conduct is subject to some degree of EU harmonisation; and 
5. the regulatory toolkit of the competent authorities is not limited to criminal 
sanctions or administrative fines only, but includes alternative regulatory responses 
as well. 
 
Market abuse regulation wrestles with near identical problems.  The European Parliament 
recently took the step of implementing a Directive requiring that all EU Member States impose 
criminal sanctions for market abuse as a minimum standard as it was considered essential for 
																																																						
755 Jacob Hamburger, supra n. 751.  
756 Ibid.   
757 Ibid.   
758 Ibid.   
759 Ibid.   
760 See Taffet and Whitlock, ‘Antitrust and Financial Benchmark Litigation,’ December 2013, CPI Antitrust 
Chronicle.   
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a successful regulatory response to market manipulation.761  This was despite the fact that 
administrative sanctions were already in place by virtue of the first Market Abuse Directive.762  
This chapter therefore, will look to how the EU managed to create of a regulatory framework 
that successfully provided for both administrative and criminal sanctions in the hope of 
identifying potential conceptual solutions that could aid in the improvement of the anti-cartel 
regulatory space in the UK, and thereby improve the impact of the criminal cartel offence upon 
the fight against cartels.    
 
 
 6.3.  The Law on Market Abuse in the UK and EU 
 
 
  6.3.1.  Introduction: What is Market Abuse? 
 
Market abuse is a generic term used to describe ‘improper market behaviour.’763  The term 
covers both insider dealing and market manipulation.  This improper market behaviour 
amounts to very serious practices that are considered to be amongst the primary causes of some 
of the colossal financial catastrophes to have occurred throughout history.764  Indeed some 
would argue that ‘no behaviour is a more potent enemy of market efficiency and [a] bigger 
destroyer of investor confidence than market abuse.’765  Both market manipulation and insider 
dealing are regarded as very harmful forms of economic behaviour.766  Market manipulation is 
achieved by creating false information to artificially alter prices.767  One example of such 
manipulation occurs when false information about the performance of the company is used to 
create a ‘misleading impression of its economic value, and therefore, a false market in the 
shares.’768 Another form of manipulation occurs when attempts are made to ‘create a 
																																																						
761 With the exception of the UK and Denmark.  Under the Lisbon Treaty certain EU countries are given the 
choice  
762 Directive 2003/6/ED of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing 
and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ L 096, 12/04/2003. 
763 Edward J. Swan and Jon Virgo, ‘Market abuse regulation,’ 2nd Edn (Oxford University Press: 2010) p.1.   
764 Emilios E. Avgouleas, ‘The mechanics and regulation of market abuse: a legal and economic analysis,’ 
(Oxford University Press Catalogue, 2005) p.3.   
765 Ibid.   
766 This view is not, however, universal.  Prominent scholar, Henry Manne articulated his belief that insider 
dealing is, in fact, ‘desirable’, in his book, ‘Insider Trading and the Stock Market’ (The Free Press, New York: 
1966).   
767 Edward J. Swan and Jon Virgo, supra n.762.   
768 Paul Barnes, ‘Insider dealing and market abuse: The UK’s record on enforcement,’ International Journal of 
Law, Crime and Justice 39(3) (2011) 174.   
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misleading impression of the market in the shares by simply repeatedly buying and selling 
them in order to raise the reports volume of trade in the shares.’769   The ultimate effect of 
actions such as these is to ‘distort and undermine the market, thereby damaging the interests of 
its ordinary participants.’770   
 
Insider dealing involves the taking advantage of ‘asymmetric information’771 that puts the 
holder of that information in a privileged position in comparison to the public.772   It occurs 
when trading in shares or securities is done by, or instigated by someone with knowledge of 
unpublished business data or information that would affect the price of the shares being bought 
or sold. Or more simply, insider dealing occurs when a person trades in ‘financial instruments 
when in possession of price-sensitive inside information in relation to those instruments.’773 
 
The examples of serious market abuses are plentiful, perhaps one of the most well-known 
resulting in the collapse of Enron, a Texas-based energy firm.  In just 15 years, Enron has 
managed to grow to be America’s seventh largest company.  It employed over 21,000 staff and 
operated in more than 40 countries.774  However, it was a complex web of various forms of 
market manipulation and frauds that has created the firm’s success by keeping the company’s 
debts and losses out of its accounts.775  In 2002, as the depths of Enron’s deceptions finally 
became apparent, the firm went into bankruptcy in what was, at the time, ‘the world’s biggest 
ever corporate failure.’776  The resulting investigation led to 3 people being sentenced to terms 
																																																						
769 Ibid.   
770 Ibid.   
771 Peter-Jan Engelen, ‘Structural Problems in the Design of the Market Abuse Regulations in the EU’ (2007) 19 
The Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 57. 
772 Edward J. Swan and Jon Virgo, supra n.762.   
773 European Commission Press Release, ‘European Parliament’s endorsement of the political agreement on 
Market Abuse Regulation,’ 10th September 2013, Brussels.  Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_MEMO-13-774_en.htm.  Last accessed 21st February 2019.   
774 BBC News, ‘Enron scandal at a glance,; 22 August 2002, Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hu/business/1780075.stm.  Last accessed 15th May 2018.   
775 One of the ways in which the company manipulated its share value was to use ‘mark-to-marketing 
accounting’ which artificially inflated the appearance of the company’s profits.  It would build an asset, for 
example, a power plant, and then immediately claim the projected profits, even though no actual profits had 
been made yet.  If the revenue from the asset did not match the projected amount, instead of taking the loss, 
Enron would transfer the asset to an off-the-books corporation where the loss would go unreported.  For more 
details and discussion see, ‘Enron Scandal: The Fall of a Wall Street Darling,’ Investopedia, 2nd December 
2006.  Available at: http://www.investopedia.com/updates/enron-scandal-summary/.  Last accessed 15th May 
2018.     
776 The Economist, ‘The fall-out from Enron,’ 24th January 2002.  Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/954494.  Last accessed 18th May 2018.  It is estimated that shareholders 
ultimately lost $74 billion in the four years leading up to the bankruptcy and its employees lost billions in 
pension benefits.  Since Enron there have been a number of corporate bankruptcies that have surpassed Enron as 
the largest corporate bankruptcies including Washington Mutual and the Lehman Brothers, which in turn 
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of imprisonment.  In Europe, the collapse of Parmalat was considered to be ‘Europe’s 
Enron’.777  Parmalat was an Italian retailer of dairy and food, specialising in long-life milk.  In 
the months prior to the collapse of the company they had reported global revenues of €7.5 
billion.778  However, a complex array of ‘borrowings, false accounting, and misleading reports’ 
in a fraud involving transactions all over the world that concealed, from both investors and 
regulators, a debt of roughly €14 billion.779  Parmalat collapsed ‘virtually overnight.’780   
 
Market abuse is a pervasive problem that is incredibly challenging to detect and prevent.  Much 
like cartels the extent of market abuse is difficult to determine although some attempts have 
been made.781  What is clear however, is that in both cases of market abuse and cartels, well 
educated citizens with an otherwise strong normative commitment to obeying the law, are 
engaging in seriously harmful economic conduct in a manner that the authorities find difficult 
to detect.   
 
 
6.3.2.  The Evolution of Market Abuse Regulation in the UK: a brief history 
 
A series of financial scandals in the 1970s and early 1980s showed that the traditional self-
regulation of financial services that had been prevalent suffered from ‘serious systemic 
weakness’782 and left the UK financial markets exposed to abuse.  Attempts had been made in 
1977 and 1978 to implement laws in the UK that would deal with insider dealing, but it was 
not until 1980 that the first legislation to make insider dealing a criminal offence was 
																																																						
resulted in the Royal Bank of Scotland finding itself insolvent and having to rely upon the UK government to 
acquire 58% of the shares to avoid its otherwise unavoidable collapse.  For discussion see, Gordon Rayner, 
‘Banking Bailout: the rise and fall of RBS,’ The Telegraph, 20th January 2009.  Available at: 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/4291807/Banking-bailout-The-rise-and-
fall-of-RBS.html.  Last accessed 21st February 2019.   
777 ‘Suing over spilt milk: the Parmalat scandal’ 24th June 2011, World Finance.  Available at: 
https://www.worldfinance.com/markets/the-parmalat-scandal.  Last accessed 17th November 2018.     
778 Vincent Boland, ‘The saga of Parmalat’s collapse’ 19th December 2008.  Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/c275dc7c-cd3a-11dd-9905-000077b07658.  Last accessed 17th November 2018.   
779 Ibid. 
780 Ibid.  
781 Some estimates have the suspected level of market abuse to be as high as 90% of looked at cases.  The 
estimates are discussed in more detail in the following section of this chapter.  See also, Paul Barnes, ‘Stock 
Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse,’ (Gower, 2009), p.186; Ben Dubow and Nuno B. 
Monteiro, ‘Measuring Market Cleanliness’ (2006).  Available at: SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1019999.  
Last accessed 17th November 2018.   
782 Emilios E Avgouleas (2005) supra n. 763, p.308.  
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enacted,783 in the form of the Companies Act 1980.  This was then later amended by the 
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985.  However, an over-dependence on the 
criminal sanctions and otherwise ‘inadequate enforcement because of regulatory 
fragmentation’784 meant that the regime was still considered to be ‘very ineffective.’785  This 
perception was reinforced by the lack of any successful prosecutions brought under the Act.786    
 
The criminal sanction for insider dealing shared the regulatory space in the UK with a variety 
of regulatory responses available to the competent authorities.  These included ‘supervisory 
and disciplinary powers enforceable against regulated firms and registered individuals 
employed by former self-regulatory organisations (later similar powers were granted to the 
Financial Services Authority in respect of authorized firms and persons approved to work 
within them’787).   
 
Nevertheless, it was not until the European Union took steps to create some degree of 
harmonisation of insider trading laws that the UK’s ‘first major, and effective laws’ to 
prosecute insider dealing, in the form of Part V788 of the Criminal Justice Act 1993, occurred.  
The EU’s ‘Directive coordinating regulations on insider dealing,’ referred to as the ‘Insider 
Dealing Directive’789 was spurred on by the impending creation of the single integrated market 
by the end of 1992 by way of the Single European Act.790 
 
																																																						
783 Section 68 and 69 of the Companies Act 1980 made it an offence for a person with inside information (‘non-
public information which affects the price of securities) to deal in those securities or otherwise to encourage 
someone else to.  It was also made it an offence to disclose inside information other than in the proper 
performance of employment, office or profession.  
784 Emilios E Avgouleas (2005) supra n. 763, p.308 
785 Karen Harrison and Nicholas Ryder, ‘The Law Relating to Financial Crime in the UK’ (Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd: 2013) p.99. 
786 Ibid.  
787 Emilios E Avgouleas (2005) supra n. 763, p. 2.  
788  A person commits insider dealing if he uses price sensitive information to: 
(2)(a) encourage another person to deal in securities that are (whether or not that other knows it) price-affected 
securities in relation to the information, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the dealing would 
take place in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (3); or, (b)  he discloses the information, otherwise than 
in the proper performance of the functions of his employment, office or profession, to another person. 
(3)  The circumstances referred to above are that the acquisition or disposal in question occurs on a regulated 
market, or that the person dealing relies on a professional intermediary or is himself acting as a professional 
intermediary. 
789 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing, OJ L 334 
of 18 November 1989, pp.30-32.   
790 Emilios E Avgouleas (2005) supra n. 763. 
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The measures however, failed to shake off the perception of being sub-optimal, and were 
regarded as ‘ineffective [in some respects] and in others incomplete.’791 This was as a result of 
a series of high-profile trials failing to obtain convictions which in turn ‘exposed weaknesses 
in the insider trading laws and attempts to criminalise improper market behaviour.’792  Melanie 
Johnson MP, who was economic secretary to the Treasury at the time commented that financial 
markets are protected in two ways,  
 
 ‘First, there are criminal regimes for market manipulation and insider dealing.   
 These are both serious criminal offences…Secondly, there is the regulatory regime 
 under which various regulatory bodies can take action against regulated persons for 
 market abuse.  However, there is a gap in the protections.’793   
 
The Financial Services and Market Act 2000 (the ‘FSMA 2000’) added a civil offence to the 
enforcement mix to fill that gap, and thus complement the existing regulatory responses and 
criminal sanctions mentioned above.  
 
The impact of the introduction of legislation upon instances of market abuse is difficult to 
empirically determine.  This is exacerbated by the fact that, as is the case with cartels, it is 
almost impossible to empirically prove with absolute certainty, the true extent of the problem.  
Despite that being the case, attempts have been made to provide reliable estimates as to the 
true scale of market abuses in the UK.  During the period between 2000 and 2005, Dunbow 
and Monteiro ‘looked at market cleanliness by assessing the rise and fall of share prices two 
days before information was released to the public.  Significant changes … were seen as 
evidence of some level of insider dealing.’  During the timeframe they considered ‘they found 
between 25 and 33 per cent of all merger bids involves statistically significant price changes 
in a two day window prior to the information being publicly known.’794 
 
																																																						
791 Emilios E Avgouleas (2005) supra n. 763, p.2.  
792 Ibid.  “Noteably the failure to sustain convictions against directors and financial advisors for improper 
conduct in connection with a rights issues in the Blue Arrow case (R v Cohen [1992] 142 NJL 1267); see further, 
the failure to make criminal allegations tick against Ernest Saunders in relation to suspected wrongdoing in 
respect of Guiness plc’s take-over of Distillers plc (Saunders v UK [1996] 23 EHRR 313).    
793 Melanie Johnson MP, Standing Committee 1, 2 Nov 1999, HNISO, quoted in Emilios E Avgouleas (2005) 
supra n. 763, p.3.  
794 Harris and Ryder (2013) supra n. 784, p.97 referring to the work of B. Dubow and N. Moteiro, ‘Measuring 
Market Cleanliness,’ (2006) FSA Occasional Paper, March 2006, London: Financial Services Authority.   
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Others have estimated that when the period under review is two months prior to the 
announcement of information, the evidence indicates that statistically significant changes 
indicating some level of insider dealing are evident in more than 90 per cent of cases.795  Barnes 
goes on to say that when this is matched with the number of prosecutions, ‘there is only a one 
in 500 chance of being caught.’796  Sir Howard Davies alluded to the poor enforcement record 
in respect of financial market crimes in an annual lecture at the Securities Institute Ethics 
Committee: 
 
 ‘I think we have to recognise, sadly, that the City’s image is not all it might be.   
 There have been too many ‘accidents’ for that to be so … There have been some 
 prosecutions, certainly … But the record in heavily contested serious fraud trials  
 has, frankly, not been good.  And remarkably few prosecutions have been brought 
 for insider trading.  There is a common perception, which is hard to dismiss, that  
 City crime is simply not punished on the same basis as other forms of theft.’797 
 
Despite that being the case, the introduction of the FSMA 2000 into the legislative landscape 
represented a major evolution in market abuse law in the UK.  It created a new regulator, the 
Financial Services Authority (the ‘FSA’) and ‘changed the legal form and ambit of the UK’s 
market abuse regime radically.’798  It provided for a new market abuse offence and sought to 
address the perceived over-reliance on criminal sanctions by dealing with abusive market 
practices by way of regulatory sanctions.  The FSA had 4 options for dealing with market abuse 
as a result of the FSMA;  
 
1.  initiate criminal proceedings 
2. exercise powers contained in section 123 and impose a penalty, make a public 
statement or take disciplinary action 
3. take another action, for example, the issuing of a restriction order requiring 
offenders to ‘disgorge ill-gotten gains’ to those injured by their conduct, by virtue 
of section 384, or 
4. apply to the court for an injunction.   
																																																						
795 P. Barnes, ‘Stock Market Efficiency, Insider Dealing and Market Abuse’, Gower, 2009. 
796 Ibid, at 186, referred to in ‘The Law Relating to Financial Crime in the UK’, p.98 
797 Sir Howard Davies, then Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, ‘Are Words Still Bond: How Straight 
is the City?’, Securities Institute Ethics Committee: 3rd Annual Lecture, 2 Nov 1998.  
798 Emilios E Avgouleas (2005) supra n. 763, p.310.  
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In 2007 the global financial crisis started as a result of the undercapitalisation of the Western 
banking system, and triggered by the subprime mortgages of the United States.  Some regarded 
it as a turning point in terms of how financial crimes would be dealt with.799  Further reform 
followed in 2012, the impetus for which came as a result of a number of high profile cases800 
as well as the LIBOR manipulation scandal.801 
 
 
6.3.3.  The Evolution of Market Abuse Regulation in the EU: a brief history 
 
 
One of the foundational aspirations of the EU has always been the establishment of ‘one 
territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the free movement of 
goods and services.’802  The free movement of capital ‘underpins the single market and 
complements the other three freedoms.’803  Prior to the Single Market, the Treaty of Rome 
required that restrictions be removed ‘only to the extent necessary for the functioning of the 
common market.’804  Incrementally, further small steps were taken over time until the launch 
																																																						
799 Sarah Wilson, ‘The new Market Abuse Regulation and Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse: 
European capital markets law and new global trends in financial crime enforcement’ ERA Forum (2015) 16 
427-466.   
800 Mathuas Siems and Natthijs Nelemans, ‘The Reform of the EU Market Abuse Law: Revolution or 
Evolution?’ (2012) 19 The Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 195-205.  See Spectator 
Photo Group NV where a company purchased its own shares and subsequently published new and positive 
results concerning its commercial policy; and IMC Securities, where it was held that trade-based market 
manipulation does not require that the price of the securities by kept at an abnormal or artificial level for a 
certain duration.   
801 LIBOR is the London inter-bank lending rate.  ‘It is considered to be one of the most important interest rates 
in finance, upon which trillions of financial contracts rest.’  It is used to help determine the price of transactions 
but is also used as a ‘measure of trust in the financial system and reflects the confidence banks have in each 
other’s financial health…Every day a group of leading banks submits the interest rates at which they are willing 
to lend to other financial houses…Then an average is calculated’ and that is how LIBOR is set.  The LIBOR 
scandal revealed that a number of banks had been submitting false figures and that ‘traders at several banks 
conspired to influence the final average rate that results, the official LIBOR rate, by agreeing amongst 
themselves to submit rats that were wither higher or lower than their actual estimates.’  Business, ‘Libor: What 
is it and why does it matter?’, BBC NEWS, 3 August 2015.  Available at:http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
19199683.  Last accessed 18th May 2018.       
802 European Commission, ‘The European Single Market.’  Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-
market_en.  Last accessed 15th April 2019.     
803 Dražen Rakić, ‘Free movement of capital,’ in Fact Sheets on the European Union, The European Parliament, 
October 2018.  Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/39/free-movement-of-capital.  
Last accessed 14th February 2019.   
804 Ibid.   
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of the Single Market, at which time the liberalisation of capital markets really began.  This led 
to the introduction of the free movement of capital as a defined Treaty freedom.805 
 
A common legal and regulatory framework is required for the good functioning of the internal 
market, and a properly functioning financial market is considered to be essential for economic 
growth.  Financial integration within the EU has as its objective no ‘friction discriminating 
between economic players with regard to accessing or investing capital, particularly as a result 
of their geographic origin.’806  The increased ease with which financial services could be 
obtained across borders within the internal market however, led to not only an increased risk 
of abuse, but also an increased cost of compliance for businesses, and an increased possibility 
of rule conflict.807   
 
In July 2000 the European Union Council of Finance Ministers (‘EconFin’) set up the 
Commission of the Three Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (‘The 
Wise Men’) to produce a report that would identify failures and develop recommendations for 
a new regulatory process for the single financial market.808  The Wise Men, chaired by 
Alexander Lamfalussy, released their Final Report in February 2001 in which they articulated 
a new ‘four-level procedure for the adoption, implementation, transposition and monitoring of 
legislation’809 affecting the securities markets, ‘the Lamfalussy Process.’810  A major objective 
of the new process was to enable a more rapid response to developments within the financial 
sector.   
 
Level 1 refers to framework legislation which articulates the core principles essential to each 
proposal.811  Level 1 legislation therefore takes the form of directive or regulation.  Level 2 the 
technical implementation measures are adopted through a procedure called the ‘comitology 
																																																						
805 Article 26(2) TFEU.   
806 Elisabetta Gualandri and Alesasandro Giovanni Grasso, ‘Towards a New Approach to Regulation and 
Supervision in the EU: Post-FSAP and Comitology’ (2006) MRPA Paper No. 1780.  p.4.  Available at: 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1780/1/MPRA_paper_1780.p.  Last accessed 14th February 2018.   
807 Emilios E Avgouleas (2005) supra n. 763, p.251.   
808 Alma Pekmezovic, Gordon Walker and Mark Fox, ‘Reorganisation of market segments and transparency 
standards at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange: Part 1’ (2010) Journal of International Banking Law and Regulation 
214.   
809 European Commission, ‘Lamfalussy Report’ (2009), 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/lamfalussy/index_en.htm. Last accessed February 24th 2018. 
810 It was called the Lamfalussy Process after the committee chairman, Alexander Lamfalussy.   
811 The Committee of Wise Men, ‘Final Report of the Committee’ p.22.  Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf.  Last 
accessed 3rd May 2018. 
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procedure’812 and involves ‘fleshing out the bones’ of the framework legislation.813  The EU 
Securities Committee (the ‘ESC’) together with the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (the ‘CESR’) to develop these  implementing measures.814  Level 3 requires EU 
regulators to draw up common guidelines, recommendations and standards in order to ensure 
consistent and equivalent transposition of Level 1 and 2 legislation at Member State level.815  
Finally, Level 4 requires that the Commission monitor compliance with EU legislation and 
take action when required in order to strengthen enforcement consistency across the Union.816   
 
As mentioned in the preceding section, the global financial crisis of 2008,817 which ultimately 
led to a sovereign debt crisis,818 was a significant event in terms of financial regulation in 
Europe.819  The devastating effect of the crisis ushered the EU into a new phase of financial 
regulation,820 in which the Lamfalussy Process played a staring role. It was not only used in the 
drafting of the new Market Abuse Regulation and the Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse 
																																																						
812 Ibid, p.24.    
813 Ibid, p.28.   
814 Both the ESC and the CESR are made up of representatives of the Member States, see p.30 of the Final 
Report.   
815 The Committee of Wise Men, ‘Final Report of the Committee’ supra n. 810, p.37. 
816 Ibid, p.40. 
817 ‘On 15th September 2008 Lehman Brothers, the giant US investment bank, went bust.  That was the moment 
when global financial stress turned into a full-blown international emergercy.’  It was called, by the Chair of the 
Federal Reserve (the central bank of the USA), ‘the worst financial crisis in global history.’  Ben Chu, 
‘Financial crisis 2008: How Lehman Brothers helped cause ‘the worst financial crisis in history,’ 12th September 
2018, Independent.  Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/financial-
crisis-2008-why-lehman-brothers-what-happened-10-years-anniversary-a8531581.html.  Last accessed 14th 
February 2019.   
818 ‘Bankers in the US had developed a lucrative business of buying up the US mortgages of poor Americans 
(known as “subprime”), packaging them together with better quality mortgages and selling them on as 
essentially risk-free assets known as mortgage-backed securities.  When the US central bank raised the interest 
rates in 2006 many American homeowners started to default, house prices fell and these securities were revealed 
to be, in fact, very risky indeed and it was clear that there were considerable losses in the system.’  The 
subprime mortgages revealed that banks had run down their capital reserves to a dangerously low level, and that 
the ‘entire Western banking system was catastrophically undercapitalised and illiquid…In 2010 Andy Haldane, 
the chief economist of the Bank of England, estimated that the total cost of the crash in foregone economic 
growth was between $60 trillion and $200 trillion, or between one and five times the planet’s GDP.’  Ben Chu, 
‘Lehman Brothers helped cause ‘the worst financial crisis in history,’ 12th September 2018, The Independent.  
Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/financial-crisis-2008-why-
lehman-brothers-what-happened-10-years-anniversary-a8531581.html.     
819 For discussion see, Blanaid Clarke, ‘Banking Regulation,’ in William K. Roche, Philip J O’Connell and 
Andrea Prothero (eds) Austerity and Recovery in Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2017) Ch.6.   
820 Caroline Bergin-Cross and Finbarr Murphy, ‘Financial Services Law in Ireland: Authorisation, Supervision, 
Compliance and Enforcement’ (Round Hall Ltd: 2017).   
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Directive, it was also used to draft the MiFIDII821 and the MiFIR.822  It was felt that these new 
measures would help to further ensure the integrity of the financial services within the internal 
market, deepen the harmonisation of regulation, and restore consumer confidence.  
Interestingly they were ‘developed … alongside other national and internationally co-ordinated 
initiatives…such as the Effective Markets Review.’823 This was in recognition of the breadth 
and depth of the factors that conspired to enable the crisis. The degree of interconnectivity of 
regulations within the legislative framework adopted to tackle financial crime, both in the EU 
and domestically is therefore high and complex.  This will be considered in more detail in the 
following section.     
 
 
 6.4.  Criminal Sanctions on Market Abuse 
 
 
  6.4.1.  EU Competence over Criminal Matters 
 
Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the field of environmental law played a vital 
role in developing and defining the EU’s competence over criminal matters.  Many had held 
the position that the EU lacked any competence over criminal matters but in the environmental 
crimes case824 it was recognised that ‘criminal law could fall with the EU sphere of competence 
if it was necessary for the full effectiveness of EU law.’825  It was a necessary step in terms of 
the success of the EU when tackling environmental crimes because ‘while the EU [was] 
increasingly defining the scope and parameters of regulatory goals, their implementation and 
enforcement primarily remain in the hands of the Member States.’826  The Court states that the 
																																																						
821 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU.  Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0065&from=EN.  Last accessed: 6th May 2018. 
822 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments, OJL 173 12.6.2015, p. 84-184.  Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.173.01.0084.01.ENG.  Last accessed: 6th May 2018. 
823 Martin Sandler, Matthew Baker, Andrew Tuson and Sara Evans, ‘The EU Market Abuse Regulation’ 2016 
135 Compliance Office Bulletin 1-29.   
824 Case C-176/03 Commission v Council [2005] ECR- 2005 I-07879.   
825 Ester Herlin-Karnell, ‘Effectiveness and Constitutional Limits in European Criminal Law’ (2014) 5(3) New 
Journal of European Criminal Law 267-273.   
826 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele, ‘Enforcing the market abuse regime: towards an integrated model of 
criminal and administrative law enforcement in the European Union?’ (2014) 5(2) New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 192-220.   
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general rule that criminal law or criminal procedure do not fall within the Communities 
competence,827 
 
‘does not prevent the Community legislature, when the application of effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the competent national authorities is 
an essential measure for combating serious environmental offences, from taking 
measure to relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it considers necessary 
in order to ensure that the rules which it lays down on environmental protection are 
fully effective.’828   
 
So ‘despite the fact that law enforcement powers are considered to belong to the care of the 
nation-state (and EU law is therefore usually enforced by national authorities), those authorities 
and their powers are an essential part of the European legal order,’829 and so doctrines and now 
legislation, have developed over time to ensure a level of practical input over the attainment of 
its objectives.  A clear example of this can be seen in respect of the Duty of Loyal Cooperation, 
which some argue is where the ‘principal of effectiveness is often held to stem from,’830 
contained in Article 4(3) TEU as discussed in Chapter 5 of this work.    
 
Some have argued that ‘the fight against financial crime was a legitimate objective for the 
European Union even before’831 Article 83 TFEU.  In Article 67(1-3) Treaty on the Area of 
Freedom and Justice (AFSJ) it states that ‘the Union shall endeavor to ensure a high level of 
security through measures to prevent and combat crime.’  Further, the ‘aims of the internal 
market and the AFSJ are also combined in Article 3 TEU which sets out the main goals of the 
Union.  The link in the Treaties between regulation and enforcement is thus ensured.’832 
 
																																																						
827 Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595, at para. 27; Case C226/97 Lemmens [1998] ECR I-3711, at para. 19.   
828 Case C-176/03, supra n.164, at para. 48.   
829 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele, ‘Enforcing the Market Abuse Regime: Towards an Integrated Model 
of Criminal and Administrative Law Enforcement in the European Union?’ (2014) 5(2) New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 192.   
830 Ester Herlin-Karnell, supra n. 824.  
831 Ibid.  See also, A. Sherloch and C. Harding, ‘Controlling Fraud within the EC,’ (1991) 16 European Law 
Review 21; John Vervaele, ‘Fraud against the Community’ (Kluwer Law International, 1992).  
832 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaelel (2014) supra n.828.  
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The pre-Lisbon Treaty competence of the EU in matters of criminal law was however, ‘ill 
defined…[and] fuelled a debate concerning the exact limits of competence.’833  The 
‘innovation of the Lisbon Treaty … does not consist in inventing a hierarchy of norms in 
European Law, but in the attempt to make it more visible through the formal distinction 
between legislative and non-legislative acts.’834  The Lisbon Treaty therefore, more clearly 
separates EU framework laws contained in the Treaties and implementing laws such as 
directives and regulations, from non-legislative acts such as decisions and opinions.  In so 
doing, it provides a structural clarity that was previously missing.   
 
Article 83(1) TFEU, a framework law, articulates the competence of EU in regard to the 
regulation of substantive criminal law and states that: 
 
 ‘The European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in 
 accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules  
 concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of  
 particularly serious crime with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature or 
 impact of such offences or from a special need to combat them on a common  
 basis.’835 
 
It goes on to then identify specific areas of law to which Article 83(1) TFEU is intended to 
apply.836 Article 83(2) TFEU then creates a much broader competence which is applicable 
when, 
 
																																																						
833 Ester Herlin-Karnell, ‘Effectiveness and Constitutional Limits in European Criminal Law’ (2014) 5(3) New 
Journal of European Criminal Law 267.  For further reading on the nature of that debate, see for example, V. 
Mitsilegas, ‘The Transformation of Criminal Law in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (2007) 26 
Yearbook of European Law; S. Peers, ‘EU Criminal Law and the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2008) 33 European Law 
Review 507.   
834 Alexander Türk, ‘Lawmaking after Lisbon’ in Andrea Biondi, Piet Eeckhout and Stefanie Ripley (eds) EU 
Law After Lisbon (Oxford University Press: 2012) p.66.  
835 Article 83(1) TFEU, Official Journal 115 , 09/05/2008 P. 0080 - 0081.  Available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12008E083. Last accessed 18th March 2018.     
836 They are terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug 
trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer 
crime and organised crime. Article 83(1) TFEU.  
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 ‘the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the Member States proves  
 essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area which 
 has been subject to harmonisation measures.’837 
 
It then states that when such a need arises ‘directives may establish minimum rules with regard 
to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned.’838  Put simply 
Article 83 TFEU enables the EU to establish minimum standards for the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions in respect of serious crimes with a cross-border dimension when it is 
essential for the effective implementation of EU policy in areas that are subject to 
harmonisation.  This therefore excludes areas that remain within the exclusive competence of 
the Member States, but includes within its scope, areas of exclusive EU competence and areas 
of competence that is shared between the EU and its Member States.   
 
One of the crucial elements in determining when the EU can assume competence in criminal 
matters therefore, is the principle of effectiveness.  The principle of effectiveness, as shown in 
the discussion in Chapter 5 of this work, is often regarded as the being derived from the more 
general duty of loyal cooperation contained in Article 4(3) TEU ‘and has played a crucial 
role839 in shaping the contours of the effectiveness of EU law.’840  This is a position with which 
Herlin-Karnell agrees, stating that,  
 
‘The principle of effectiveness has had a remarkable career in EU law…from the EU 
foundational cases [like] Francovich841 [which] told us that state liability was inherent 
in the Treaty so as to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law…[to] more recent cases 
such as Mangold842 and Kükükdeveci843 rulings [which] demonstrate that the force 
behind the doctrine of effectiveness is far from turned out and is still very much a living 
EU law concept.’844 
																																																						
837 Article 83(2) TFEU. 
838 Ibid.  
839 ‘For example it has given birth to the doctrine of indirect effect, state liability and also supremacy is 
embedded in “effectiveness” thinking.’ Temple Lang (below…swap citations round).  
840 Temple Lang, ‘The Developments of the Court of Justice on the Duties of Cooperation of National 
Authorities and Community Institutions under Article 10 EC’, 31 Fordham International Law Journal (2008) 
1483.   
841 Joined Cases C-6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357. 
842 Case C-144/04 Marigold v Helm [2005] ECR I-9981 
843 Case C-555/07 Kükükdeveci [2010] ECR I-5769 
844 Ester Herlin-Karnell (2014) supra n. 832. 
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It is clear therefore, that the principle of effectiveness continues to be ‘one of the main drivers 
of EU integration.’845  In the context of market abuse therefore, in order for Article 83(2) TFEU 
to be the appropriate legal basis for the requirement of a criminal sanction at the EU level, it 
must be the case that the criminal sanction is essential for the effective implementation of a EU 
policy where harmonisation measures have already been adopted.846  The EU policy is question 
is the integrity of the proper functioning of the internal market through the protection of the 
integrity of the financial market in this specific context.  Harmonisation measures already 
existed for this policy objective, and in particular market abuse, in the form of the 2003 Market 
Abuse Directive.847  Therefore, the two fundamental limbs of the Article 83(2) TFEU test was 
clearly satisfied.  It must then be the case that criminal sanctions are essential for the effective 
implementation of the EU policy of ensuring market integrity which in turn helps to protect the 
internal market of the EU.  In order to address that limb of Article 83(2) TFEU it is important 
to understand that some would argue that,  
 
‘financial crimes together with organised crime have since the early days of the 
European Union constituted the main criminal law threat to the establishment of the 
internal market and have, until 9/11 when the fight against terrorism became a higher 
priority, formed the core of the European Union’s approach to criminal law.’848 
 
The extent and scale of the global economic crisis ‘highlighted weaknesses in the EU’s 
supervisory framework, which fragmented along national lines despite…financial market 
integration.’849  It led to concerns as to whether MAD was effective and the ‘High-Level Group 
on Financial Supervision was set up to strengthen supervisory arrangements covering all 
financial sectors, with the objective of establishing a more efficient, integrated and sustainable 
European system of supervision.’850 The Group ultimately argued that a ‘sound prudential and 
																																																						
845 Ibid.  
846 Ester Herlin-Karnell, ‘White-Collar Crime and European Financial Crises: Getting tough on EU market 
abuse,’ (2012) 37 European Law Review 481.   
847 Directive 2003/06 on insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) [2003] OJ L96/16.   
848 Ester, ibid.  See also, S. Peers, ‘EU Justice and Home Affairs’ (Oxford University Press: 2011) Ch. 1.   
849 European Commission, ‘High Level Expert Group on EU financial supervision to hold first meeting on 12 
November, Press Release Database, 11th November 2008, IP/08/1679.  Available at: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-08-1679_en.htm.  Last accessed 14th February 2019.     
850 Ester Herlin-Karnell (2012) supra n.845. 
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conduct of business framework for the financial sector must rest on strong supervisory and 
sanctioning regimes.’851   
 
This ultimately led to the conclusion that MAD along with the ‘weak and heterogeneous’852 
sanctioning regimes of the Member States were not enough to protect the integrity of the 
financial market and thereby, the internal market itself.  This in turn then to the creation of the 
new Market Abuse Regulation (MAR)853 and the Criminal Sanctions on Market Abuse 
Directive (CSMAD)854 which update the market abuse regime in the EU.  They were developed 
‘in line with other post-financial crises measures to regulate markets … to tackle misconduct 
and restore market confidence.’855  MAR entered into force on the 2nd July 2014 although most 
of its provisions did not become law until the 3rd July 2016.  As an EU regulation, MAR is 
directly effective in the Member States, unlike CSMAD which also became law on the 3rd July 
2016.  As a directive, CSMAD requires that Member States enact domestic legislation within 
their own jurisdictions to give effect to the goal articulated in the directive856 but only for the 
Member States that had opted in to its provisions which came into force in January of 2018.  
 
The Regulation updated the law on market manipulation in order to tackle the advancements 
and changes that had occurred in the trading of securities since the original MAD, and also to 
cover certain activities that had previously been outside of the scope of the market abuse 
regime.  The CSMAD obligated those Member States who had opted in, to criminalise 
intentional market abuse offences.  The precise nature of the criminal sanctions that were to be 
created was left to each of the Member States so long as they are ‘effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.’857 
 
																																																						
851 The High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, a Report prepared for the European Commission, 
25th February 2009, at para. 83.  Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication14527_en.pdf.  Last accessed 14th February 
2019.    
852 Ester Herlin-Karnell (2012) supra n. 845. 
853 Regulation (EU) No 596/214 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market 
abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC. 
854 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on criminal sanctions 
for market abuse (market abuse directive). 
855 Martin Sandler, Matthew Baker, Andrew Tuson and Sara Evans, ‘The EU Market Abuse Regulation’, 
Compliance Officer Bulletin, 2016, 135 (Apr), 1-29.   
856 Europa, ‘Regulations, directives and other acts.’  Available at: https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-
law/legal-acts_en.  Last accessed 14th February 2019.     
857 CSMAD, Article 6.  
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The reason that the changes to the market abuse regime were done by way of a regulation and 
a directive is that Article 83(2) TFEU only permits the approximation of criminal laws to be 
done by way of a directive.  Directives require Member States to pass legislation in order to 
implement them.  Imposing an obligation to create criminal sanctions by way of directive 
therefore, permits the Member States to create and implement criminal sanctions that satisfy 
their obligations to the EU whilst at the same time accounting for their domestic legislative and 
constitutional arrangements.   
 
 
  6.4.2.  The Market Abuse Regulatory Space 
 
 
The new market abuse Regulation and Directive adopted by the EU were not created in a 
vacuum.  Much in the same way that anti-cartel enforcement operates within the wider 
regulatory landscape of competition, and thus must be compatible with the overriding policy 
goals and objectives of competition law in order to ensure coherence of the legal regime, MAR 
and CSMAD exist within the wider regulatory landscape of securities and financial services 
law.  As shown in Chapter 4 of this work, the number of governmental actors, policy goals, 
legislative objectives and enforcement tools that cohabit a regulatory space will add to its 
complexities and will therefore, require a coherent framework within which they can co-exist.  
The greater the complexity, the more that is required to understand the dynamics of the regime, 
to ensure that the various elements within that regulatory space can operate in effectively 
towards the overall policy goals of the regime.  The overall impact of the regime is critical, and 
is judged by how capable the regime, and the specific enforcement tools within it, are of 
achieving the outcomes that justify the interference with liberty that such enforcement, by 
necessity requires.  In order to achieve that therefore, as demonstrated in Chapter 4 of this 
work, a relatively high degree of legal coherence is required.   
 
It is worth noting at this point, that MAR and CSMAD are not alone in legislating for the 
protection of securities and financial services.  The other main EU legislative acts in this 
regulatory landscape are the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II858 (the ‘MiFID II) 
																																																						
858 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU.   
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and the Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation859 (the MiFIR). ‘The general objective of 
improving investor confidence in the markets links MAR [and CSMAD] to MiFID II and 
MiFIR.’860  Indeed, certain elements within MAR and CSMAD rely upon definitions contained 
within the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (the ‘MiFID II).861   
 
To create a framework capable of providing for such a complex regulatory landscape, that 
would be enforced across the majority of the Member States, it was vital that the EU allow for 
enough flexibility to be made available, whilst also not jeopardising the ability of the 
framework to deliver on its objectives.  In the context of market abuse regulation for example,  
 
 ‘Austrian constitutional law … does not allow for administrative pecuniary sanctions 
 of the amount provided for in the regulation.  This is why Article 30(1) stipulates that 
 Member States may decide not to introduce administrative sanctions for certain  
 infringements, provided that those infringements are already subject to criminal   
 sanctions in their national law.862 
 
The Directive and the Regulation are therefore very closely related as the ‘package … 
introduces a dual regime (unless a state opts for criminal law alone)’863 and indeed the Directive 
itself states that its scope ‘is determined in such as away as to complement, and ensure the 
effective implementation’864 of the Regulation. 
 
Given therefore, that civil sanctions are not obligatory where a criminal sanction exits, and 
criminal sanctions are indeed mandated, the minimum requirement for harmonisation under 
both the Directive and the Regulation is criminality for the specified conduct.  Civil sanctions 
are additional although not compulsory.  Nevertheless, the criminal sanctions are, as 
																																																						
859 Regulation (EU) No. 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in 
financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No. 648/2012.   
860 Deloitte, ‘The revised Market Abuse Directive and new Market Abuse Regulation: to what extent will the 
revised framework impact banks?’ 19th April 2016.  Available at: 
https://www2.deloitte.com/mt/en/pages/financial-services/articles/mt-banking-alert-024-revised-Market-Abuse-
Directive-and-new-Market-Abuse-Regulation.html.  Last accessed 14th February 2019.     
861 For example, the MAR and CSMAD apply to financial instruments admitted to trading on a trading venue.  
The definition for trading venue is provided for by MiFID II.   
862 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele, ‘Enforcing the market abuse regime: towards an integrated model of 
criminal and administrative law enforcement in the European Union?’ (2014) 5(2) New Journal of European 
Criminal Law 192.  
863 Ibid.   
864 CSMAD, Recital (22).  
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highlighted above, intended to complement and assist the effective implementation of 
administrative sanctions which, one would assume as a result of more inclusive culpability 
requirements, lower evidentiary and procedural standards, civil sanctions will remain the 
primary mechanism by which market abuse is tackled in the Member States which provide for 
such sanctions.   
 
This position is arguably corroborated by the stated objectives of both the Regulation and the 
Directive.  The Regulation explains that ‘administrative sanctions and other administrative 
measures should be provided to ensure a common approach in the Member States and to 
enhance their deterrent effect (emphasis added).’865  The Directive however, states that 
criminal sanctions are essential for ‘compliance with the rules on market abuse’ because they, 
 
 ‘demonstrate a stronger form of social disapproval compared with administrative  
 penalties.  Establishing criminal offences for at least serious forms of market abuse 
 sets clear boundaries for types of behaviour that are considered to be particularly 
 unacceptable and sends a message to the public and to potential offenders that  
 competent authorities take such behaviour very seriously.’866   
 
It would appear therefore that the articulated goal of the administrative mechanisms are 
compulsion based and primarily focused  upon creating a deterrent effect, whereas the primary 
function of the criminal offences in routed in compliance theory with a strong focus on the 
educative role that criminal sanctions can have.  This is perhaps as a result of the general view 
of white collar crime being ‘not real crime’ and is reflective of the fact that the criminal law 
instruments within the toolkit are unlikely to be the first choice for those agencies responsible 
for preventing market abuse.   
 
In articulating the criminal law sanctions as a builder of normative compliance rather than the 
cornerstone of effective deterrence, the EU is arguably implicitly acknowledging that not all 
market abusers will be pursued with criminal sanctions despite the seriousness of the conduct.  
The EU is therefore, perhaps attempting to ensure that deterrence, and its empirical 
measurement, are not hampered by the anticipated infrequent use of criminal law sanctions.  If 
																																																						
865 MAR, Recital (71). 
866 CSMAD, Recital (6).  
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for example, criminal sanctions are lauded as the cornerstone of effective deterrence, the 
infrequent use of the criminal sanctions in the real world could arguably diminish how 
effectively the regime as a whole is regarded as an effective deterrent to acts of market abuse.   
 
As shown in Chapter 3 of this work, the perception of a regime’s efficacy plays a critical role 
in its ability to act as a deterrent for those considering engaging in prohibited conduct.  
Deterrence is created not merely by the appearance of an offence in the statute books, but as a 
result of a chain of factors working together to enable the legislative threat to create a real 
world deterrent effect, and the successful investigation, prosecution and sanction of those who 
break the law are vital.  If it is envisaged that there will be relatively few examples of market 
abusers being successfully prosecuted and imprisoned, then it is arguably wise of the EU to 
frame civil sanctions as the cornerstone of effective deterrence in order to preserve the 
perception of the overall regime as an effective deterrent to market abuse.   
 
 
 
  6.5.  Lessons from the Market Abuse Experience 
 
 
There are clear parallels between the market abuse regulatory space in the EU and the anti-
cartel enforcement regulatory space in the UK.  Conceptually however, the fact that the 
emphasis of the criminal sanctions for market abuse is upon its educative role as a crime 
reduction tool places it in a stronger enforcement position that the criminal cartel offence which 
has been framed as a deterrent.  This role reversal in the competition regime, as compared to 
the market abuse one, plays a role in the perception that the regulatory toolkit for anti-cartel 
enforcement is not having a significant impact upon the deterrence of cartel activity. The 
perception of the effectiveness of a legislative regime is an important component of creating a 
deterrent effect because it is the subjective assessment of that regime, carried out by those who 
may consider breaching it, that plays a critical role in determining whether or not they will be 
deterred by it.  The educative role of a criminal sanction as a compliance former however, is 
less reliant upon real world examples of successful prosecutions, and so can serve in this 
function quite successfully even in an environment where prosecutions are sporadic.   
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Fully harmonised criminalisation of hard-core cartels across the EU would face challenges 
analogous to those faced in the context of market abuse in respect of Austria.  This is because 
of the constitutional arrangements of certain Member States, Sweden in this particular context.     
The Swedish Constitution does not allow for the grant of immunity to a defendant suspected 
of committing a criminal offence.  The creation of immunity from criminal prosecution in order 
to protect the efficacy of civil leniency is therefore constitutionally prohibited.  Without a 
complimentary criminal immunity the effect of a criminal sanction for cartel abuse would have 
a disastrous effect upon the efficacy of administrative leniency, and so in the specific legal 
landscape of Sweden, a criminal cartel offence could not be sustained.867  
 
 In the case of market abuse the problem was that the constitutional arrangements of Austria 
did not permit for civil sanctions of the level required by harmonisation.  The Commission was 
able to overcome the hurdle presented to it by Austria’s constitutional requirements by enabling 
Member States to adopt a singular criminal regime rather than the dual criminal/civil regime, 
should that be necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of minimum harmonisation. If a 
similar approach were to be adopted in respect of hard-core cartels, minimum harmonisation 
would have to be civil sanctions as is currently the case, with criminal sanctions being required 
only if permitted by the constitutional arrangement of the Member States.  If criminalisation 
became subject to EU harmonisation by virtue of Article 83(2), a nuanced approach to the 
regulatory dynamic specific to criminalisation, leniency and civil sanctions would have to used.  
Were it not possible to create such a delicate dynamic capable of protecting the functioning of 
the leniency programme, criminalisation would not be desirable as it would create a self-
defeating enforcement environment.  It is for this reason for example, that the disclosure of 
certain documents and leniency statements is blocked under the Damages Directive.868  Were 
such documents able to be disclosed for the purpose of private enforcement actions it would 
alter the cartelist’s evaluation of whether or not they should make an application for leniency 
and could therefore, negatively impact the operation of the leniency programme.  This concern 
is articulated in the Directive:  
 
																																																						
867 For fuller discussion, see section 4.4.2.  Additionally, the creation of a criminal cartel offence in this 
particular legal context could in theory amount to a breach of Article 4(3) TEU.  See Chapter 5 for further 
discussion.  
868 Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 
on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349, 5.12.2014, p. 1–19.  Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0104&from=EN.   
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‘Undertakings might be deterred from cooperating with competition authorities under 
leniency programmes and settlement procedures if self-incriminating statements such 
as leniency statements and settlement submissions, which are produced for the sole 
purpose of cooperating with the competition authorities, were to be disclosed.’869 
 
That would in turn lead to a negative impact on the success of the system of administrative 
sanctions that are the primary enforcement mechanism within the EU, diminishing the overall 
public enforcement of cartels.  The Directive therefore exempts both leniency statements and 
settlement submissions from the requirement that evidence be disclosed for the purpose of 
private enforcement actions.    
 
Given that administrative actions against cartels as well as actions for damages have been 
subject to EU harmonisation, in the new post-Lisbon landscape, the question of whether 
harmonisation of criminal sanctions for cartels could occur is arguably more topical.  
 
 
 6.6.  Conclusions 
 
 
The EU considers both the protection of competition within its borders and the integrity of the 
securities and financial market as essential to the creation and maintenance of the internal 
market.  Significant harmonisation steps have been taken in both regulatory landscapes when 
the EU have regarded it as essential for these fundamental Union policy objectives.  However, 
the scale and effect of the global financial crisis provided the impetus for the EU to perform a 
significant and large scale overhaul of the securities and financial services legislative 
landscape.  It meant that an opportunity arose for a top-to-bottom assessment of the framework 
could take place and wholesale reform could be achieved, in a clear and structured way.  The 
result was the creation of a framework that was much better able to accommodate all of the 
various elements that must co-exist in that regulatory space.  In contrast, anti-cartel 
enforcement in the UK has not faced a catastrophic event that redefined the way in which cartel 
activity was to be tackled.  As a result the evolution of the laws and the framework has been 
much more gradual and piecemeal.  Without an external event forcing a full re-evaluation of 
																																																						
869 Ibid at Recital (26). 
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that evolution it has arguably meant that the anti-cartel enforcement landscape, in the UK where 
dual enforcement has been created, there is not the same clarity in the framework that has been 
created to sustain anti-cartel enforcement.    
 
The analysis of the market abuse regime in the EU has shown that over-reliance on one aspect 
of an enforcement tool kit can lead to significant weaknesses in a policy achievement.  The 
specific challenges faced by criminal enforcement (higher standard of evidence and procedural 
rules for example) mean that a regulatory response that relies solely or predominantly on 
criminal sanctions will fall far short of achieving criminal policy outcomes (moral 
condemnation, deterrence, punishment of wrongdoing).  However, a regulatory response that 
relies solely or predominantly on civil sanctions may suffer the same problems (no moral 
blameworthiness is communicated, deterrence is limited and punishment of wrongdoing is 
limited to undertakings and not the individuals directly responsible for implementing the 
cartel).  The use of additional mechanisms can go a long way to compensating for the particular 
failures of primary enforcement mechanisms, but as the number of mechanisms within a 
regulatory space is increased, so does the complexity of the regularly dynamics.  This is further 
compounded by a multitude of policy objectives and institutional actors.  
 
The reformulating of the EU’s response to market abuse in the wake of the global financial 
crisis as showed that in complex and highly inter-connected regulatory spaces a comprehensive 
engagement with policy objectives, instrument goals and dynamics is required if an effective 
enforcement environment is to be created.  This corroborates the findings of Chapter 4 of this 
work in which a review of the existing literature showed that there is a real and vital need to 
address and explicitly deal with each of these elements, as well as the various institutional 
interactions, in order to achieve an optimal regulatory dynamic capable of achieving stated 
objectives.  In this type of complex regulatory space, the genesis of market abuse regulation in 
the UK demonstrated that a regulatory dynamic that is dependent upon criminal sanctions will 
be ineffective, whilst the genesis of market abuse regulation in the EU demonstrated that a 
dynamic which is too reliant upon administrative penalties can also result in disastrous 
weaknesses.  This over-reliance on one mechanism within the regulatory enforcement space 
together with an inadequate engagement of policy objectives and goal objectives, further 
diminishes the ability of the framework to create an environment in which effective mechanism 
dynamics can be achieved, or indeed, even properly assessed over time.   
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The example of the market abuse regulatory response arguably demonstrates that when such 
holistic investigation does take place, that results in a clear articulation of policy principles, 
instrument goals and mechanism dynamics, that the diversity of the political and legal realities 
of the Member States are not a barrier to implementing cohesive and in-depth harmonisation 
within a regulatory environment that is complex and highly interconnected.   
 
As was done in the market abuse regime, clearly stating a connection between the mechanism 
and the goal it is seeking to achieve not only adds additional clarity but can help to ensure that 
all of the specified goals are being addressed.  This is particularly useful in complex regimes 
where there are a multitude of goals, policies and mechanisms.  It is the case that mechanisms 
may have an impact on more than one of the stated goals and in this case, it is the position of 
this work that the primary, secondary and tertiary goals should be articulated as such.   
 
Once a framework has clearly stated the policy objectives of the regime, linked those objectives 
to the goals of the mechanisms that have been chosen to achieve them, a clearly ordered 
structure has been created within which the dynamics can be more easily assessed to ensure 
that an optimal enforcement environment has been created.  It also permits a periodic 
assessment of the performance of each mechanism within the regime and their ongoing 
dynamics as a whole in order to better address any weaknesses that may develop over time.  
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Chapter 7.  Conclusions 
 
This thesis has sought to consider the place of the criminal cartel offence within the anti-cartel 
regulatory space that has been created in the UK, as a Member State of the European Union.  
As has been shown, the inclusion of a criminal sanction within a traditionally administrative 
regime brings with it challenges and complexities that if not addressed directly, can make a 
challenging to enforce sanction, considerably more so.  This work has sought to examine 
whether the place that the criminal cartel offence has been forced to occupy, and the dynamics 
that its conclusion has created within the wider regime, have played a significant role in the 
underwhelming enforcement impact of the section 188 offence.   
 
In order to address this primary question, a series of secondary research questions have been 
identified in Chapter 1 of this work, and addressed in the subsequent chapters.  The following 
list provides a very concise summary of the issues contained within those research questions 
and the chapters in which they are addressed in the thesis: 
 
7.1.  Chapter 2 of this work analyses the theories of punishment that legitimized the 
criminal cartel offence when it was originally created, and how these theories 
fit within the wider competition law policy landscape of anti-cartel 
enforcement.   
7.2.  Chapter 3 examined deterrence as the long preferred cartel reduction tool of 
anti-cartel enforcement in the UK.  In doing so it addressed whether it should 
be the primary crime control objective of the criminal cartel offence.   
7.3.  Chapter 4 used regulatory mix theory to identify the dynamics of the anti-cartel 
enforcement regulatory space in the UK since the inclusion of a criminal 
offence.   
7.4.  Chapter 5 examined the bilateral obligations contained in Article 4(3) TEU 
and the impact that those obligations have on the UK as a current Member State 
of the EU, and the UK’s sovereign right to create and implement criminal 
sanctions for individuals who engage in cartel activity.  It then considered what 
potential impact the recorded underwhelming enforcement of a criminal 
sanction within the UK have upon the obligations owed to the EU as a result of 
the highly interconnected dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement, highlighted in 
Chapter 4.   
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7.5.  Chapter 6 uses a comparative legal analysis to determine whether the 
experience of the dual enforcement regime for market abuse, described as 
analogous to cartel activity, can illuminate conceptual solutions that could 
improve the impact of the criminal cartel offence in particular, and/or the anti-
cartel enforcement regime as a whole.  
7.6.  This chapter concludes by articulating a series of recommendations based 
upon the analysis of the preceding chapters, that could enhance the regulatory 
framework of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK and improve the impact of the 
criminal cartel offence upon the fight against cartels.  It also provides insight 
for other Member States who may seek to add criminal sanctions to their anti-
cartel toolkit in the future.   
 
 
7.1.  Theories of Punishment and the Criminal Cartel Offence: conclusions 
 
The first step in the process of understanding the place of the criminal cartel offence within the 
wider anti-cartel regulatory landscape has been to examine the justifications for its creation.  
This is important because,  
 
‘[i]f we do not know what we are trying to achieve when we punish people, we are in 
a poor position to assess whether the means we are taking to those ends are effective or 
inappropriate.’870 
 
Chapter 2 showed that despite the fact that the articulated primary purpose of the section 188 
was to create a serious deterrent effect, the original inclusion of ‘dishonesty’ as the substantive 
test for the offence meant that it did not fit within the utilitarian theoretical perspective on 
punishment upon which deterrence theory is built.  Utilitarian theories of punishment, typical 
to competition law, focus on the prevention of future crime and do not seek to justify the 
imposition of punishment upon a moral judgement of the wrongfulness of the conduct. The 
formulation of the offence as a dishonest one imported an element of retributive theory to a 
regulatory landscape unaccustomed to such normative thinking.  There was no meaningful 
exploration of the impact that retributive considerations would have upon the dynamics of on 
																																																						
870 Bill Wringe, ‘An Expressive Theory of Punishment’ (Singer: 2003) p.3.   
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the wider anti-cartel enforcement regulatory space particularly given the central role that 
leniency plays within that space.  The utility of immunising culpable undertakings from fines 
in exchange for otherwise unobtainable information is clear.  The argument in favour of 
allowing culpable defendants to escape punishment for seriously harmful and morally 
condemnable conduct in exchange for information, is less so. The UK had therefore, introduced 
new complexities into the enforcement landscape without considering what those complexities 
were or how they would affect the regime as a whole. 
 
The impact upon the dynamics of enforcement caused by the inclusion of a criminal offence 
were only considered from a procedural and evidential perspective.  The relationship between 
the mechanisms within a regulatory space dominated by deterrence theory, and a new 
mechanism which was more opaque in its theoretical foundations, but which seemed to want 
to engage with other crime control methods, was not confronted.     
 
By failing to consider the available theoretical foundations for crime control mechanisms in 
general, and retributive theories on criminal sanctions in particular, the important role of the 
criminal law as a moral educator was left untapped.  The existing literature shows that this 
function of the criminal law is particularly important when atypical enforcement mechanisms 
are implemented, especially when they represent a significant shift in the sanction level that 
has historically been the case.  This point was further supported in the conclusions drawn in 
Chapter 6 based upon the examination of the dual enforcement regime utilised for market abuse 
within the EU.  The discussion in that chapter showed that in complex economic crimes that 
are difficult to detect and therefore, are rarely prosecuted, a criminal sanction is more likely to 
be effective as an influence upon the creation of a culture of compliance, than it is as an 
impactful deterrent.  This is further corroborated by the analysis in Chapter 3 of this work 
which showed that for a real world deterrent effect to be created, a real threat of successful 
prosecution must exist and be communicated via a record of successful prosecutions.   
 
This failure to engage with the retributive reality of a crime framed as a dishonest one, and the 
impact that it had upon the dynamics of the regime, meant that when the time came to amend 
the offence, the beneficial aspects of a retributive offence outline in the above paragraph and 
articulated in Chapter 2 were not even a consideration.  The removal of the dishonest element 
meant bringing criminal enforcement of cartels in line with the rest of the regime, and was a 
more honest representation of the instrumental way in which the authorities wished to employ 
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the offence.  However, in so doing, instead of creating a more comprehensive enforcement 
environment in the UK, what has been created is an enforcement environment that is less 
comprehensive as it is less capable of addressing and therefore, confronting the variety of 
influencing factors that could lead an otherwise law abiding citizen to break the law.   It meant 
that not only was the critical educative function of the offence ignored, but now has been lost 
as a potential crime control mechanism and as a driver of voluntary compliance.   
 
The deficiencies that were present and which contributed to the initial underperformance of the 
criminal cartel offence as originally drafted,871 were mindlessly reproduced.872  No attempt was 
made to clarify the role that the criminal cartel offence would play as a criminal sanction in its 
own right, or how it was hoped that it would interact with the rest of the enforcement toolkit.  
These deficiencies were compounded by the fact that no consideration was given to how the 
removal of a the substantive test with roots in retributive theory, would impact the theoretical 
foundations of the offence.  Removing dishonesty from the definition of the section 188 offence 
fundamentally changed the nature of the offence and the place it therefore, occupied within the 
anti-cartel regime.  
 
The focus stubbornly remained on the cartel offence’s impact upon deterrence with no 
consideration was given to the other crime control functions that a criminal cartel offence could 
have.  Nevertheless, the amendment process continued to fail to engage even with deterrence 
theory resulting in little explanation being provided as to how the removal of dishonesty would 
improve the impact of the section 188 on deterrence, except to say that it would make it easier 
to prosecute.  As shown in the discussion contained in Chapter 3 of this work, successful 
prosecution is but one link in the chain of successful deterrence.  This has been examined in 
Chapter 3 of this work and will be addressed in the following section.  Suffice to say at this 
point however, that even though the justification for removing dishonesty was anchored to the 
desire to improve the prosecutability of the offence, there have been more successful ‘legacy’ 
cases brought under the old section 188 offence, than there have been under the new 
reformulated cartel offence. 
																																																						
871 These deficiencies were not just limited to those which are examined in this work, but include the 
‘legitimacy defects of the criminal cartel offence’ as explored by Galloway, ‘Securing the Legitimacy of 
Individual Sanctions in the UK,’ (2017) 40(1) World Competition 121.   
872 Robert Bork in his seminal work, ‘The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself’ (Basics Books, Inc., 
New York, 1978) remarked that, ‘[i]n all kinds of political weather the machinery of antitrust enforcement 
grinds steadily on, mindlessly reproducing both the policy triumphs and disasters of the past.’ p.4.    
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The section 188 offence did however, represent a significant step forward in addressing the 
gap of enforcement that exclusive reliance upon an administrative regime focused upon 
undertakings only, had created.  It demonstrated a recognition of the reality of the relationship 
that exists between individuals and undertakings.  It is a legal fiction to treat an undertaking as 
able to make decisions and take actions independently of the individuals who actually make 
the decisions and take the actions that the law attributes to the undertaking.  The criminal cartel 
offence therefore, places within the scope of the law, those individuals who in reality create 
and maintain the cartel.  There has been a lack of in-depth consideration of this agency principle 
in the competition law enforcement space with the Court of Appeal in R v IB going so far as to 
say that the criminal cartel offence was ‘not a competition law’ within the meaning of 
Regulation 1/2003 because it was not a means by which undertakings were pursued for 
breached of cartel law.  As has been shown however, the UK are attempting to use the threat 
of criminal sanctions in an instrumental way as a means of improving enforcement of anti-
cartel laws against undertakings, the claim being that it incentivises more leniency applications.  
The result however, has been that very few individuals are actually being punished for their 
role in creating those cartels even when fines have been successfully levied against the 
undertakings that they represent, and there is limited empirical evidence to suggest that the 
criminal cartel offence has caused a ‘rush to the enforcer’s door.’873  The focus of enforcement 
against individuals should however, be shifted from its narrow focus on deterrence and the 
impact that a criminal sanction could have upon ‘the calculation taken by the agents who act 
on behalf of and bind firms,’ and moved to targeting and punishing the criminally blameworthy 
element of the agents’874 behaviour in creating the cartel, a more inclusive regulatory spectrum 
would be created.  That spectrum would more accurately reflect the diverse motivations that 
lead to undertakings, by way of their agents, entering into hard core collusive agreements.   
 
 7.2.  Deterrence and the Criminal Cartel Offence: conclusions  
 
Deterrence has always been the primary focus and justification for the creation of a criminal 
cartel offence in the UK.   This was despite the fact that claims that the mere existence of the 
																																																						
873 Caron Beaton-Wells, Criminal Sanctions for Cartel Conduct: The Leniency Conundrum’ (2017) 13(1) 
Journal of Competition Law & Economics 125 
874 Jonathan Galloway, ‘Securing the Legitimacy of Individual Sanctions in UK Competition Law’ (2017) 40(1) 
World Competition Law 121.   
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section 188 offence would be sufficient to deter individuals from engaging in cartel activity 
were simply wrong, and the predicted 6 to 10 prosecutions a year had failed to transpire. 
Nevertheless, deterrence remained the policy objective of the cartel offence when a decade of 
underwhelming enforcement of section 188 and the collapse of the trial against the BA 
Executives led to the conclusion that the criminalisation of cartel activity needed to be 
amended.   
 
The amendment of the offence concentrated on how the inclusion of dishonesty had made 
section 188 harder to prosecute.875  It was assumed therefore, that removing dishonesty would 
lead to more prosecutions which would in turn create the perception that cartelists were more 
likely to be caught and punished,876 a fundamental link in the creation of an effective deterrent.  
No further investigation of deterrence theory was carried out.  Chapter 3 of this work showed 
however, that in order for that deterrent effect to be created in practice, and thereby be effective 
as a crime control mechanism, there are other links within that chain that must also be 
addressed, and the particular challenges and complexities of the prohibited conduct will help 
to determine which links within the chain of deterrence for that specific offence, are likely to 
require additional caution.   
 
It appeared that the UK had attempted to transplant the kind of deterrence theory applicable to 
administrative sanctions, uncritically and without examination, to a criminal law sanction that 
was (or should have been) pursuing a predominately different purpose that the administrative 
regime. Further, it failed to acknowledge the complex variety of factors that motivate 
individuals to obey the law or not.  Chapter 3 therefore examined deterrence theory as a method 
of crime control within the context of anti-cartel enforcement, as well as considering other 
crime control functions that could have been employed in the fight against cartels.  The analysis 
showed that whilst certainty of prosecution plays an important role in creating an impactful 
deterrent effect capable of reducing cartel activity, the actual enforcement strategy of the OFT, 
and now the CMA showed that in practice, the authorities are unlikely to pursue a criminal 
investigation no matter what the definition of the offence.  Further, deterrence theory as applied 
to cartels shows that certainty of detection is the greatest hurdle to be overcome with there 
																																																						
875 BIS, A Competition Regime for Growth: A Consultation on Options for Reform, Government Response to 
Consultation (BIS/12/512) 12th March 2012.  Available at: http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/growth-
competition-and-the-competition-regime-government-response-to-consultation.   
876 Jonathan Galloway, supra n.873.  
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being very little empirical evidence to support the view that the creation of a criminal offence 
has caused a significant increase in the number of people and undertakings seeking to provide 
information to the CMA in exchange for immunity.  The analysis of Chapter 3 also 
demonstrated that certainty of sanction, the one aspect of criminal cartel deterrence that would 
appear to be within the scope of section 188 to influence, found that in reality, without the aid 
of sentencing guidelines the courts have shown no appetite to impose the kind of sanctions that 
would be necessary to create any appreciable deterrent effect.   
 
The chapter showed therefore, that by deterrence theory’s own standards, the cartel offence, 
with its low detection rate and even lower prosecution rate, combined with a ‘lukewarm’ 
judicial response to significant prison sentences, is very unlikely to lead to a deterrent effect 
sufficient enough to justify the creation and maintenance of a criminal cartel sanction in the 
UK.  In such circumstances, it is difficult to see how in those very rare prosecutions that do 
result in a term of imprisonment can be considered a fair and just outcome when that sentence 
is justified in terms of deterrence, but nobody is being deterred.   
 
The chapter therefore, turned to alternative crime control mechanisms that could be relied upon 
to justify the existence of a criminal sanctions for individuals who create cartels.  This analysis 
showed that criminal prohibitions play an important role in the creation of a culture of voluntary 
compliance, not induced by fear but motivated by the desire to obey the law.  In contrast to 
deterrence theory, the moralising function of the criminal law is not so heavily dependent upon 
continuous and consistent prosecutions to articulate its message.  In the context of a complex 
economic crime that is difficult to detect and punish, and that is not the subject of strong 
societal disapproval, a moralising education could play a critical role in protecting consumer 
welfare and the competitive process from the serious harm created by cartels.   
 
The paradox of a typical individual cartelist is their previous strong commitment to obeying 
the law.  A cartel offence framed in such a way as to illuminate the serious criminal harm of a 
cartel to the those individuals who are in a position to create them, may help to close the gap 
in their normative commitment to legal obedience.  The analysis of Chapters 2 and 3 show that 
whilst moves have been made in the right direction by bringing the individuals ultimately 
responsible for the cartel within the scope of the law, the narrow focus on its role as a deterrent 
has significantly diminished its ability to have any impact upon the fight against cartels.  It also 
paved the way for the removal of the one aspect of the offence’s definition that could have 
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been capable of tapping into the moralising function of the criminal law that in the long term, 
could have played a significant role in creating a culture of voluntary compliance.   
 
A careful enforcement strategy targeting examples of clear harm could have helped to ‘foster 
a hardening of attitudes’877 towards cartel activity that had not existed prior to the EA 2002.  
Further, an offence, defined in such a way as to clearly articulate the criminal harm and moral 
blameworthiness of a cartel would have helped to address the fact that as compared to 
traditional crimes that a jury may be more aware of, cartels are much more ‘contingent and 
ambiguous.’878  This would have had the further benefit of clarifying the place that the cartel 
offence was to occupy within the wider anti-cartel regulatory framework, which would in turn 
have helped to identify and navigate any regulatory incompatibilities that may arise as the result 
of including new and atypical enforcement mechanisms within the toolkit.   
 
 
 7.3.  Anti-cartel Regulatory Dynamics and the Cartel Offence: conclusions 
 
 
The analysis contained in Chapters 2 and 3 of this work not only addressed the specific 
concerns summarised above, they highlighted the degree of complexity that exists within the 
regulatory space of anti-cartel enforcement.  Further, they showed that the UK Government 
failed to explore or even provide a rudimentary identification of those complexities.   The 
inclusion of an enforcement mechanism with somewhat unclear theoretical foundations and 
potentially contradictory policy objectives added more confusion to an increasingly 
complicated regulatory space. Together these issues played a crucial role in the creation of an 
underwhelming criminal offence, and its later (ineffective) amendment.  
 
Chapter 4 utilised regulatory mix literature to provide one lens through with the anti-cartel 
regulatory space could be examined.  The literature provided a conceptual understanding of the 
interactions that occur within complex regulatory mixes in general, which illuminated the 
dynamics of the anti-cartel regulatory space in particular.  The analysis showed that the 
																																																						
877 Ibid. 
878 Caron Beaton-Wells, C. Harding and J. Edwards, ‘Leniency and Criminal Sanctions in Anti-Cartel 
Enforcement: Happily Married or Uneasy Bedfellows?’ in Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age: 
The Leniency Religion (C. Beaton-Wells & C. Tran eds, Hart Publishing, 2015).    
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criminal cartel offence, implemented properly should have been a positive addition to the 
enforcement toolkit.  It broadens the scope of anti-cartel enforcement action and inherently 
addresses the agent-principle relationship and the factual reality that it is the individual agents 
that create the cartels for which the undertakings as a whole have traditionally been solely 
punished.  Further, its inclusion within the enforcement toolkit reflects the scale of seriousness 
of cartel activity and the variety of factors that motivate individuals and undertakings to break 
the law.  However, the chapter also showed that a fundamental lack of clarity as to the 
theoretical basis for action, combined with a lack of understanding of which policy objectives 
can be realistically achieved by which enforcement tools, meant that what should have been an 
inherently complimentary regulatory mix has become incompatible in areas where no such 
incompatibility need exist.   
 
Exploring the regulatory mix literature and applying it within the context of anti-cartel 
enforcement in the UK highlighted the importance of engaging with, and clearly articulating 
the theoretical bases for State action and ensuring that policy objectives and ultimately, 
enforcement tools can be traced back to their ideological foundations. Further, it creates a 
framework within which enforcement action can legitimately exist, and which can be used to 
ensure that such legitimacy is not eroded over time.   It provides a standard against which 
enforcement action can be judged, and helps to identify gaps and inconsistencies before they 
are able to damage the perception and legitimacy of any one tool in particular, or the regime as 
a whole.  The chapter showed that there was nothing inherently contradictory in adding a 
criminal offence to a regime previously reliant upon administrative sanctions only, but that the 
confused regulatory dynamics that were created by a failure to engage with the theoretical 
justifications for the tools with in the enforcement toolkit, along with the enforcement strategy 
that was employed, has led to at best, a contradictory regulatory space, and at worst an 
ineffective one.  Further, the almost absolute focus upon deterrence as the mechanism for 
reducing cartel activity has meant that often, the wrong tool is used at the wrong time, indeed,  
 
‘Scholarly evidence and regulatory best practice suggests that regulators should 
generally use mixes of regulatory styles or strategies to improve compliance, rather 
than relying on deterrence alone.’879 
																																																						
879 Gunningham and Grabosky, ‘Smart Regulation: Designing Environmental Policy’ (Oxford University Press: 
1999) 
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 7.4.  Ineffective Criminal Cartel Enforcement and Article 4(3) TEU: conclusions 
 
 
The early chapters of this work demonstrated the underwhelming enforcement of the criminal 
cartel offence, and its causes.  They further showed the intricacies of anti-cartel enforcement 
and the connection between the criminal and civil regime.  The importance of the relationship 
between the UK and the EU on the formulation and enforcement of competition laws within 
the UK’s own jurisdiction was also highlighted in these early chapters.  Chapter 5 brings 
together each of these strands of discussion.  It explores one particular unexplored facet of the 
relationship between the UK and the EU in the context of anti-cartel enforcement, and the 
potential problems that the underwhelming enforcement of the UK criminal cartel offence 
could have upon the obligations placed upon the UK by virtue of Article 4(3) TEU and the 
enforcement of the civil cartel regime contained in Article 101 TFEU.   
 
An examination of how this principle has been applied throughout the history of the EU has 
shown that whilst it has given rise to some of the most important legal principles in operation 
in the EU today, it is too wide in scope to be justiciable on its own.  It must be used in 
combination with an additional rule of EU law that can provide sufficient clarity to create an 
actionable obligation or right.  In the context of the competition law that additional detail is 
provided by Regulation 1/2003 which requires that Article 101 TFEU must be effectively 
enforced within the Member States’ own jurisdictions.  Article 4(3) TEU requires that Member 
States must refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives.  Taken together with Regulation 1/2003 therefore, this amounts to an obligation 
that Member States must refrain from any measure that could jeopardise the enforcement of 
Article 101 TFEU, and thereby the functioning of competition within the internal market.   
 
The potential for a breach of Article 4(3) TEU arises therefore, when a measure adopted in the 
Member States could jeopardise the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU.  The effective 
enforcement of Article 101 TFEU is now largely down to the domestic authorities of the 
Member States who account for 85% of enforcement action since Regulation 1/2003 mandated 
decentralised enforcement. The enforcement of Article 101 TFEU is made effective in practice 
 219	
	
by the operation of the programme of leniency that encourages cartels to come forward and 
provide sufficient information to the relevant authorities to enable them to detect and sanction 
cartels. The leniency programme was protected in the UK when the criminal cartel offence was 
created, by the creation of no-action letters which provide immunity from criminal prosecution.   
 
However, some have argued that by raising the stakes, instead of destabilising cartels the UK 
have provided them with greater incentive to policy their illicit agreements.880  Further, if the 
enforcement of the criminal cartel offence is so remarkably underwhelming that it diminishes 
the perspective of the capabilities of the CMA as an investigatory body, it could lead cartels to 
believe that without coming forward, the authorities stand little chance of detecting or 
punishing them.  The enforcement record of the criminal cartel offence could have indeed 
created this perception.  Particularly, when it appears from the outside at least, that the CMA 
have adopted enforcement strategy that only includes the criminal cartel offences in 
exceptional circumstances, given that they continue to administratively sanction cartels but 
very rarely prosecute the individuals who created them.  Add to this the new cartel offence and 
its ‘obtaining legal advice’ defence which as shown in the analysis of Chapter 2 of this work 
defeats the purpose of the offence and ‘creates an absurdity that runs counter to effective legal 
policy.’ 881  If together these problematic issues accumulated and resulted in a reduction in the 
number of leniency applications made in the UK because of an increased belief that the CMA 
as a whole, were ineffective it could reduce the efficacy of the enforcement of the civil regime 
within the UK as cartels may be emboldened to not come forward.  Were that to be the outcome, 
it could result in a reduction in the efficacy of the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU in the UK.   
 
The degree of impact upon the efficacy of Article 101 TFEU that poor enforcement of the 
criminal cartel offence need have in order to be considered a breach of Article 4(3) TEU and 
Regulation 1/2003 is not definitively laid out in the jurisprudence of the CJEU.  However, as 
protection of competition and the prevention of artificial barriers to trade within the internal 
market are fundamental principles of the EU, there is strong reason to believe that the threshold 
for their protection would not be unduly high.  Indeed, there is judicial precedent for the 
requirement that that national legislation already in force, that ‘may’882 render EU competition 
																																																						
880 Caron Beaton-Wells (2015) supra n. 877. 
881 Andreas Stephan, ‘The UK Cartel Offence: a purposive interpretation?’ (2014) Criminal Law Review 879.   
882 Case 231/83 Cullet v Centre Leclerc Toulouse [1985] ECR I-305 148.   
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rules ineffective should not be ‘maintained in force.’883   The impact that this has upon the 
place which the criminal cartel offence occupies within the anti-cartel regulatory space in the 
UK cannot be underestimated.  Competition law is an area of exclusive competence for the 
EU.  The Member States therefore, in recognition of the importance of competition and the 
necessity that its laws be applied consistently across the Union, bestowed upon the EU the 
power to determine how that is to be achieved.  By way of Regulation 1/2003 limited scope to 
legislate for and enforce competition law was granted back to the Member States.  Therefore, 
any actions taken by them are limited to that which is articulated in Regulation 1/2003 and 
must be viewed within the wider context of the overriding competition law objectives of the 
EU.  Regulation 1/2003 states that national laws that pursue a predominantly different purpose 
are not within the its scope, and a criminal offence that sought to pursue the criminal harm of 
cartel activity could be so excluded.  The instrumental use of a criminal offence directed at 
inducing cartelists to come forward and make leniency applications, which would in turn 
increase the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU, makes the conceptual distinction much more 
difficult to maintain.  The assessment of the regulatory dynamics carried out in Chapter … of 
this work showed that a criminal sanction, properly designed, implemented and enforced is not 
inherently contradictory to the objectives of the EU and Article 101 TFEU.  Nevertheless, the 
poor enforcement of such a mechanism, should it amount to a threat to the objectives of the 
EU described above, could if that threat was serious enough, amount to a breach of Article 4(3) 
TEU.   
 
The application of Article 4(3) TEU is tempered to a degree by Article 4(2) TEU which 
requires, inter alia, that the EU respect the national identities of the Member States and their 
essential State functions required to maintain law and order.  This was clarified to include their 
basic public policy choices and social values.  In theory therefore, this should include within 
the scope of Article 4(2) TEU a Member State making a determination that an action is contrary 
to the social values within its jurisdiction, and taking a policy decision to criminalise that 
action.  However, in the context of the criminal cartel offence, the manner in which the UK 
have defined and applied the law makes it more difficult to sustain an argument that it was 
done within the scope of protecting the UK’s social values.  The section 188 offence, 
particularly since its amendment has been applied in a way that strongly suggests a utilitarian 
rationale that is not concerned with morality or social values.  There has been no attempt to 
																																																						
883 Ibid.   
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engage with traditional criminal policy considerations that would most commonly be 
associated with the criminalisation of conduct, and there was an explicit rejection of the one 
element of the original offence that would indicate that the cartel offence was focused upon 
addressing social values in the UK.   
 
Should an argument be put forward that the drafting of, and enforcement of the criminal cartel 
offence in the UK was so poor as to amount to a threat to the effective enforcement of Article 
101 TFEU, and thereby a breach of Article 4(3) TEU, it would be a novel use of the provision.  
There is no existing judicial precedent to provide guidance on the likely outcome of such a 
claim.  Nevertheless, what this example demonstrates to the UK and any other Member States 
who may wish to include criminal sanctions for cartel activity within their own jurisdictions, 
is that whilst national criminal laws may technically be outside of the scope of EU law in 
respect of cartels, the highly interconnected dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement means that in 
practice, concern must be had for the impact that enforcement of such legislative action could 
have on their overriding obligation to the EU to effectively enforce competition law in the 
manner that the EU see fit.   
 
 
 7.5.  The Market Abuse Experience and Anti-cartel Enforcement: conclusions 
 
Market abuse and cartels share a variety of attributes, and the authorities charged with detecting 
and punishing those who engage in them face a variety of the same challenges.  Like cartels, 
market abuse is difficult to detect, difficult to prove, and results in serious economic harm.  
Like cartels, market abuse has been subject to a high degree of harmonisation in the EU.  Unlike 
cartels however, that harmonisation includes the requirement that Member States provide for 
criminal sanctions for those individuals found to have engaged in market manipulation and 
insider dealing.  Given the diversity of legal and constitutional arrangements across the EU 
Member States, creating a regime for fighting market abuse within the internal market, that 
ensures consistency and that utilises both civil and criminal sanctions, is a challenge that the 
EU managed to overcome with the introduction of the new Market Abuse Regulation and the 
complementary Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse Directive.  Chapter 6 of this work 
therefore, examined the evolution of market abuse regulation in the EU in search of conceptual 
solutions to the problem of creating a dual enforcement regime capable of fighting complex 
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economic crime, that could be work to improve the regulatory framework of anti-cartel 
enforcement in the UK, and thereby improve the impact of enforcement actions in the fight 
against cartel activity.   
 
The analysis confirmed that in the case of complex economic conduct, over-reliance upon one 
method of enforcement will lead to weaknesses that can be exploited by those who would seek 
to unfairly game the system.  The evolution of market abuse regulation in the UK shows that 
over-reliance on criminal sanctions ultimately created a weak and ineffective regime incapable 
of adequately facing the challenges posed by market manipulation and insider dealing.  The 
evolution of market abuse regulation in the EU showed that over-reliance upon a civil regime 
also created exploitable weaknesses.   
 
The global financial crisis of 2008 caused the EU to re-evaluate the system for fighting market 
abuse because of the weaknesses to the system that the crisis revealed.  As a result, the whole 
of the market abuse regime was addressed and a top to bottom amendment of the pre-2008 
regime occurred.  This allowed the EU to create a comprehensive and coherent regime capable 
of addressing the problems that the 2008 crisis highlighted, and flexible enough to be future 
proof, so far as it is possible to be.  The result was the Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse 
Directive alongside the new Market Abuse Regulation.  A system of dual civil and criminal 
enforcement was therefore, created, and one that obligated the Member States to legislate for 
criminal sanctions for those found to have engaged in the proscribed conduct.  The EU made 
use of the Lamfalussy Process when creating the new CSMAD and MAR as a means of 
ensuring that what they created was a clear and structured framework, anchored to the 
theoretical principles that justified the chosen enforcement action, and that was capable of 
taking account of the diversity of legal and constitutional arrangements of the Member States.  
 
Chapter 6 showed that when attempting to prevent complex and harmful economic conduct a 
comprehensive legal response is required.  One that is capable of engaging with multiple policy 
objectives that reflect and acknowledge the varied motivations and contributing factors that 
play a part in otherwise law abiding citizens to commit seriously harmful, ultimately criminal 
acts.  More than that however, it demonstrated that in order to do that successfully, clarity 
between theoretical motivating factors and enforcement tools is established and maintained.  
The review of the market abuse regulation experience in the EU has shown that when theory 
is treated an integral part of the legislative process, the end result is much more comprehensive 
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and, it is hoped, impactful in practice.  It confirmed the findings of chapters 2 and 3 of this 
work, that when care is taken to anchor policy choices and enforcement tools clearly to their 
theoretical foundations avoidable contradictions are indeed avoided, and complex regulatory 
spaces can be navigated with much more ease.   
 
There has been no one cataclysmic event in the history of anti-cartel regulation in the UK that 
would cause a wholesale review of the regulatory and enforcement choices that have been 
taken.  However, the gradual decline of the criminal cartel offence, combined with the impetus 
that Brexit could represent,884 may prove to be sufficient motivating factors to cause the UK to 
undertake the desperately needed re-evaluation of the criminal cartel offence and its place 
within the wider anti-cartel regulatory landscape.  
 
 
 7.6.  Recommendations 
 
The analysis of this work has repeatedly shown that over-reliance upon one enforcement 
mechanism, inadequate engagement with the theoretical foundations of those enforcement 
mechanism, and insufficient clarity as to policy objectives seeking to employ those 
mechanisms is damaging to a complex regulatory space.  That is particularly true when that 
regulatory space has been created in order to detect, deter, and punish complex and seriously 
harmful economic behaviour.  In the UK, a failure to understand this has led to the creation of 
a response to cartels with a regulatory framework and enforcement strategy that ‘is very heavily 
focused upon traditional deterrence theory, with the result that enforcement in practice has 
tended to resort to the use of the wrong enforcement tool at the wrong time.’885  Further, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 of this work,886 business managers have shown ingenuity and 
adaptability in ‘responding to ever more severe public enforcement campaigns against 
collusion.’887  It is important therefore, that legislators and even more crucially, enforcement 
agencies shown the same level of ingenuity and adaptability in their fight against cartel activity.   
 
																																																						
884 CMA – SFO recommendation.   
885 JG 
886 Cross reference to leniency section in chapter 4. 
887 William E. Kovacic, supra n.  
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The UK anti-cartel regulatory space does provide for  a collection of enforcement tools capable 
of creating an impactful response to the fight against cartels, and flexible enough to allow for 
the type of reflexive enforcement that is needed to deal with the problem of hard-core collusion 
orchestrated by determined and adaptable business leaders. It provides for a selection of 
enforcement mechanisms that could represent the variety of policy objectives and ideological 
concepts that are required for a comprehensive regulatory response to the harm caused by hard-
core collusion.  The addition of sanctions aimed at the individuals who create the cartels does 
have the potential to close an important gap in the pre-2003 legislative landscape.  However, 
what the current regulatory space lacks is the requisite cohesion and structure that is crucial for 
a complex regulatory environment.  Enforcement tools have not been implemented with the 
proper clarity as to which policy objective they have been employed to fulfil and that is in part, 
due to a lack of understanding as to the theoretical foundations of the policy objectives being 
pursued.  There is a disconnect in the regulatory dynamics of anti-cartel enforcement at the 
moment that has allowed for complementary mechanisms to in fact, be implemented in a way 
that diminishes the impact of the criminal cartel offence in particular, and perhaps the anti-
cartel regime as a whole.  This lack of cohesion has meant that with each evolution of anti-
cartel enforcement in the UK, inconsistencies have been reinforced and as a result, the current 
place that the criminal cartel offence occupies within that space is contradictory and will, in its 
current form, continue its slow decline.  The lesson provided by the analysis of market abuse 
regulation is that a clearly defined approach, grounded in a proper understanding of theory to 
which policy objectives are linked, and upon which enforcement action is based can create a 
regulatory environment capable of providing for a complex, enforcement tool rich legislative 
response.  Whilst ‘competition policy, grounded in [economic] theory in practice is effectively 
the daily work of competition agencies,’888 that understanding of theory must go deeper if 
criminal policy is to be included within the enforcement toolkit, and more importantly, have 
an impact.   
 
In order to improve the impact of anti-cartel enforcement in the UK therefore, the ideological 
basis for anti-cartel enforcement must be clearly articulated from the start.  All policy 
objectives and thereby, enforcement tools should emanate from that point.  The overriding 
policy objective of competition law, as discussed in Chapter 4 of this work is that of consumer 
																																																						
888 William Kovacic, Hugh M. Hollman and Patricia Grant, ‘How Does Your Competition Agency Measure 
Up?’ (2011) 7(1) European Competition Journal … 
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welfare.889  Anti-cartel enforcement goals should therefore, feed back into this overriding 
objective.  The objectives of criminal law, as the examination in Chapter 2 showed, can be 
broadly separated into those pursuing utilitarian objectives and those pursuing retributive ones.  
The analysis in Chapters 2 and 6 of this work demonstrated that while the pursuit of utilitarian 
objectives is possible and desirable for the civil sanctions within the anti-cartel regime, it is a 
much less impactful objective for a criminal sanction for individual cartelists. Retributive 
theories of criminal punishment therefore, should be the primary focus of a criminal sanction 
in this specific context.  The analysis of regulatory mix theory showed that multiple policy 
objectives are possible and even advantageous, nevertheless, the primary purpose of the 
enforcement tool should be the grounds for which it is chosen so as to ensure that it fits within 
the regulatory structure being created.  The enforcement tools chosen to implement those policy 
objectives should then, reflect this primary function.  These recommendations, whilst directed 
at the anti-cartel enforcement space in the UK, can be of use to other Member States that may 
wish to add criminal sanctions for individuals who engage in cartel activity within their own 
jurisdictions.  The four step process articulated here can help illuminate potential conflicts that 
may arise within the structural limits of what is achievable given their own legal and 
constitutional limits, thereby helping to significantly reduce the rise that poor implementation 
and enforcement of a criminal offence could pose to their obligations under Article 4(3) TEU.   
 
In practice in the UK the above recommendations require that the civil regime utilises the 
utilitarian mechanism of deterrence in order to pursue the competition law objective of 
preventing cartel activity, and thereby protecting consumers.  As this work has shown, optimal 
deterrence is not achievable by fines alone however, and so should be supported by other 
enforcement tools within the toolkit. The deterrent objective of the administrative sanctions 
can be supported by the use of competition disqualification orders, which research has shown 
is an effective deterrent for the individuals who create cartels.  As a civil remedy, they do not 
face the same procedural and evidential challenges as a criminal sanction for cartels and so 
could be implemented and enforced with much greater frequency.  The secondary function that 
the administrative sanctions can achieve is the redistribution of cartel rents through fines, and 
the secondary function that the competition disqualification orders can achieve is 
																																																						
889 This is the position that the CMA have recently articulated as being at the ‘heart’ of competition law in the 
UK. See, CMA Press Release, ‘Reforms proposed to put consumers at the heart of UK competition regime,’ 25th 
February 2019.  Available at: http://www.gov.uk/government/news/reforms-proposed-to-put-consumers-at-the-
heart-of-uk-competition-regime.  Last accessed 6th March 2019.     
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incapacitation and thereby, a reduction in future cartel activity.890  The criminal sanction for 
individual, as has been shown, should pursue retributive crime control objectives in order to 
close the gap in the commitment to legal obedience that cartelists appear to otherwise have, 
and in order to help to build a culture of compliance not so reliant upon legal compulsion in 
the future.  This in turn helps to achieve the overriding competition law goal of consumer 
welfare by working towards the goal of reducing cartel activity over time.  Further, in order to 
avoid the harmful layering effect identified in Chapter 4 of this work, the criminal cartel 
offence should abandon the pursuit of deterrence.891 
 
In order to achieve this the criminal cartel offence would need to be amended again.  The 
potentially disastrous ‘obtaining legal advice’ defence should be removed, and the new 
definition of the offence must be able to define its own outer limits without the need to rely 
upon the civil regime.892  Most importantly of all, it should be defined in such a way as to 
reincorporate an element of moral blameworthiness that goes to the heart of the criminal harm 
of a cartel.  A criminal cartel offence that operates to punish the criminal harm of a cartel would 
not be as reliant upon frequent enforcement for its core objective to be achieved, as is currently 
the case for a criminal sanction that aims to deter.  It would continue to be reserved for the 
most egregious examples of cartel activity, supported by sentencing guidelines.  This would 
help to ensure that terms of imprisonment were actually implemented in practice, would 
provide certainty, and would help to reinforce communication of the seriousness of the offence.  
Any gap in enforcement action against individuals that remained as a result of the relatively 
low number of prosecutions that experience would dictate should be anticipated, would be 
filled by the use of competition disqualification orders.  The work has shown that the most 
impactful enforcement action is that which is directed at individuals, it is therefore crucial that 
tools that can be enforced frequently (the competition disqualification order) and those which 
can punish the very serious, morally blameworthy harm that cartels create (the criminal cartel 
offence).  
 
The successful aspect of the criminal cartel offence is the recognition of a need for 
comprehensive cartel enforcement to target the individuals who create the cartel and bind their 
																																																						
890 The disqualification orders can also help to prevent recidivism.   
891 See, Chapter 4, section 4.2.4.   
892 Earlier in this work it was shown that the contours of the criminal cartel offence as it currently stands are 
defined, in part, by the fact that cartelist will not openly make hard-core anti-competitive agreements, as is 
permitted by section 188 because to do so would invite civil sanctions by way of the Competition Act 1998.   
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undertakings to prohibited agreements.  It recognised a significant gap in enforcement that 
existed and is supported by the academic literature from a variety of sources.  To rearticulate 
the offence so as to re-engage with retributive rationale will help to re-establish the place which 
the cartel offence occupies within the anti-cartel regulatory framework and define it as an 
enforcement tool in its own right.  A criminal offence anchored directly to both the criminal 
policy objectives and ideological foundations that justify intrusion into individual liberty, and 
to the competition law objectives of the landscape in which it must exist will help to ensure 
that it is able to have a greater, and more appreciable impact on the fight against cartels.  This 
must of course, be reinforced by an enforcement strategy in the CMA that understands the 
intricate balance of anti-cartel enforcement, and that is not itself dominated by traditional 
concepts of deterrence.  As it currently stands, the place that the criminal cartel offence 
occupies within the wider anti-cartel regulatory space in the UK is confused and contradictory.  
It was created in the hope of filling a gap in deterrence, when what was required of it was to 
fill a gap in enforcement.  This work has shown however, that unless steps are taken to further 
amend the offence, the gap will remain as wide as it ever was.   
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ANNEX 1: DG Comp letter to Swedish Competition Authority 
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